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This thesis explores the international political dynamics of developing low carbon 
technology. Specifically, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology as a climate 
mitigation strategy in a developing country context is examined. CCS is a technological 
solution that allows for the continued use of fossil fuels without the large amounts of 
associated CO2 emissions. This entails capturing the CO2 emitted from large point sources, 
such as a coal-fired power station, and transporting the captured emissions to be injected 
and stored permanently into geological media. Consequently, CCS is a bridging technology 
that could provide more time for transitioning to a low-carbon economy.  
A case study of India is used, which is an emerging industrialising economy, and is also 
the third-largest coal producer in the world. India faces a dilemma: poverty alleviation and 
infrastructure development to support its billion plus population requires vast amounts of 
energy, which is predominantly based on fossil fuels. Therefore, it was envisioned that CCS 
would be a sustainable option, which could enable industrialisation at the rate required, 
whilst preventing the exacerbation of the negative effects of climate change. However, 
during the period of study (2007-2010), CCS was not embraced by India, despite there 
being a growing impetus to develop, demonstrate and transfer the technology.  
India was reluctant to consider CCS as part of a mitigation strategy, and this thesis 
focuses on the reasons why. An interdisciplinary approach is used, coupling perspectives 
from science, technology and innovation studies (STS) with concepts from International 
Relations (IR) scholarship. This sociotechnical conceptual framework is applied to gain a 
more holistic picture of the failed attempt to transfer CCS technology to India. Key technical 
challenges and blockages are identified within India’s existing energy system, which have 
restricted CCS technology implementation. In addition, the political challenges associated 
with the rejection of CCS by the Indian Government are explored. Empirical evidence is on 
the basis of elite interviews, an expert stakeholder survey and relevant documents. Another 
case study on the Cambay basin is used to further demonstrate the influence of political 
factors on CCS implementation, even in an area considered to have suitable technical 
conditions. The outcomes of this study have implications for policy addressing global 






This study looks at how low-carbon, or green, energy technologies are developed in 
rich countries, which could also be applied in poor countries. The main focus is on Carbon 
Capture and Storage technology, shortened to CCS, which was being developed in rich 
countries such as the UK, Norway, Australia and USA. This technology involves capturing 
carbon dioxide gas, which is a polluting gas that contributes to climate change when it is 
released into the atmosphere. Carbon dioxide is released as a waste product from large 
industrial processes, such as a power station that burns coal to produce electricity. The 
captured carbon dioxide gas is then transported, usually by pipelines, to be stored, or 
injected deep underground, around three kilometres below the surface, so that it does not 
escape into the atmosphere. Good storage locations for captured carbon dioxide can be 
found either on land, or offshore, deep below the surface of the seabed. Many of these 
suitable storage sites are places where oil or natural gas have already been discovered. 
Most countries around the world depend on fossil fuels, such as coal, oil and natural 
gas to produce electricity to power their factories, buildings and homes. Burning fossil fuels 
can be quite a polluting process, therefore CCS can be useful for cutting down the amount of 
carbon dioxide produced by industry and energy sectors. CCS could be especially useful for 
those countries that are less-developed and need a lot of energy to support their 
population. One such country is India, which uses a lot of coal because it is cheap and easily 
available. India needs this fuel to develop its industries, such as steel production, and also 
to produce electricity for powering its cities and villages. Therefore, India and other poor 
countries need cheap and clean energy to help lift their people out of poverty. At the time of 
this study, many experts in rich countries thought that this technology might also be useful 
if applied in India as part of a global effort to combat climate change. 
However, this study found that India was not keen to apply CCS technology. And so, 
this thesis looks at the technical and political reasons why India rejected CCS. This 
information was gathered from a series of interviews and surveys with very senior 
decision-makers in India, as well as technical experts in CCS technologies. The results of this 
study give a good understanding of the realities of the relationships between rich and poor 
countries. The findings also show how important these international relationships are and 
how they can influence key decisions, especially about new technologies which can be 
useful for limiting the effects of climate change. This work is also useful for understanding 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The aspiration to investigate the prospects of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 
technology in India was a timely proposal. A series of events and circumstances 
preceding the actual period of study significantly influenced how this research was 
originally framed. This chapter sets the scene for how the research project came to be, 
and explains the overall rationale behind this thesis. The key research questions and 
objectives are presented and explained, along with a brief outline of how the thesis is 
structured. 
1.1 Background 
This journey started in 2005; at the time I was working at the Environmental 
Change Institute, University of Oxford. We were host to the G8 Energy Workshop, 
where I was first introduced to the idea of CCS technology. This technology entails the 
capturing of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from a point source, such as a fossil-fuel 
based power station, and then transporting the CO2 away from the source to a 
geological storage location, whereby the emissions are kept permanently from entering 
the atmosphere. 2005 was an exciting year for CCS, particularly in a political context. 
For example, there was a strong presence of the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) 
at the G8 workshop, promoting their work on Carbon Abatement Technologies (CATs), 
which included CCS. In addition, the UK held the G8 presidency in 2005; CCS had 
significant political backing from Tony Blair and, this became evident at the Gleneagles 
summit, where the potential of CCS technology development and transfer was on the 
agenda (see UK DECC 2005, p. 5). Notably, the Gleneagles summit hosted not only the 
G8 nations, but also five emerging economies – China, India, Mexico, Brazil and South 
Africa; delegations from these countries were also present at the Energy Workshop in 
Oxford. 
Furthermore, CCS also became significantly more prominent on the global stage in 
2005 via the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), an international 
institution that launched CCS into the international climate change discourse with their 
special report. The report considered CCS “as an option in the portfolio of mitigation 




2005, p. 2). In terms of climate mitigation, the target was large point sources of CO2, 
such as fossil-fuel based electricity generation, hydrocarbon (i.e. oil and natural gas) 
production and processing, or, energy intensive industries such as petrochemical, steel 
and, cement production. The IPCC report described the process as “consisting of the 
separation of CO2 from industrial and energy-related sources, transport to a storage 
location and long-term isolation from the atmosphere” (IPCC 2005, p. 2). Therefore, 
CCS was viewed as a technological solution for tackling climate change, particularly for 
industrializing countries. By December 2005, CCS had formally entered into 
international climate negotiations at the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), where CCS 
methodologies were being discussed under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
(See Dixon et al. 2009). Shortly after, the IPCC released methodologies and guidelines 
for GHG inventories in 2006, including a section on CO2 transport, injection and 
geological storage (see IPCC 2006; Chapter 5).  
Moreover, in the lead up to this study, i.e. 2005-2007, there was tremendous 
activity within various legal fora in order to accommodate and support CCS related 
activities. This included the amendment of the international marine treaty the 1972 
London Convention and its 1996 Protocol, a global agreement that regulates disposal of 
wastes and other matter at sea; the Protocol (1996) was amended in November 2006 
and the ratification came into force by February 2007, allowing the disposal of CO2 in 
offshore geological formations (see Armeni 2011). At the regional level, negotiations 
were taking place during this period to ratify the North-East Atlantic 1992 OSPAR 
treaty, which takes precedence over the London Convention and its Protocol. The 
amendments to the OSPAR treaty, which also permitted the injection of CO2 streams 
into sub-soil geological formations offshore, were adopted in June 2007, and later 
coming into force by 2011 (Ibid.). In addition to the OSPAR treaty, during this period 
the process for delivering a draft European Directive on CCS to the EU Parliament was 
well underway. During my time at Oxford, my path crossed with key academics, 
negotiators and lawyers, all who were either contributing to or, directly involved in, the 




1.1.1 The rise of ‘Chindia’ 
In parallel to the growing international momentum behind CCS, 2005 also marked 
the beginning of significant growth in the gross domestic product (GDP) of certain 
industrialising countries, chiefly China and India. During the years 2005 through to 
2007, India maintained a GDP growth rate of over 9%, generally referred to as the 
period of ‘miracle’ growth, and was often compared to China’s growth rate in double-
digits (see Table 1.1).  
Table 1.1: Annual GDP growth rate from 2005 – 2010 for India and China (source: World 
Bank). 
Year Annual GDP growth rate (%) 
India China 
2005 9.3 11.3 
2006 9.3 12.7 
2007 9.8 14.2 
2008 3.9 9.6 
2009 8.5 9.2 
2010 10.3 10.4 
Therefore, 2005 was the beginning of the twinning of China and India by many 
observers in the West, later to be coined ‘Chindia’ jokingly by Delhi bureaucrats1. The 
media notwithstanding2, a major part of the comparisons between the countries was 
not only to do with economic growth, but also to the inherently linked rise in energy 
                                                             
1 Credit for coining the phrase and popularisation of this term is given to Jairam Ramesh, former 
Minister for Environment & Forests, according to Wikipedia (see: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chindia). However, I personally also heard this term being used 
repeatedly, from various interviewees during my fieldwork in 2008. 
2 For example, see “Will ‘Chindia’ rule the world in 2050, or America after all?” The Telegraph, Feb 






demand. The International Energy Agency (IEA) published a special version of their 
annual World Energy Outlook report in 2007 with specific insights on China and India’s 
energy supply and demand portfolios, primarily to assess the implications for global 
energy security (IEA 2007). Notably, China and India were gaining a reputation as large 
energy consumers and, both of these countries are heavily reliant on fossil fuels to meet 
their energy needs. The IEA report highlighted that given the availability of cheap 
indigenous supplies of coal, it would be the fuel of choice for decades to come (Ibid.). In 
terms of energy demand, it was also noted that “together, the two countries accounted 
for more than half of the estimated global increase in energy use between 2000 and 
2006”, where “coal accounted for 43% of this increase in global energy demand” (Ibid., 
p. 54). This is illustrated in Figure 1.1 below. Also, the IEA’s analysis showed that 
despite indigenous coal resources, the supply would be insufficient to meet increased 
demand at those rates of GDP% growth in Table 1.1, and therefore, oil imports were 
also on the rise for these two countries (Ibid.; see Figure 1.1).  
 
Figure 1.1: Comparison of China and India’s energy demand, along with CO2 emissions over 
the period 2000-2006 (Source: IEA 2007). 
Energy security issues aside, the implications for climate change and GHG 
emissions from this surge in energy demand were a cause for global concern. The CO2 
emissions released by the burning of burning fossil fuels for energy is one of the most 
significant contributors to climate change (IPCC 2007a; IEA 2007). According to the 




2006 came from China and 6% from India,” illustrated in Figure 1.1 (IEA 2007, p. 55). 
In addition, the IEA predicted that China would overtake the USA as the world’s biggest 
CO2 emitter from 2007 onwards (Ibid.). However, the report also noted that in terms of 
energy demand, per-capita emissions in China and India would remain roughly one 
third below member countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) (Ibid.). Therefore, historically and at present, the developed 
world, i.e. OECD-group of countries, are the primary contributors to climate change; 
‘Chinidia’ were set on the pathway in the mid-2000s to become significant polluters of 
the future. 
It is within this context that it was envisioned that CCS would have a very 
significant role in climate mitigation. Given that China and India are considered the 
polluters of the future, this notion of twinning the two nations was supported further 
by the endorsement of CCS in 2006 by the Stern Review on the economics of climate 
change, which noted that: 
“[CCS] is a technology expected to deliver a significant portion of 
the emission reductions. The forecast growth in emissions from 
coal, especially in China and India, means CCS technology has 
particular importance.” (Stern 2006, p. 419)3 
The Stern report went on further to stress that a “failure to develop viable CCS 
technology, while traditional fossil fuel generation is deployed across the globe, risks 
locking-in a high emissions trajectory” (Stern 2006, p. 419). Notably, the drive to 
develop CCS came predominantly from the West, however it was anticipated that once 
demonstrated to be viable, it could be deployed in developing countries4. This involves 
the process of technology transfer, which in the context of this study implies the 
                                                             
3 Emphasis added. 
4 For the purposes of this thesis, developing countries are broadly defined as those regions that were 
formerly colonised by Western powers; they have been late to industrialise and sustain very high 
levels of poverty: Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and South America (Burnell & Randall 
2007). It is also important to distinguish between less developed countries (LDCs), such as parts of 
sub-Saharan and central Africa, and ‘economies in transition’, which are chiefly Brazil, China, India, 




movement of technology from one country to another. Furthermore, this became 
evident in not only the strategic interests declared at Gleneagles 2005, but also within 
various UK Government reports on CCS and discussions within Westminster: 
“Post-combustion [capture] is the most globally relevant 
technology. It can be used with existing and planned coal-fired 
stations globally, and can also be retro-fitted, tackling emissions 
from power stations that will be in operation for 30-40 years—vital 
in combating climate change and relevant particularly to China 
and India.” (Memorandum 10, Select Committee on Science & 
Technology, UK House of Commons 2007)5 
Therefore, from the outset there were very strong political and economic drivers 
behind the development of CCS technology, with the view of ‘Chindia’ as a potentially 
significant market. It is these sociotechnical aspects of the proposal to implement CCS 
in India that the thesis examines. 
1.2 Research Objectives, Rationale & Questions  
CCS technology and its implementation is the central topic of this research project 
and, the developing country context chosen as the focus for this thesis is India. As 
discussed below, India is at high risk from the dangerous impacts of climate change, yet 
heavily dependent on fossil fuels. The substantial differences between the challenges 
faced by China and India during the study period also suggest that the twinning of 
China and India at the time of this study by UK policymakers (see Chapter 4) was an 
oversimplification. Therefore, in addition to seeking an explanation for India’s 
reluctance to embrace CCS, a part of this research also aims to explore the unique 
Indian context in depth as a means for highlighting both technical and social challenges. 
The overriding objective of this research is to contribute to the wider academic 
deliberation on the global transition to sustainable energy systems, and in 
particular, to demonstrate how the integral role of international and domestic 
politics in processes of technology development can be more robustly 
represented in theories of sociotechnical systems. 
                                                             




1.2.1 Evolution of Research Questions 
Given the urgency to reduce carbon emissions, and India’s ambition to build very 
large coal-fired power stations, an attempt to identify sites in India that may have 
potential for early CCS demonstration projects was the original objective of this thesis. 
Therefore, initial research questions aimed to assess both key technical and 
policy/legal blockages & barriers within the existing systems in India and, how to 
overcome them for potential demonstration plants.  
However, within the first four months of the study, it became quite apparent that 
CCS in India was first and foremost a political subject. This was an observation made 
during preliminary fieldwork, specifically noting the international stance taken by the 
Indian Government at the DEFRA workshop in 2008, which I attended, along with my 
principal supervisor. The political dimensions of this topic dominated this first fieldtrip 
almost entirely. Rather than focusing on the technical challenges involved for the 
transfer of CCS from a one country to another, the Indian Government made it very 
clear that they were not interested in implementation or demonstration of the 
technology in India. It was at this point that this study took a more social and political 
turn, in response to the findings from this initial fieldwork. 
1.2.2 Rationale & Questions 
If we regard the Earth’s atmosphere as the global commons, then by that respect 
the increase in GHG gases, which causes climate change, should be an issue of global 
concern. That being the case, then climate change mitigation requires collective action 
by countries, both developed and developing. However, how does one reconcile the 
political differences between state actors? Particularly as the impacts of climate change 
are not universal and are dependent on unique country contexts, which are influenced 
by physical and human geographical elements, e.g. natural resources, history, culture, 
political economy etc. Therefore a comprehensive understanding of country contexts, 
in addition to the political relationships between state actors is a crucial aspect of the 




Moreover, an important element of the international climate change debate is the 
development of environmentally sustainable technologies for both mitigation of, and, 
adaptation to climate change (see IPCC 2007b; IPCC 2007c; de Coninck 2009). 
Therefore, technological innovation and development have a key role in terms of 
combating climate change, and the work of de Coninck (2009) illustrates that indeed, 
technology-oriented international agreements provide greater incentive for countries, 
and are more likely to encourage effective collective action: 
“[Such agreements] could provide benefits for all Parties involved. 
An agreement on technology development, diffusion and transfer 
would provide for greater innovation and global markets for 
countries with an outlook on technological leadership.” (de 
Coninck 2009, p. 212) 
The statement above is written in the context of technology transfer, because in 
terms of technological innovation, again, not all countries are on an even footing; 
developed countries typically have more advanced technological systems, therefore an 
important factor of climate change mitigation will involve the movement and flow of 
technology between countries. 
Furthermore, there is also the issue that ‘technology’ cannot be considered in the 
simplistic terms of its physical components, e.g. pipelines, turbines etc. Other 
components include social aspects such as institutions, regulations, market, culture etc. 
In this regard, technology is best viewed as sociotechnical. This perspective allows for 
an holistic approach and is essential if the technology is to be developed and diffused in 
multiple country contexts, even more so if it is to be part of an effective process for 
combating climate change. In this context, the thesis’s two overarching research 







Q. 1: Why did the attempted transfer of CCS technology to India not occur during the 
period 2007-2010? 
  
Q. 1(a): What were the specific technical challenges that ultimately prevented CCS 
technology transfer to India?  
 
Q. 2: Can we better understand this lack of adoption by using a sociotechnical 
system analysis in conjunction with theories of international relations? 
 
Q. 2(a): How did the UK/developed world framing of the CCS technological system 
influence the process of attempting to implement CCS in India during the period 
2007-10? 
 
Q. 2(b): What are the principal social and political factors that prevented CCS from being 
considered as a viable climate mitigation option in India? 
1.2.3 Research Contribution 
This thesis argues that there are three fundamental elements which frame the 
problem of developing CCS technology for climate mitigation as illustrated in Figure 1.2 
(also discussed more expansively in Chapter 2). Firstly, there is the issue of defining 
CCS technology in sociotechnical terms in order to understand its innovation and 
development. Secondly, if CCS is truly intended to be implemented widely across the 
globe for climate mitigation purposes, then international dimensions and developing 
country contexts must be considered. Therefore technology transfer processes, 
traditionally from developed to developing countries, also become a key factor. Lastly, 
but just as important, is the third element of the State and its relationship with 
technology, which in turn also influences its relationship with other states, given that 





Figure 1.2: Schematic diagram of research rationale, including key elements of technology, 
technology transfer and states, all which are significant factors for implementing CCS. 
In line with the concept shown in Figure 1.2, a sociotechnical approach is applied to 
the prospect of CCS implementation, in order to understand the challenges. Moreover, 
where the limits of the sociotechnical approach are reached, this thesis also considers 
approaches generally more associated with the political sciences.  A key contribution of 
this thesis is, therefore, the combination of insights from political science with a 
sociotechnical approach to provide a more robust model of the integral role of politics 
in processes of technology development. 
1.3 India’s Challenges 
Presently, developing countries are faced with a major dilemma: they have to cope 
with the adverse impacts of climate change and consider whether they should take 
action to mitigate the risk of more extreme impacts in the future while at the same time 
reducing poverty. For example, at the start of the study period, statistics from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA 2007) and the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP 2007/2008) indicated that there were still roughly 2.5 billion 
people in developing countries who rely heavily on traditional cooking fuels, and 




India is a developing country that illustrates the nature of this challenge. According 
to the IEA and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), it was home to more 
than a quarter of the world’s poor and accounted for roughly 50% of energy 
impoverished people who have a high dependence on traditional cooking fuels, and for 
31% of people without access to electricity (IEA 2007; UNDP 2007/2008). Economic 
development and the fulfilment of basic human needs such as education, sanitation, 
health and communication are critically dependent on the availability of modern 
energy services. For this reason, improved living standards in India are inherently 
linked with an increase in energy demand. This rise in energy demand has led to an 
increase in India’s overall CO2 emissions since the vast majority of the increase in 
energy demand has, so far, been met by increased use of fossil fuels. Over 70% of 
India’s carbon emissions are associated with the burning of fossil fuels, with a 
significant proportion of these associated with coal-fired power plants. In terms of 
electricity, India had roughly 138GW of installed capacity, where roughly 70% was 
generated by thermal power plants, 25% by hydro and 5% from other renewables, 
mostly wind (IEA 2007).   
Alongside these development challenges, developing (and developed) countries 
focus significant efforts on maintaining ‘energy security.’ Energy security can be used to 
refer to a broad range of issues including providing sufficient supply capacity to meet 
demand, security of reliable access to primary fuel to be used within a country and 
diversity of supply, which is sometimes seen as a proxy for security of access since it is 
assumed that multiple supply chains are less likely to fail simultaneously (UNDP 2004).  
Each definition of energy security brings with it a wide range of factors that must be 
carefully considered within energy system planning. For example, the United Nations 




“…The availability of energy at all times in various forms, in 
sufficient quantities, and at affordable prices, without unacceptable 
or irreversible impact on the environment. These conditions must 
prevail over the long term if energy is to contribute to sustainable 
development. Energy security has both a producer and consumer 
side.”   
Nevertheless, the term ‘energy security’ can have an even more complex meaning in 
the developing world context. Sethi (2009, p. 20) argues that the increased use of 
commercial energy by those who currently use more than a ‘sufficient’ quantity simply 
because they can afford to do so, threatens the “very existence of those who never used 
it in the first place, or used it in insufficient quantities and at unreasonable prices.” 
Therefore, in the context of developing countries, such as India, ‘energy security’ can 
have strong overtones of equity and can imply a “moral responsibility towards 
reversing the historic impact on our global commons6” (Ibid., p. 21). 
The Government of India is committed to the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs)7, which requires a significant increase in the proportion of the population with 
reliable access to energy.  This will be a significant challenge since India has the world’s 
largest concentration of poor people – over 830 million Indians lived below $2/day, 
where roughly 370 million of those lived in abject poverty on less than $1/day (UNDP 
2007/2008). In terms of energy, over 600 million Indians lived without electricity, and 
over 700 million still used traditional biomass as the primary fuel for cooking (IEA 
2007). The responsibility for providing the energy for cooking through traditional 
biomass, notably, falls upon women and their daughters, who spend a total of 80 billion 
hours each year collecting firewood (Gibbs 2008). This dependence on biomass for 
cooking and heating causes more than 400,000 premature deaths (mostly women and 
children) in India annually, partly due to poor indoor air quality associated with 
                                                             
6 The ‘global commons’ is anything that no single entity or person controls and that is central to life.  
It draws on the use of shared ‘common’ land for grazing animals, where it is likely that everyone will 
want more than their ‘fair share’ of the land and the commons are then likely to be damaged for all. 
7 United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals represent a global partnership to achieve eight 
international development goals by 2015, including poverty alleviation, education, gender equality 




traditional use of biomass (IEA 2007). A number of measures are planned including 
improving and expanding infrastructure for providing electricity.   
India’s efforts to alleviate poverty are, however, being undermined by vulnerability 
to climate change. A particular concern for India is that agriculture accounts for around 
one third of India’s Gross National Product (GNP) and directly employs more than 60% 
of the Indian population (Gibbs 2008). Around 70% of India’s population lives in rural 
areas and recent studies have shown that access to electricity is least among 
agricultural labourers (Gupta 2009). The Indian Government plans to invest heavily in 
the rural sectors, seeking to achieve more than 4% agricultural growth according to the 
draft paper for the 11th national plan, which ran from 2007 to 2012 (Gibbs 2008). The 
most recent review of the IPCC on likely impacts of dangerous climate change 
highlighted that India’s agriculture and natural resources could be subject to extreme 
changes, posing a major threat to the livelihoods of millions of people (IPCC 2007b). 
For example, Himalayan glaciers are amongst the fastest retreating in the world.  
Glacial meltwater is crucial to Indian agriculture since it feeds the major rivers on the 
sub-continent and accounts for 37% of India’s irrigated land.  It is possible that changes 
in this glacial meltwater will cause water shortages for 500 million people (IPCC 
2007b). 
A high proportion of India’s energy comes from coal.  To reduce dependence on coal 
and increase diversity, Indian policymakers are taking a growing interest in promoting 
energy efficiency and renewables.  Although these measures can be expected to reduce 
emissions of greenhouse gases compared to use of fossil fuels for energy supply, a key 
driver for this alternative choice is to try to reduce security of supply concerns related 
to the country’s escalating fuel needs (TERI 2006). The Indian Government also sees a 
significant role for coal in the future, and is investing in coal-fired Ultra-Mega Power 
Plants (UMPP)8. It was expected that these plants would come online after 2012 
(Chikkatur & Sagar 2009). 
                                                             




1.4 Thesis Structure 
The thesis comprises of eight chapters in total, including this introductory chapter. 
Chapter Two discusses key theories from the social sciences related to technology, its 
development and, transfer. These theoretical concepts largely derive from the field of 
science and technology studies (STS). However, as discussed within the previous 
sections of this chapter, quite early on in the research it became apparent that the 
political dynamics of CCS in India dominated the discourse. Therefore, the relationship 
between politics and technology is crucial, which in essence adds another dimension to 
the theoretical framework of this study. Given the international aspects of CCS 
implementation, there is a critical analysis and discussion of STS concepts in light of 
international development and technology transfer, along with a review of key 
concepts from international relations (IR) political theory. Combined, these concepts 
are used to frame the interdisciplinary approach used throughout this thesis. 
Chapter Three presents the methods chosen to gather evidence in relation to the 
research questions presented above and the theoretical approaches discussed in 
Chapter Two. Given the nature of the study, the evidence base is almost entirely formed 
by gathering qualitative data by means of in-depth interviews, participant observation 
and an expert survey. This is supported by documentary evidence from various 
government publications and documentation from international bodies, plus peer-
reviewed research publications.  
The main empirical chapters are Four, Five, Six and Seven. Chapter Four focuses on 
CCS technology itself; describing the various components that involve capturing CO2 
emissions, transporting them and storing them permanently in geological structures, 
and when integrated, form the CCS technological chain. This chapter also explores the 
main drivers for developing this technology and why the UK specifically took the lead 
during the study period. 
Chapter Five explores in detail the Indian context, specifically looking at India’s 
history, the legacy of colonialism, and how the current energy system evolved. This 




of technology receptivity and capability for further R&D on large-scale initiatives such 
as CCS.  
Chapter Six looks at the feasibility of CCS in India, though exclusively within an 
international context, highlighting the political challenges. This chapter draws upon 
data gathered during various field trips, including from the UNFCCC COP15 at 
Copenhagen in 2009, as well as survey material. The focus is on India’s international 
stance on CCS and the reasoning behind it, bringing in elements of international 
environmental law and India’s overall approach to climate change. 
Chapter Seven also looks at the feasibility of CCS in India, but the emphasis is on the 
challenges at the domestic level. The focus in this chapter is on India-specific factors, 
which will need to be considered first, even if conditions (discussed in Chapter Six) 
become favourable at the international level. These include sensitive issues such as 
security and corruption associated with coal-mining areas. A case study of Cambay 
Basin is included in this chapter to illustrate a context where opportunities for CCS are 
more promising, but also highlights some of the challenges still remaining. 
Chapter Eight is the final chapter, which draws conclusions in light of the research 
questions discussed above. This chapter also includes a section reflecting upon the 
overall research process, particularly in terms of the scope of interdisciplinary 




Chapter 2: Conceptualising Technology and Politics in 
Relation to Climate Change 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews theoretical approaches and concepts from social science 
literatures relevant to technology, and the various social processes that influence its 
development. In terms of the development and transfer of CCS in the Indian context, 
this review draws specifically upon concepts relating to technological change and 
technology transfer, as well as the political influences on these processes. The overall 
aim of the review is to identify and discuss the most relevant existing scholarship in 
order to provide a theoretical framework for this thesis. 
All the elements of our present lifestyle are powered by burning fossil fuels. This 
produces carbon emissions meaning that the development, implementation and use of 
technology is often viewed as the main contributor to climate change. Yet, it can also 
form part of the solution by reducing emissions through a combination of low-carbon 
technologies such as: efficient combustion technologies, storing CO2 emissions in 
depleted oil and gas fields, and harnessing clean renewable energy such as solar or 
wind. Therefore, technological change, i.e. either the development or decline of 
technology, will significantly feature in the global effort to tackle the adverse effects of 
climate change. However, because our current global energy, transport and food 
production systems are still entirely dependent on fossil fuel technologies, this will 
entail undertaking profound structural changes to our infrastructure. Therefore, a suite 
of technologies, including Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), could potentially mitigate 
the effects of climate change by cutting emissions from fossil fuel use, and help us move 
to a more low-carbon economy.  
However, there are peculiar characteristics associated in particular with low-
carbon technologies, adding complexity to their development and diffusion. 
Specifically, Ockwell & Mallet (2012, p. 7) point to three key issues that need to be 
considered when looking at the transfer of a technology such as CCS to a developing 
country such as India. Firstly, the potential impacts of dangerous climate change 




technologies would need to be developed and diffused quickly in order to allow us to 
mitigate or adapt. Secondly, given that time is imperative, facilitating low carbon 
technology transfer requires policies and incentives despite “the absence of an obvious 
market”, in order to deliver “a global good” (Ibid.). Thirdly, many low-carbon 
technologies have yet to be developed commercially. Therefore, not only is there the 
task of getting beyond the research and development (R&D) phase by overcoming 
“high-levels of investor risk”, but also there is a need “to adapt technologies to new 
contexts” for successful transfer (Ibid.). This last point is particularly relevant for CCS 
technology transfer to developing countries because presently the majority of R&D is 
carried out in those developed countries with historically fossil fuel based energy 
systems and the expertise in relevant sectors (e.g. oil and gas exploration, pipeline 
technology for gas transport or power plant design). Moreover, the current CCS R&D is 
supported under established institutional and regulatory frameworks specific to those 
countries, including the UK. 
Technological change, its innovation processes, its transfer and its role in social 
change, is a subject of interest amongst multiple disciplines within the social sciences, 
including economics, geography, history, psychology and sociology (e.g. Abraham 1998; 
Castells 2000; Lall & Urata 2003; MacLeod & Kumar 1995; Talalay et al. 1997). The 
literature on this subject is large and diverse. For the purposes of this thesis, insights 
are drawn largely from science and technology studies (STS). This is because CCS is 
currently in the pre-commercial stage meaning the initial innovation and development 
processes, which form a significant part of the empirical core of STS theories, are 
important to consider in relation to the empirical material of this thesis. A number of 
analytical frameworks based on STS concepts have been used to analyse technological 
change motivated by environmental and sustainability concerns (see van den Bergh et 
al. 2011). Insights from this field contribute to the understanding of technology that 
goes beyond the usual science and engineering lens. Outcomes from this particular 
approach are useful for informing a variety of policies and strategies on issues such as 
economics, innovation and sustainable development. 
Section 2.2 explores some of the STS approaches for understanding and explaining 




transitions theory, which is generally associated with major societal shifts in sectors 
such as transport, agriculture and energy. In the context of this thesis, CCS is conceived 
of by some key actors as part of a transition from a carbon intensive energy system to a 
low-carbon energy system. However, given the three unique aspects of low-carbon 
technology transfer discussed above, combined with CCS R&D largely taking place in 
specific developed countries, the developing country context is missing. Therefore, a 
broader approach is taken by linking STS concepts with insights from international 
development (Section 2.3) and international relations (IR) theories (Section 2.4). This 
is because transitions theory largely draws upon a developed country empirical base, 
generally neglecting phenomena such as polarisation9 in a globally interconnected 
world, or socio-economic and political differences between the developed and 
developing world. 
2.2 Technology, Innovation and CCS 
This section draws upon concepts from a wide body of literature on STS, which 
centre on innovation and technological change. STS is itself a cross-disciplinary field 
and includes a diversity of approaches from sociology, economics, human geography 
and history (e.g. Bijker et al. 1990; Lundvall 1992; Foray & Freeman 1993; Hughes 
2004). STS ideas are discussed and used as a means to illustrate the complexities 
associated with commercially developing CCS, which is shown to have multiple and 
mixed identities. 
2.2.1 Defining Technology 
Technology is more than a set of tangible objects, artefacts or tools, which “by 
themselves have no power; they do nothing” (Geels 2004a, p. 1). Rather, it is “only in 
association with human agency, social structures and organisations do artefacts fulfil 
functions” (Ibid.), and therefore is a product of “material and socio-cultural 
configuring” (Rip & Kemp 1998, p. 329). As a result, modern technology consists of a 
“cluster of elements”, including artefacts, user practices, cultural meaning, markets, 
                                                             
9 O’Bryne & Hensby (2011, p. 2) describe ‘polarization’ as the “process of increasingly apparent 




regulation, infrastructure, maintenance and supply networks (Geels 2004b, p. 19), 
which are all organized into “a configuration that works” (Rip & Kemp 1998, p. 330). 
Figure 2.1 illustrates this conceptualization of technology, and this diagram is used 
further in Chapter Four in the context of CCS technology. This description not only 
views technology as a social construct, which cannot be separated from society, but is 
also grounded in a systemic way of thinking, i.e. where a system is composed of units 
and their interactions, or relationships. This concept highlights the interlinking 
technical and social aspects of a sociotechnical system (Hughes, 1983).  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Schematic diagram of technology as viewed through a sociotechnical lens. 
 
Consequently, this social constructivist approach regards human relations and 
societies as being integral to shaping technological systems because not only are people 
the creators of technology but also collectively, as a society, they influence the 
development of the technology. For example, the public acceptance (or unacceptance) 
of nuclear technology forced developers to redesign their systems, particularly for 




society is also continually being shaped by advances in technology, such as the various 
industrial revolutions over time – starting with steam engines on to electricity 
networks and through to Information Technology and the digital revolution (Hughes 
2004). Therefore, technology is “both socially constructed and society shaping” 
(Hughes 1990, p. 51) and can be viewed as the materialized product of “interconnected 
political, social, or economic interests, norms, or identities” (Fritsch 2011, p. 32). 
Moreover, historical studies on the social construction of technology (SCOT) have 
shown that different social groups perceive artefacts in different ways, and this in turn 
influences how the artefact is developed further. This idea of “interpretive flexibility”, 
developed by Pinch & Bijker (1990, p. 40), was empirically-based on the development 
of bicycles in the nineteenth century, where the design and functionality was 
influenced by, for example, women and elderly men, who prioritized safety over 
everything else (Ibid. p. 42). The social constructivist approach is therefore useful to 
consider when analysing low-carbon technology transfer because: 
“[Such] technologies will be widely adopted not simply because 
they successfully harness technical principles, but also if their form 
and function are ‘aligned’ with dominant social practices, or offer 
opportunities to realize new practices that are attractive in 
particular social and geographical settings.” (Ockwell & Mallet 
2012, p. 10)  
The specific historical and cultural context, as well as the current social norms of 
developing countries, must be taken into consideration when transferring low-carbon 
technologies. Accordingly, in its Fourth Assessment Report the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines technology in the context of climate change 
mitigation as “the practical application of knowledge to achieve particular tasks that 
employs both technical artefacts (hardware, equipment) and (social) information 
(‘software, know-how for production and use of artefacts)” (IPCC 2007, p. 107).  
2.2.2 Defining CCS Technology 
CCS technology, as defined within this thesis, comprises of all aspects of the 




includes the skills necessary to install and operate the technology (including 
infrastructures, division of labour, and cultural norms) and ways of managing the 
situations in which they can be handled productively. Furthermore, CCS is far more 
complex than many other low-carbon technologies, and is in essence composed of three 
different technological systems linked together forming a much larger system. This 
includes the capture, transport and storage aspects of the CCS chain (see Chapter 4). 
For example, if low-carbon technologies were to be defined in terms of solely their 
material artefacts, such as a wind turbines or solar power, then CCS is composed of a 
suite of technologies that have to be linked together in order to serve its purpose. An 
illustration of these inter-linking technologies, based on the STS conceptualisation in 
Figure 2.1, can be found in Chapter Four (Section 4.3, Figure 4.6), which discusses the 
sociotechnical challenges of defining CCS in more detail.  
Even though the capture, transport and storage aspects of the CCS chain contain 
components that are developed and established technologies in their own right10, they 
have yet to be tested at scale. It is only when all aspects of their technological systems 
(including the social aspects, or ‘software’ as discussed in Section 2.2.1) are integrated, 
that they serve the purpose of climate change mitigation. Furthermore, as highlighted 
in the previous section, the social constructivist approach to technology implies that 
various social groups can define CCS differently. At this stage, CCS is still open to 
interpretation by different countries. For example, R&D activities in the US are 
exploring the possibility of developing CCS technologies in such a way where CO2 could 
be used to further hydrocarbon production (USDOE 2012a) or as a chemical feedstock 
to produce other materials (USDOE 2012b). Accordingly, in the US the technology is 
referred to as Carbon Capture Utilization and Storage (CCUS). These multiple identities 
of CCS illustrate the complexities associated with the technology and have influenced 
its development trajectory. This issue of sociotechnical complexity is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Four, which explores CCS technology in more depth. 
                                                             
10 For example, CO2 capture in gasification processes; transport of CO2 for the food and drink 




2.2.3 Technological Change & Innovation 
When a radical invention11 is successfully developed, and is then commercially 
deployed, it goes through a process of ‘innovation’. Years of research have shown that 
working, re-working with, existing knowledge, rather than generating new knowledge, 
is the principal activity in innovation (see Fagerberg et al. 2005). Based on the work of 
sociologist Joseph Schumpter, innovations can be classified “according to how radical 
they are compared to current technology” (Fagerberg 2005, p. 7). The literature also 
distinguishes between the different types of innovation: radical innovations involve 
“the introduction of a totally new type of machinery” that does something in a 
completely new way; and a “cluster” of such innovations, which combined, can have a 
far-reaching impact on society, creating “technological revolutions” (Ibid.). There are 
also “incremental” or “marginal” innovations that involve modest changes to make 
“continuous improvements” to existing technology (Ibid.). Lundvall et al. (1992) discuss 
how the cumulative effect of incremental innovations can have just as high an impact as 
radical innovations. It is important to consider this differentiation of innovation when 
it comes to defining CCS technology (see Chapter 4). 
Crucial for these innovations are the interactions between organisations and firms, 
and can be understood as the outcomes of innovation systems (see Freeman 1987; 
Edquist & McKelvey 2000; Fagerberg et al. 2005). Traditionally, innovation studies 
have been viewed as “the creation, diffusion and use of new ideas applied in the 
economy” (Lundvall et al. 2003, p. 2). Note, the emphasis is on the economy, which is 
presently at odds with issues such as climate change and sustainable development for 
industrialising nations such as India. 
The innovation systems approach is about exploring the roles of actors and the 
institutions involved, where Freeman (1987) defines innovation systems as “the 
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, modify and diffuse new technologies.” Also, the innovation system 
                                                             
11 The Oxford Handbook of Innovation differentiates between ‘invention’ and ‘innovation’: 
“Invention is the first occurrence of an idea for a new product or process, while innovation is the first 




consists of “elements and relationships which interact in the production, diffusion and 
use of new, economically useful knowledge … and are either located within or rooted 
inside the borders of a nation state” Lundvall (1992, p. 3). This ‘national system of 
innovation’ (NSI) approach has been used to determine the relationship between 
research and economic processes in developed countries, with emphasis on learning 
and interactions between firms and knowledge institutions (e.g. universities, technical 
institutes and schools) (OECD 1997; Archibugi & Michie 1998).  
Consequently, a very large amount of empirical evidence has been generated, which 
can now be used as a guide to determine what does and does not work in terms of 
fostering successful innovation for commercial and economic gain (see Lundvall 1992; 
Foray & Freeman 1993; Archibugi & Michie 1998; OECD 2006). The key insight from 
these studies is that the ‘innovative capacity’, defined as the ability to “adopt, adapt, 
develop, deploy and operate technologies effectively” (Ockwell & Mallet 2012, p. 8) is 
linked to specific contexts and/or locations, almost exclusively in developed countries. 
Other than the few notable exceptions, such as the work of Muchie et al. (2003) on 
African innovation systems, and Edquist & Hommen’s (2006) research on small 
economies in Asia, the empirical base for the NSI approach is predominantly from a 
developed country context.  
Innovation scholars themselves admit that their contribution stems from “a 
minority of small countries which may be characterized as culturally homogenous and 
socio-economically coherent systems (Sweden, Denmark and Norway)” (Lundvall 
1992, p. 3)i. The country context matters because historical events influence a nation-
state’s technological pathways (e.g. Hughes 1983). As with all nation-states, India has a 
complex history, and like many developing countries, its colonial past has a huge 
bearing upon its socio-economic systems, which in turn impacts its innovation and 
technological systems (MacLeod & Kumar 1995; Abraham 1998; Josephson 2006: 148-
196). Moreover, ‘national’ concepts are becoming increasingly challenged in a world 
that is characterised by international trade, globalisation and transnational innovation 
(Lall 1984; Talalay et al. 1997; Fritsch 2011; Ravenhill 2011).  
Nevertheless, the NSI method has relevance because certain factors “remain local 




and learning” (Lundvall 2003, p. 4). This means that different countries have different 
innovative capabilities, thus impacting the rate at which they acquire technology.  In 
addition, there is a linking between scientific and technical progress with economic 
growth and international trade. This implies that national governments need to include 
innovation or research & development (R&D) policy as a key part of their wider 
economic/welfare policy. This is why the NSI analytical framework features in the 
development literature, because it also has relevance for developing countries and 
their acquisition of modern technology, i.e. technology transfer (Archibugi & Lundvall 
2002; Muchie et al. 2003). This STS concept is linked with the development literature in 
Section 2.3, and later, with India’s historical energy context in Chapter Five. 
2.2.4 The Peculiarity of CCS Innovation 
Innovation system concepts do not necessarily have to be restricted within national 
geographic boundaries; they have also been analysed at the regional level (Doloreux & 
Parto 2005), the sectoral level (Malerba 2002; Winskel 2002) and at the technology 
specific level (Jacobsson & Johnson 2000; Bergek et al. 2006). The latter approach, 
known as the Technological Innovation System (TIS) first developed by Jacobsson & 
Johnson (2000) has been applied to the development of renewable energy 
technologies. The TIS framework consists of a set of functions with a focus on 
entrepreneurial activities and relevant policies to support them, such as knowledge 
diffusion through networks or the mobilising of resources for knowledge production 
(Hekkert et al 2007).  
This particular approach has also been applied to CCS because the TIS framework 
transcends geographical and sectoral boundaries, which encapsulates attributes of CCS 
technology. For example, capture technologies exist mainly within the power sector, 
and injection of CO2 requires expertise from the hydrocarbon industry; CO2 can be 
captured in one country and transported to be stored in another (e.g. US/Canada 
collaboration on the Weyburn project, see Table 4.2, Chapter Four). The TIS approach 
has been used by researchers to explore the roles of actors and institutions within the 
CCS innovation system in countries that are actively developing CCS technologies, 
mainly the USA, Canada, Norway, the Netherlands and Australia (van Alphen et al. 




CCS innovation system; all the countries that were analysed had substantial academic-
based knowledge generation and diffusion, though market formation for the technology 
and entrepreneurial activity were considered to be the weakest aspects (van Alphen et 
al. 2009; van Alphen et al. 2010).  
However, the TIS concept puts a lot of emphasis on ‘bottom-up’ dynamics and the 
entrepreneurial aspect that is normally seen in renewable and small-scale single 
technologies (e.g. Hekkert & Negro 2009). Therefore, it can be argued that TIS might 
not be the appropriate method to analyse a technology such as CCS, mainly because of 
its association with existing large-scale technological systems and the need for state-
determined development due to the high capital costs; top-down policies may leave 
very little room for entrepreneurial activity. It is this aspect that separates CCS 
technology from other low-carbon technologies (e.g. fuel cells, wind turbines, biofuels, 
electric vehicles etc.). 
CCS technologies are linked with mature energy systems, such as centralised power 
stations, transmission and distribution networks, and fossil fuel exploration and 
production. These, in essence are technologies that have over time evolved and 
expanded into very large-scale and complex systems, generally characterised by large 
firms (e.g. electric utilities and oil companies) and established markets and fiscal 
policies (e.g. tax regimes and subsidies). Research has shown that such systems are 
prone to ‘system entrapment’. This system inertia, when put in the context of 
technological systems responsible for ‘climate forcing emissions’, is referred to as 
‘carbon lock-in’, a term coined by Gregory C. Unruh (2000). Meaning that in the case of 
those sectors relating to energy, carbon lock-in is prevalent, therefore making changes 
to them very difficult (see Walker 2000, Unruh 2000; Unruh & Carillo-Hermosilla 
2006). Walker’s description of system entrapment can be applied to the current 




“The timely death – and effective adaptation – of technologies (and 
of technology paths) cannot be taken for granted where large 
technology systems are involved. It can be ignored least of all 
where complex products and infrastructures are being constructed 
over long periods, and where states are heavily involved for 
whichever reasons. In those contexts, the unfit can attract huge 
investment and can survive long after they should have been sent 
to the grave.” (Walker 2000, p. 834) 
In addition, Walker also emphasises the role of the champions of the technology, 
who “can make it their business to reduce diversity”, especially when there are scarce 
resources – “sometimes to the extent of creating technological monocultures, in their 
efforts to secure the survival of their organisations and their preferred solutions” 
(Ibid.). He argues that developed countries are already locked into a carbon economy, 
and the diffusion of low-carbon technologies is restricted, despite their obvious 
environmental or economic advantages, political and economic actors will resist 
bringing them in (Ibid.).  
Moreover, in the context of CCS technology transfer to India, Unruh & Carillo-
Hermosilla’s analysis (2006) on ‘globalizing carbon lock-in’ is even more appropriate. 
Even though the original concept of carbon lock-in is based on “a condition that has 
arisen through the historic development path followed by industrialized countries”, 
large transition economies such as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa), are, according to Unruh & Carillo-Hermosilla (2006), unlikely to escape carbon 
lock-in, suggesting that there will be a “transfer of carbon lock-in” (p. 1187). This is 
partly because these transition economies tend to have development strategies that 
involve “accelerated construction of key industrial infrastructures” over the coming 




“[These] countries are promoting rapid industrialization through 
the adoption of policies, regulatory frameworks, and development 
strategies that have proven successful in industrial countries… In 
this context, fossil fuel-based energy technologies appear to be 
proven, low relative cost solutions that can respond to the demands 
of rapid industrialization and quickly provide needed power.” 
(Ibid., p. 1188)12 
On that account, it could be argued that CCS technologies will only perpetuate the 
use of fossil fuels. This not only takes away crucial resources for developing 
alternatives, but also provides less incentive to choose them, and therefore exacerbates 
the problem of carbon lock-in (Unruh & Carillo-Hermosilla 2006; Greenpeace 2008; 
Markusson & Haszeldine 2010). It can also be argued that, given rapid industrialisation 
based on fossil fuels is the priority, there is a stronger case for CCS technology to 
mitigate emissions for such countries. 
Furthermore, analysis by Shackley & Thompson (2012) indicates that there can be 
different degrees to carbon lock-in, where there are ‘high-risk’ and ‘low-risk’ carbon 
lock-in pathways for developing CCS technologies (p. 104). Their analysis shows that it 
is possible to eventually escape carbon lock-in, provided that it is ‘shallow’ or low-
carbon risk, which involves constructing new plants that are already fitted for CCS 
capabilities, or have a mandate that they will be able to use CCS within five to ten years 
(Ibid., p. 119). For this to occur there needs to be strong market signals as well as 
political will, both of which are currently absent, even for developed countries that are 
actively investing in CCS R&D (see GCCSI 2011; UKERC 2012). Even so, both Walker 
and Unruh agree that the ill-suited technology will always lose, and that lock-in only 
delays an inevitable technological transition, though “by definition, it is then already 
too late” (Walker 2000, p. 834).  
There are certain issues about CCS innovation in particular that need to be drawn 
out of the above discussion on lock-in. Firstly, CCS is difficult to define in terms of 
innovation. Is it just an ‘add on’ technology to an existing system, or in other words, an 
incremental innovation? Or is it a radical or revolutionary innovation, whereby its 
                                                             




introduction may have a very far reaching impact? For example, if CCS is developed to 
maintain the status quo in terms of power generation, and deployed to just cut CO2 
emissions, then it can be viewed as an incremental innovation. On the other hand, CCS 
technologies could potentially promote a shift towards a hydrogen economy, especially 
if technologies such as Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) are coupled with 
a CCS system. Shackley & Thompson (2012) point out that there are “radical changes 
implicit in a shift to hydrogen as a major fuel carrier,” and therefore suggest: 
“CCS could be an element in the technological shift towards low- 
and zero-carbon technologies through being integral to 
technological innovation around hydrogen, the supply of which 
could ultimately come from renewable energy sources.” (Ibid., p.  
112)13 
Notwithstanding, the question remains that at this stage it is unclear what 
innovation trajectory CCS technology will take, making it difficult to analyse using 
established STS theories. The potential to be both incremental and/or radical in terms 
of innovation gives an added duality to CCS, which is another aspect highlighting the 
multiple identities of CCS. 
Second, the body of scholarship on lock-in discussed earlier highlights the 
blockages to achieving a major shift, or sociotechnical transition towards a low carbon 
energy system. This phenomenon entails major structural and systemic changes in 
large sectors (e.g. transport, agriculture and energy), and is generally characterised by 
long-term processes, complexity and multiple actors, whereby the system is 
transformed completely, forming a new sociotechnical system (see Rip & Kemp 1998; 
Geels 2002). In relation to this thesis, the development of CCS technology for climate 
change mitigation can be viewed as a sustainability transition, which is based on: 
                                                             




“… an increasing awareness that solving resource scarcity and 
environmental problems, notably related to fossil energy use and 
climate change, represents a very tough problem14, the solution to 
which requires a combination of technical, organizational, 
economic, institutional, social-cultural and political changes.” 
(van den Bergh et al. 2011, p. 2) 
Sustainability transitions are unique, because unlike historical transitions that were 
emergent, these are “goal oriented” (Geels 2011, p. 25). In this context, the goal is 
climate change mitigation, and Geels observes that “private actors have limited 
incentives to address sustainability transitions, because the goal is related to a 
collective good,” and therefore “public authorities and civil society will be crucial to 
address public goods and internalise negative externalities, to change economic frame 
conditions” and support low-carbon innovation (Ibid.). Furthermore, these types of 
transitions are characterised by lock-in mechanisms, not only in terms of technological 
change, but also in other elements: 
“It is […] unlikely that environmental innovations will be able to 
replace existing systems without changes in economic frame 
conditions (e.g., taxes, subsidies, regulatory frameworks). These 
changes will require changes in policies, which entails politics and 
power struggles, because vested interests will try to resist such 
changes.” (Ibid.)  
  
                                                             
14 “So tough, that Tainter (2011) is doubtful regarding the viability of a planned and smooth 
sustainability transition. Drawing from his research on the collapse of ancient civilizations, he argues 
that solutions to energy scarcity have tended to create more system complexity and associated 
indirect energy use. A collapse of our civilization appears more likely to him, in line with what 




Table 2.1: The different analytical levels of the MLP (adapted from Geels 2011). 
Level Description Attributes 
Niches 
(micro-level) 
“the locus for radical 
innovations”(p. 26) 
Niche actors: entrepreneurs; start-
ups; spin-offs 
 






“the locus of established 
practices and associated 
rules that stabilize existing 
systems” (p. 26) 
Consists of “set of rules that orient 
and coordinate the activities” of 
existing sociotechnical systems 
(e.g. institutional arrangements & 
regulations; legally binding 
contracts; lifestyles & user 
practices) (p. 27) 
 





The wider context that 
influences niche and regime 
dynamics 
Includes: demographical trends; 
political ideologies; societal 
values; macro-economic patterns 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that sustainability transitions require a broader 
approach in terms of analysis. Based on concepts from STS, evolutionary economics 
and historical transitions theory, Frank W. Geels, developed a broad analytical 
framework called the multi-level perspective (MLP), which draws upon the work of 
other STS scholars (e.g. Hughes 1983; Bijker et al. 1990; Rip & Kemp 1998) and “views 
transitions as non-linear processes that results from the interplay of developments at 
three analytical levels” (Geels 2011, p. 26). The three levels of the MLP framework 
(niche, regime & landscape) are summarized in Table 2.1. This approach has been used 
by Geels to analyse transportation systems, such as the piston engine aircraft to 
jetliners in American aviation (1930-1975) (Geels 2004a), to more recent low-carbon 




The MLP emphasises the regime level, or the existing systems, “because transitions 
are defined as shifts from one regime to another regime” (Geels 2011, p. 26), and it 
goes beyond the TIS approach discussed earlier in this section. Geels (Ibid., p. 25) 
argues that even though the TIS approach is also multidimensional, it “does not address 
structural change (how emerging innovations struggle against existing systems)”, nor 
does it address cultural and demand-side aspects sufficiently. Therefore, the MLP can 
potentially be a more useful method for analysing low-carbon transition technologies. 
However, as the discussion in the previous sections has shown us, CCS technologies 
are difficult to define in terms of innovation and can be best described as “an interloper 
from within the sociotechnical regime itself” rather than a radical innovation that 
“comes from the margins – from the niche hinterland of dominant sociotechnical 
regimes” (Markusson et al. 2012, p. 8). Again, this aspect highlights the mixed identity 
of CCS, wherein it consists of a combination of new emerging technologies, as well as 
mature, incumbent technologies. Markusson et al. (2012, p. 8) observe: 
“[CCS] comes from the same companies that already produce 
power and chemical plants or components thereof such as 
Mitsubishi, Doosan, Siemens, Alstom, Flour etc. CCS is promoted, 
developed and planned for by the incumbents in the electricity 
generating sector (existing utilities) and from the oil and gas 
companies that develop and manage hydrocarbon reservoirs.” 
(Ibid.) 
Consequently, CCS can be viewed as a “defensive technology developed by the 
existing system incumbents,” and therefore not quite fitting the MLP framework (Ibid., 
p. 9). Winskel (2012, p. 214) argues that STS approaches such as the TIS and even the 
MLP are rooted in the constructivist school of thought, where radical niche 
technologies are essential for systemic changes for sustainable transitions, and 




“As a large-scale technology, drawing partly on components 
developed from other sectors, fostered largely by regime 
incumbents, and aimed at adapting rather than replacing 
established systems, CCS evidently cannot qualify as a system 
innovation under the constructivist blueprint.” (Ibid.) 
According to Hughes (1990), theories adopting a social constructivist ideology 
“have a key to understanding the behaviour of young systems; technical determinists 
come into their own with the mature ones” (p. 57). This latter statement points 
towards technological determinism, a school of thought initiated by Karl Marx, and 
refers to the notion that technology is “the driving force of social change” by which it 
“establishes a particular set of power relations” (Street 1992, p. 30-31). This view 
implies that mature technological systems, or Large Technological Systems (LTS) 
specifically, can “become a globally dominating force”, leading to a “concern about real 
or perceived loss of socio-political control over transformative processes set off by 
technology” (Fritsch 2011, p. 31). The LTS15 concept was devised by historian Thomas 
P. Hughes, who describes technological systems as having life cycles with different 
phases, including “invention, development, innovation, transfer, and growth, 
competition, and consolidation.” He argues that as these systems grow larger and more 
complex, becoming a LTS they “tend to be more shaping of society and less shaped by 
it” (Hughes 1990, p. 56-57).  
However, the STS concepts introduced so far still do not in the main explicitly 
acknowledge the political circumstances that influence the adoption of low-carbon 
technologies (Meadowcroft 2011). Nor do they address how the development of large 
energy systems in one country can influence the socio-economic, political and 
technological systems in another. The international dynamic is missing from existing 
scholarship. Moreover, Bridge et al. (2013) argue that “the low-carbon energy 
transition is fundamentally a geographical process that involves reconfiguring current 
spatial patterns of economic and social activity” (Ibid., p. 331). This analysis highlights 
                                                             
15 The LTS concept predates the MLP, and within the field of STS, MLP has become the more popular 
theory (van den Bergh et al. 2011; Markusson et al. 2012, p. 7; Winskel 2012). Nevertheless, both 




how STS analyses, in particular MLP transitions theory, of energy systems tend to 
disregard spatial processes: 
“Indeed, it is the temporal concept of ‘transition’ – rather than a 
geographical alternative – that is often mobilised for thinking about 
the changes involved in developing low-carbon energy systems… 
‘Transition’ readily captures change over time for a given 
geographical unit (e.g. a country or a region) but frequently 
overlooks changes in the spatial organisation of the energy system 
and economic activity more widely. These geographical shifts are 
both internal (within a particular region or country) and external 
in that they involve relationships between one country/region and 
others.” (Bridge et al. 2013, p. 332) 
This point is crucial for understanding CCS technology transfer processes, 
particularly if it is to be deployed globally. In the context of India, presently CCS R&D is 
taking place outside its borders, therefore technology transfer would not only require 
interaction with those nations that are actively developing CCS, but also domestic 
infrastructures (both physical and institutional) would need to be established. 
Accordingly, this thesis examines CCS technology in India both in terms of international 
and domestic contexts and challenges. 
Furthermore, Bridge et al. (2013) contend that even “contemporary work on low-
carbon energy transition”, such as the MLP framework, pays little attention “to 
questions of scale and space”, focusing more on the temporal aspects, despite using 
“geographical metaphors” (i.e. niche, regime and landscape) (p. 333). According to the 
MLP framework the landscape “includes spatial structures (e.g. urban layouts), political 
ideologies, societal values, beliefs, concerns, the media landscape and macro-economic 
trends”, which is “beyond the control of individual actors” (Geels 2012, p. 473). In MLP 
terms, issues related to international relations and trade are considered as the wider 
context, and would therefore lie within the landscape level. However, although 
recognised as having influence over the niche and regime levels, the landscape is still 
considered to be exogenous to the sociotechnical system. It is viewed as “an external 
context that actors at the niche and regime levels cannot influence in the short run” 




In the context of international technology transfer, actors within the niche and 
regime levels from one country could potentially impact sociotechnical system 
landscapes in other countries via the movement of technology. The literature on 
technology transfer has shown that the landscape of one country can be influenced by 
different actors from the regime level in another, particularly through international 
trade and North-South transfer (i.e. the movement of technology from developed to 
developing states) (e.g. Mountjoy 1966; Balasubramanyam 1973; Brandt 1980; Meier 
1984; Lall 1984; Rosenberg & Frischtak 1985; Mehrotra 1990; Talalay et al. 1997; 
Josephson 2006). This large body of work on technology transfer addresses the more 
geographical aspects of technological change, the considerations of which are missing 
from most STS scholarship. It also emphasises the link between different socio-
economic systems, political will and technology transfer, plus its impact on the 
international system, which is arguably in the landscape level, or at the macro-level. 
These aspects are discussed in more detail in the following sections.  
Recently, a more comprehensive and multi-faceted sociotechnical framework was 
developed by Markusson et al. (2012) in order to assess the viability of CCS technology 
in the UK. This approach highlighted a range of key CCS related uncertainties, including 
full CCS system integration, the diversity of CCS pathways (influenced by technological 
diversity for each of the components of the CCS chain), and significantly, the political 
uncertainties. This approach may be more appropriate to assess CCS viability because it 
takes a historical perspective via case studies, taking into consideration how relevant 
mature technologies developed to begin with, and then applying them to the present 
day context. For example, in order to highlight the uncertainties associated with the 
speed of R&D and scaling up for commercial deployment, one of the historical 
analogues looks at the UK’s ‘Dash for Gas’ between 1987 to 2000, and compares it with 
the development of flue gas desulphurisation technology in the USA since the 1960s 
(UKERC 2012, p. 22). This method of using historical analogues factors in aspects of 
mature technological systems, such as the prominence of government policies. Such 
policies are more closely linked to CCS rather than micro-scale technologies and has 
more application for potential CCS policy creation. Such an approach usefully embraces 




2.3 Technology Transfer 
The transfer of technology from one country to another is a complex topic that 
spans over a number of disciplines, amalgamating interests from economists, 
International Political Economy (IPE) and development scholars. Insights from these 
fields have traditionally been applied by policymakers and key intergovernmental 
organisations (IGOs), primarily for the aim of transferring technology from developed 
countries to developing, also referred to as ‘North-South’ transfer, as a means to reduce 
poverty (Brandt 1980). Therefore, there is a large empirical base within development 
literature of how developing countries have acquired technology in the past, with 
earlier studies looking at the agricultural sector (e.g. Boyce 1987), as well as work on 
Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and the impact of globalization (e.g. Lall 1984, 
Talalay et al. 1997; Phillips 2011; Thun 2011). 
In comparison, the innovation STS studies discussed in the previous section, are 
predominantly interested in the transfer of technology within organisations, firms, and 
sectors. However, as discussed in Section 2.2, the empirical base for technology and 
innovation studies largely draws upon developed country contexts. Nevertheless, the 
NSI approach highlights that the innovative capacity of any country, regardless of 
wealth is crucial. Furthermore, Ockwell & Mallet (2012, p. 9) observe that the transfer 
of low-carbon technologies in particular “can present significant learning and capacity-
building opportunities”, though “existing innovation capacities are important in 
facilitating this kind of process and ensuring its contribution to overall productive 
capacities in developing countries”. In order to add a more international dimension to 
the concepts, the analysis here links STS with a selection of relevant ideas from 
development scholarship. 
2.3.1 Defining Technology Transfer 
The development approach to technology transfer essentially relates to the 
acquisition of technology. This involves the dissemination of technical knowledge, skills 
and products from the point of creation or invention, out into a broader sphere of use, 
where it can be developed further into new products, applications, processes and 




Organisation (UNIDO), this process can occur through two different pathways, 
illustrated in Figure 2.2. Starting from a non-commercial phase to the commercial 
(vertical transfer), and subsequently from one operational environment to another 
(horizontal transfer) (Ricken & Malcotsis 2011).  
Vertical transfer entails the dissemination of technical knowledge from research 
settings such as academia and government laboratories to the commercial sector, 
including the progressive stages of invention, innovation and full-scale commercial 
development. This can also occur within a single organisation or a nation. Horizontal 
transfer involves the movement of a technology from one operational environment to 
another; this could be between companies, industrial sectors, and also countries. The 
key aspect of this type of transfer is that the technology is already commercialised and 
the purpose is to spread and extend its application into other contexts.  
 
Figure 2.2: Schematic diagram of the types of technology transfer (adapted from UNIDO 
2002). 
Horizontal transfer has been the traditional means for technology diffusion 
between developed countries and developing countries (Heeks 1995; UNIDO 2002; 
UNDP 2005). Notably, Japan is often referred to as a case of an advanced nation that 
developed in large part through technology transfer, whereas countries such as the UK, 




started acquiring technology via horizontal transfer and then created institutions 
supporting vertical transfer, internalising its innovation with a strong NSI (Freeman 
1987). However, it should be noted that the conceptualisation above is linear, and a 
core contribution of the STS literature reviewed in Section 2.1 is that the process of 
technological change is not linear (e.g. see Figure 2.1). The two bodies of scholarship 
therefore sit rather uneasily together. 
Given that this thesis explores the role of low carbon technology transfer to a 
developing country in a climate change mitigation context, the special report on 
Methodological and Technological Issues in Technology Transfer by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) provides a useful definition: 
 “… the term “technology transfer” is a broad set of processes 
covering the flows of know-how, experience and equipment for 
mitigating and adapting to climate change amongst different 
stakeholders such as governments, private sector entities, financial 
institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and 
research/education institutions… The broad and inclusive term 
“transfer” encompasses diffusion of technologies and technology 
cooperation across and within countries. It covers technology 
transfer processes between developed countries, developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition, amongst 
developed countries, amongst developing countries and amongst 
countries with economies in transition. It comprises the process of 
learning to understand, utilize and replicate the technology, 
including the capacity to choose it and adapt it to local conditions 
and integrate it with indigenous technologies.”(IPCC 2000, p. 3) 
The above definition is fairly broad ranging, therefore including the movement of 
technological knowledge both within nations (horizontal) and between nations 
(vertical). A key part of the definition for this thesis is the term ‘replicate’, which, 
according to the report, refers to the final part of a five-stage process of technology 
transfer. This includes “assessment, agreement, implementation, evaluation and 
adjustment, and replication”, where the combination of these actions leads to the 
transfer or “to the deployment of a given technology […] to meet a new demand 
elsewhere” (Ibid.). However, as highlighted in the introduction, low-carbon technology 




be deployed and transferred, i.e. in the ‘replicate’ stage. This implies that development 
policy for low-carbon technology transfer is: 
“…not simply concerned with their ‘horizontal’ transfer from one 
country context to another, but also their ‘vertical’ transfer from 
early research and development (R&D) stages through 
demonstration, early pre-commercial deployment, to commercially 
viable stages of  development.” (Ockwell & Mallett 2012, p. 7) 
This describes the present status of CCS, where the technology is still in the R&D 
stage in specific developed countries, and has yet to be demonstrated 
(‘implementation’), let alone deployed commercially (‘replication’). Although, an 
attempt was made to present CCS technology as more advanced (see Section 4.3.1). The 
following section explores CCS technology in technology transfer terms. 
2.3.2 Technology Transfer of CCS 
Analysis later in Section 2.2 develops the idea that CCS has multiple identities with 
potentially different possible development pathways (e.g. used for Enhanced Oil 
Recovery (EOR) or for hydrogen production), and therefore would require a particular 
method of transfer, compared to other more discrete low-carbon technologies such as 
solar panels, or efficient cook stoves. Presently, CCS is going through both a vertical as 
well as a horizontal transfer process. For example, in terms of vertical transfer, CCS is 
currently in the process of being developed from the R&D phase to commercial viability 
within nation states in the developed regions, chiefly, Europe, North America and 
Australia (see Chapter 4 and Table 4.2). Specifically, this is still the early stages of the 
technology transfer where research and academia plays a central role (e.g. van Alphen 
et al. 2009; van Alphen et al. 2010), and its development is also encouraged by legal 
reforms, such as the amendments made to the London Protocol and the formation of 
the EU’s CCS directive (GCCSI 2011). 
Furthermore, there are crucial associated technological processes that are also 
being transferred horizontally, i.e. between two different operational environments. 
This is because there are a number of technologies within the CCS chain that are 




of the technology. Firstly, there is horizontal transfer between industrial sectors. For 
example, amine-based capture technology from the gas processing industry, CO2 
transportation from the LPG/LNG shipping industry, and CO2 injection and monitoring 
technology from the hydrocarbon industry (see Chapter 4). Furthermore, when these 
technologies are transferred for CCS applications, it will be because of a change in 
philosophy, and social and institutional structures will have to be adapted accordingly, 
e.g. when the focus shifts from extraction of fluids out of rock strata, to containment 
within the geological structures (Haszeldine 2011, p. 9)16. 
Secondly, there could potentially be horizontal transfer between countries (and 
MNCs), such as the proposed Grangemouth project in Scotland, which is essentially a 
joint venture between the US-based Summit Power Group and the UK’s National Grid 
Plc (see Scottish Government 2012; Summit Power 2012). Subsequently, the result of 
these initial horizontal transfers could possibly be followed by the development of 
more novel techniques, which would potentially lead to the next generation of CCS 
technologies. And so, CCS technology transfer is a complex interplay of vertical and 
horizontal transfers, and this combination has an impact on how the technology is 
viewed by developing countries. 
Overall, in terms of the definition by IPCC, CCS technology as an integrated system 
has yet to get to the final stage of technology transfer (replication), and this is likely to 
take some time. The multiple identities of CCS, combined with lock-in and entrapment 
issues associated with transitions of large energy systems, which were illustrated using 
STS concepts in the previous section, are delaying the development of CCS, as explored 
in the case of India in Chapter Five. This adds to the challenge to develop CCS in 
accordance with the sense of urgency due to climate change, which forms that basis of 
frameworks such as set out by the IPCC. Therefore it is difficult to fit CCS within the 
development frameworks of technology transfer, which are either oversimplified 
(UNIDO 1996; UNIDO 2002) or were originally designed to suit smaller scale 
technologies (IPCC 2000; UNDP 2005; IPCC 2007). Nevertheless, the IPCC framework is 
                                                             




useful because it emphasises the importance of different sociotechnical environments 
in different countries:  
“There is … no simple definition of a “sustainable development 
agenda” for developing countries. Sustainable development is a 
context driven concept and each society may define it differently… 
Technologies that may be suitable in each of such contexts may 
differ considerably. This makes it important to ensure that 
transferred technologies meet local needs and priorities, thus 
increasing the likelihood that they will be successful, and that there 
is an appropriate enabling environment for promoting 
environmentally sound technologies (ESTs).” (IPCC 2000, p. 3) 
This links in with the social constructivist approach to technology discussed earlier, 
implying that different countries can interpret and define technology according to their 
needs. Furthermore, based on the concept of NSI, which links scientific and 
technological innovation with wealth creation, development organisations are 
adjusting their frameworks to put more emphasis on knowledge and learning networks 
to increase innovative capacity (UNDP 2005; Dutz 2007). The different ways in which 
discrete technology has been traditionally transferred to developing countries is 
discussed in the next section. 
2.3.3 Evolution of Technology Transfer to Developing Countries 
Historically, the movement of technology from industrialised nations to less 
developed countries is intricately linked to the idea of ‘national development’, which 
stemmed from post-Second World War reconstruction (see Meier 1984; Burnell & 
Randall 2007; Weiss & Daws 2007). In this context, the initial goals of national 
development were to ‘improve national capabilities through industrialisation and 
overall self-sufficiency’, and with the ambition to achieve ‘net increases in national 
wealth and by extension, national power’ (Abraham 1998, p. 12). And so, early forms of 
international technology transfer involved strategies of ‘import-substituting 
industrialisation’17, which was very popular with newly independent nations, or the 
                                                             
17 This concept is derived from Keynesian fiscal policy, which advocates a significant role of the 




non-aligned ‘Third World’18. However, even though this strategy was meant to 
encourage domestic production and commercialisation, the focus was put more on 
horizontal rather than vertical transfer. As a result, the invention and innovation aspect 
were by-passed almost entirely, and therefore the development literature puts more 
focus on the different mechanisms that facilitate horizontal transfer (e.g. Hieronymi 
1987; Cooper 1995; Lall 2003). This era also marks the establishment of key 
international organisations, notably the Bretton Woods Institutions (i.e. International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank), which even today, play a central role in financing 
and facilitating international technology transfer (Woods 2007).  
Table 2.2: The different types of technology transfer processes between 
countries (source material from Thorne (2008) & UNIDO (2002). 
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philosophy of 20th century economist John Maynard Keynes, who also helped to set up the Bretton 
Wood Institutes (see Woods 2007). 
18 ‘Third World’ countries were part of a non-alignment movement during the cold war, which was 
spearheaded by leaders from India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Ghana, Ethiopia and Indonesia. These nations 
were predominantly poor, and did not want to align themselves with either the Soviet Union (i.e. 




The literature on international business distinguishes between three types of 
transfer between countries: material transfer, design transfer and capacity transfer. 
Material transfer refers to physical artefacts, including materials, machines and their 
parts, as well as turnkey projects19 and fully operational plants. Design transfer entails 
blueprints, formulas, handbooks and any other type of information used to build 
products or production facilities. Capacity transfer comprises of scientific knowledge, 
education and training not only to operate existing plants but also to enhance technical 
capacity and capability in order to develop innovations in products and processes 
(Simon 1991). The different transfer practices currently used by developing countries 
to acquire technology are listed in Table 2.2.  
Traditionally, technology transfer to developing countries has primarily been 
through material transfer, particularly in the agricultural sector and in the form of 
turnkey projects. Here, multinational corporations (MNCs) have played a very central 
role through a combination of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)20, license agreements 
and international joint ventures (Lall 1984; Boyce 1987; Lall & Urata 2003). Over time, 
since the 1940s, technology transfer now mostly occurs as a combination of the 
different mechanisms listed in Table 2.2. This has helped newly industrialised 
countries, such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong, as well as 
economies in transition, including Brazil, China, India and South Africa, which have also 
emerged as significant beneficiaries of transferred technologies (IMF 2011).  
One of the main concerns regarding technology transfer has been the tendency to 
treat technology as a ‘black box’ entity where, due to lack of transparency, the inner 
workings of a technology are unknown to the recipient country, and therefore prevents 
                                                             
19 A turnkey project is an established approach to carrying out international business; usually 
involves the ‘setting up of an industrial plant abroad where the seller enters into a contract to 
provide the equipment as well as part or all of the services involved in design, detailed engineering, 
procurement, civil construction, equipment installation, commissioning and training of the local 
labour force’ (Lall 1984, p. 536). 
20 FDI is the purchase by the investors or corporations of one country to another to build a factory, 
purchase a business or buy real estate (Lall 2004). It can also involve a company from one country 





any innovative activity. This aspect of technology transfer can lead to ‘institutional and 
organisational fragmentation’ in developing countries (Malairaja & Zawdie 2004, p. 
236), which does not boost local knowledge systems, nor does it foster innovation in 
the long-term. Particularly, experience with turnkey projects has shown to be 
unsuccessful, primarily because many of the spare parts or services have to be 
imported, and the capacity to maintain the technology is not transferred (e.g. Lall 1984; 
Boyce 1987; Hieronymi 1987). In addition, FDIs and some joint ventures have also 
been criticised for not building capacity, again due to having a ‘black-box’ mentality 
when it comes to technology development (e.g. Heeks 1995; Lall 2003; Thorne 2008). 
In principle, joint ventures should offer the best mechanism for effective technology 
transfer to developing countries because of the potential for learning arising from the 
interactions between expatriates and local counterparts. However, studies have shown 
that joint ventures are only effective as promoters of innovation when implemented in 
countries with higher levels of economic development, and where the industrial culture 
is well established and the institutional mechanisms for learning from the technologies 
are in place (Malairaja & Zawdie 2004; UNDP 2005; Dutz 2007; Franco et al. 2011). A 
study looking at how MNCs operate in Brazil and India found that the host nations’ 
industrial policy was critical in shaping how MNCs ‘capture, manage and create 
strategic assets for innovation’ (Franco et al. 2011, p. 1258). Researchers found that, 
despite the fact that both countries had similar processes for industrialisation (e.g. 
based on import substitution and development of production capacity), the local 
knowledge-based assets created by domestic investments and specialisation differed 
significantly (Franco et al. 2011). This has highlighted the case for a more concentrated 
education effort to build country-specific innovative capacity, and there is growing 
concern about the significance of NSIs for technological progress, sustainable 
industrialisation and economic growth in developing countries (UNDP 2005). 
Therefore, knowledge and skills transfer are becoming more and more emphasised by 
the international development organisations of the UN and the World Bank (see UNIDO 
2002; UNDP 2005; Dutz 2007). 
In other instances, technologies have been transferred without much thought to 




for the recipient country has been questioned. International development 
organisations such as the World Bank are considered responsible for many such 
projects, particularly in the case of coal power plants and hydroelectric dams 
constructed in the 1970s and 80s in Asia (e.g. D’Souza 2002; Marston 2011). The 
legacies of such projects are now the source of political instability and security 
concerns in the region (see Ebinger 2011; Chellaney 2012). These issues are discussed 
further in the following section.  
Apart from the mechanisms listed in Table 2.2, there are other ways that a country 
may acquire technology, without necessarily involving the typical transaction or long-
term collaboration between two parties (i.e. the supplier and the acquirer), which is 
normally associated with technology transfer. This can occur either through publicly 
available information, which is becoming easier to access with advancing capabilities in 
IT, or in some cases it has been acquired through so-called ‘reverse engineering’. Both 
of these routes for technological acquisition require a certain level of capability, which 
is seen more in the economies in transition, notably China (Ricken & Malcotsis 2011). 
Publicly available information can be a source of technical knowledge, however it is 
unlikely to be commercially operational without an already high level of innovative and 
adaptive capability within the acquirer (UNIDO 2002). In reverse engineering the 
artefact, product or system (e.g. mechanical device, chemicals, software programme 
etc.) is taken apart in order to understand how it functions and ‘obtain missing 
knowledge, ideas and design philosophy when such information is unavailable’ (Eilam 
& Chikofsky 2005, p. 3). Sometimes it can be seen as means to further innovate the 
technology, or as means to duplicate it, which then raises the issue of protecting 
intellectual property rights (IPR). The issue of IPR can become a politically contentious 
subject and is thought to be a key barrier to low-carbon technology transfer (Ockwell & 
Mallet 2012). Challenges to CCS technology transfer in terms of IPR are discussed 
further in the empirical chapters.  
A key aspect of the IPCC framework for technology transfer that complements STS 





“Key stakeholders include developers; owners; suppliers, buyers, 
recipients and users of technology (such as private firms, state 
enterprises, and individual consumers); financiers and donors; 
governments; international institutions; NGOs and community 
groups. Some technology is transferred directly between 
government agencies or wholly within vertically integrated firms, 
but increasingly technology flows depend also on the coordination 
of multiple organizations such as networks of information service 
providers, business consultants and financial firms.” (IPCC 2000, 
p. 4) 
However, the IPCC framework also accommodates the fact that many sectors and 
systems are now integrated internationally due to globalisation. This is important 
because economic activities between countries, such as trade, investment, and 
regulation, which are all linked with technology transfer, will create new “spatial 
configurations and relationships” (Bridge et al. 2013, p. 332). In this way the 
technology transfer literature adds geography and spatial qualities to its frameworks, 
which tends to be missing from the empirical base of STS concepts such as the MLP 
(Bridge et al. 2013). 
2.3.4 CCS Technology Transfer & Developing Countries 
The International Energy Agency developed a CCS technology roadmap (2010), 
which indicated that without CCS, the overall costs to halve global emissions by 2050 
increases by 70%. And so, at the end of the period considered in this study, it was still 
envisioned that, CCS technology would play a crucial part in a long-term strategy to cut 
down carbon emissions globally, and also that the technology should be commercially 
viable by 2020 (IEA 2010). The objective of this roadmap was also to identify areas 
worldwide for potential transfer of CCS technology (Ibid.). When it comes to CCS 
technology transfer to developing countries, the process is more likely to be initiated 
through horizontal transfer, but then will have to be adapted for local conditions via a 
vertical process. The only current example is Algeria’s In Salah project, which is a joint 
venture between BP, StatoilHydro and Sonatrach (the national oil and gas company of 
Algeria). Since 2004, 3Mt of CO2 have been captured from a natural gas processing 
facility and injected into an onshore deep saline formation (see Table 4.2, Chapter 4). 




verification programme have been shared with stakeholders such as researchers, 
NGOs, regulators and policy makers (In Salah 2010).  They also submitted a new 
methodology and draft project design to the CDM Executive Board in 2009 as a 
proposal for including CCS under the CDM. 
This form of collaboration includes both dimensions of technology transfer, where 
established technology is being adapted and tested in a new environment, but there is 
also emphasis on knowledge and skills sharing which is important for building long-
term capacity. Furthermore, building upon those experiences in Algeria, the project 
aims to highlight the technical and legal issues, which subsequently may be enabling 
factors for future CCS projects in other developing countries. When taking into 
consideration the site-specific conditions for potential CCS application, such as 
available fuel, geographic location, local infrastructures and capabilities, then it is 
unlikely that the technology can be transferred as a turnkey project or through material 
means only. CCS technology transfer will therefore need to encompass all the different 
types of transfer practices discussed in the previous section, in order for it to be 
successfully deployed at the global scale set out by the IEA’s CCS roadmap for climate 
mitigation (2010), and this is a key reason why difficulties were experienced with 
implementing CCS in India during the study period 2007-10 (see Chapter 7).  
2.4 Technology, Politics and International Relations 
Given that technology is a social construct and its development inevitably involves 
large number of interests, then it can be assumed that politics lies at the heart of 
technology. In the same vein, technology reflects the type of society we live in today, 
and is central to the overall global political system, playing a key role in security, trade 
and culture. Moreover, large technological systems such as nuclear weapons, fossil-fuel 
energy, transportation networks and information technology have been developed by 
states with repercussions far beyond their own national borders. Hence there is a very 
strong international dimension to technological change (e.g. Talalay et al. 1997; 
Abraham 1998; Herrera 2006; Bridge et al. 2013). The reciprocal relationship between 
technology and politics is a crucial element of the conceptual framework of this thesis. 
This section explores a growing area of interdisciplinary scholarship that combines the 




concepts, and which discussed and analyses the key geographical relationships 
necessary for technology transfer. 
2.4.1 Technology & Politics 
“… technology matters to IR/IPE because it alters state power and 
adds to the agenda and instruments of state policy – not the least 
because it changes the competitiveness of nationally based sectors 
of economic activity.” (Talalay et al. 1997, p. 3) 
Even though a very large body of IR and IPE scholarly work implicitly recognizes 
the importance of technology and technology-related policies, it is increasingly being 
criticised for its traditional portrayal of technology “as an external, passive, apolitical, 
and residual factor” to international relations or global affairs (Fritsch 2011, p. 27; 
Talalay et al. 1997; Herrera 2006; Sylvest 2013). Fritsch (2011, p. 28) argues that: 
“… standard explanations of systemic changes in global affairs 
usually focus on political or economic variables, neglecting 
technology’s core role as a driving force behind systemic 
transformation as well as its reciprocal relations with politics, 
economics, and culture.” (Ibid.) 
Similarly, Talalay et al. (1997, p. 2) acknowledge the “potent” role of technology, 
and even though not entirely ignored, it has been “explicitly analysed in a specific and 
narrow way” and primarily “treated as an exogenous and given factor – and hence all 
too often ‘black boxed’ – and at the same time largely to be viewed as instrumental – as 
a tool or as an object of policy”. This approach is particularly prevalent in security 
studies looking at technology in terms of weapons, war and military power (McNeil 
1982), “with the associated danger of arriving at explanations/analyses from an 
implicit technological determinism” (Talalay et al. 1997, p. 2). 
Conversely, within the STS literature discussed in Section 2.2 technology is 
considered to be a key actor that is endogenous to the system and a constitutive factor. 
However, it has been argued that the STS approaches to innovation and sustainability 




(Meadowcroft 2011). Meadowcroft (2011, p. 73) calls for political scientists to better 
engage: 
“So far sustainability researchers have focused largely on policy: 
what it is and what it could/should be. For example, there must be 
thousands of academic articles on the design of climate policies and 
instruments. However, much less attention is devoted to the 
political circumstances that make the adoptions of such policies 
likely.” (Meadowcroft 2011, p. 73) 
Political scientist John Street’s (1992) analysis highlights the “inseparability of 
politics and technology” and links technical change with political processes (Ibid., p. 3). 
He also links technological change with the theory of political choice, where the need, 
be it general human needs or those of a political interest, determines the reason why 
the technology gets developed in the first place (Ibid., p. 37). Furthermore, Street’s 
analyses draws attention to the intimate relationship between the state and 
technology, where the state plays the role of the ‘customer’, the ‘regulator’, or the 
‘underwriter’ (Ibid., p. 49). All three are very important roles, especially for technology 
transfer, and more specifically the transfer of a large, complex and capital-intensive 
technology such as CCS. 
As the ‘customer’, “the state plays an important role in purchasing and introducing 
technology, and this can effect both the state’s operation and the character of available 
technologies” (Ibid., p. 53). This point is important for traditional technology transfer, 
where developing countries are in essence the ‘customers’ of technology from 
developed countries. Historically, there has been a “technological dependence on 
industrial technologies from the advanced, rich countries, from which the emergent 
nations needed to acquire modern know-how and technology as green revolution cash 
crops, hydroelectric power stations, and irrigation systems” (Josephson, 2006, p. 181).  
As a ‘regulator’, states have an impact on the operation of the technology, and 
therefore states would play a very significant role in the implementation or transfer of 
CCS, particularly in terms of integrating the technology into existing energy 
frameworks (GCCSI 2012). Moreover, given the strong and historical “connection 




significant role as the ‘underwriter’, providing the “resources for research which would 
be too costly for the individual corporations to bear” (Street 1992, p. 54). In the context 
of CCS technology, the state acts as the underwriter not only in terms of funding R&D, 
but also for taking on the liability for long-term storage (GCCSI 2011). It should be 
noted that these particular roles vary between and within nation states. Generally, 
developing countries are marked by their lack of funds to support vigorous R&D, so 
most of technology innovation and development takes place outside the country. 
Therefore, historically, technology transfer has involved turnkey projects. 
Going further into detail, Street (1992) puts the role of a state in the context of 
‘political structures of control’. The example of the Soviet system’s resistance to 
technical change in the Cold War era (1947-1991), has close similarities to India at the 
time (see Mehrotra 1990). Notably, India ‘unofficially’ aligned itself with the Soviets 
during that period21, which was marked by the ‘Hindu rate of growth’ and bureaucratic 
stagnation (Balasubramanyam 1973; Abraham 1998). Like the Soviets, this resistance 
to technical change was due to “a result of the barriers it created to internal and 
international competition” (Street 1992, p. 56), which hampered indigenous 
innovation. His example of the Soviet Union suggests that “a political structure which 
excludes economic competition or political pluralism is liable to have a technology 
policy dictated by particular interests” (Ibid., p. 58).  
However, although it is true that innovation ‘thrives best in a free and open society’ 
(Ibid., p. 57), Street argues that it depends on the technology. For example, the “lack of 
central coordination can lead to the underdevelopment of technology policy” (Ibid., p. 
58), such is the case for large and complex technologies such as nuclear technology, and 
is also important for implementation low carbon technologies such as CCS (Walker 
2000; Mallah & Bansal 2010; Sovacool & Valentine 2010; Ockwell & Mallet 2012). 
Moreover, Street adds, “centralism may be conservative in the form of technology that 
is adopted, but it provides for decisiveness in the face of potential political 
                                                             
21 Notably, the India-Soviet Union link is an important aspect of India’s energy history, and influences 




unpopularity” (Street 1992, p. 59). Therefore, the approval and cooperation of the state 
is paramount for any form of CCS technology transfer. 
2.4.2 Linking IR and STS Theories 
There have been a few notable studies that have recognized the fundamental and 
reciprocal relationship between technological change and politics (e.g. Street 1992) 
and thereby international political change and the global system (see McNeil 1982; 
Talalay et al. 1997; Herrera 2006; Fritsch 2011; Sylvest 2013). For the context of this 
thesis, the emphasis in this section is on a particular subset of IR scholars that focus on 
technology. Specifically, recent analysis by Herrera (2006), Fritsch (2011) and Sylvest 
(2013) has linked IR theories with STS approaches. These scholars have used a 
‘systems approach’ to IR scholarship, as demonstrated in STS perspectives, and 
describe the relationship between technological systems and the international system 
to be “mutually constitutive” (Herrera 2006, p. 7), where technology is “an endogenous 
and political factor that is deeply embedded into the global system” (Fritsch 2011, p. 
28). These studies draw upon the constructive approaches to technology, and argue 
that the sociotechnical systems approach should be integrated into the “theoretical 
conception of the international system” (Herrera 2006, p. 26). This would strengthen 
IR scholarship because, “technological change can induce changes in the nature and 
distribution of power within the system, but systemic level and state level factors shape 
technological change” (Ibid., p. 195).  
The focus of these studies is on mature, large technological systems and systemic 
change, using examples such as railroads and the atom bomb (see Herrera 2006), and 
largely draw upon the seminal work of Thomas Hughes (e.g. 1983; 2004) and the Large 
Technological System (LTS) concept for bridging the fields of IR and STS (Sylvest 2013, 




“Technological systems are based on networks in which 
technological artifacts, individuals, organizations etc. become 
interacting entities. With regard to global affairs, certain weapons 
systems (nuclear weapons), as well as communication, 
transportation, and energy systems might qualify as particularly 
relevant. Their distinct qualities, such as their network character, 
their tendency to diffuse globally over time, their vital backbone 
function in global economics, security, and culture, and 
particularly their impact on time-space compression in global 
social relations make them so relevant for any in-depth exploration 
of the mutual relationship between technology and global affairs.” 
(Fritsch 2011, p. 33) 
Although STS theories are good at ‘opening up the black box’ and explaining the 
drivers behind technological change, Sylvest (2013, p. 135) argues that “existing LTS 
studies tend to focus more on system builders and success stories than on stasis and 
failure, and the development of national infrastructure systems (for example gas and 
electricity) is a classic object of study in the field,” and therefore “LTS research risks 
confining itself within national or functional borders”. Furthermore, Slyvest points out 
that “only rarely are technological systems approached from a viewpoint that combines 
security and sustainability”, which is a gap that IR/IPE scholarship could address 
(Ibid.).  
Interestingly, these analyses have not explored the MLP framework, which builds 
upon the LTS concept and has been applied more widely in the context of sustainability 
transitions (see Section 2.2.4). This may link in with the argument presented earlier 
that the wider global context lies within the landscape level, and is therefore 
considered to be exogenous to the system. Moreover, the MLP is quite a structured 
framework, with distinct levels, which may be too prescriptive for interdisciplinary 
approaches by the IR/IPE community. Therefore, for clarity, the generic term of 
‘sociotechnical system’ is used throughout the thesis. This is because there is 
overlap/cross-over between LTS and MLP concepts, and therefore, ‘sociotechnical 
system’ encompasses both of them. 
IR political theories can be broadly divided into three key schools of thought – 
realism, liberalism and constructivism (see Brown & Ainley 2009; O’Byrne & Hensby 




‘customer’, ‘regulator’ and ‘underwriter’ (see Section 2.4.1; Street 1992), the area of IR 
scholarship chosen to provide insights throughout the thesis is from the Realist 
tradition, in which states are the main actors. Political realism is a very wide-ranging 
field in itself, rooted in the “assertion by the Enlightenment English political 
philosopher Thomas Hobbes that humans are, by their very nature, sinful, violent and 
committed to self-preservation” (O’Byrne & Hensby 2011, p. 178; also see Morgenthau 
1948; Talalay et al. 1997; Brown & Ainley 2009). When the realist perspective is 
applied to domestic politics, the world is considered to be without social control, or, in 
a state of ‘anarchy’, and order and control is achieved by the “presence of a strong state 
and the rule of law” (O’Byrne & Hensby 2011, p. 178). Given this premise of conflict and 
“on the intrinsically violent nature of humankind” (Ibid. p. 179), in the field of IR, 
traditional proponents of realism are often portrayed as military strategists, e.g. 
Morgenthau (1948) and Kissinger (1969). Therefore, the realist understanding of 
international politics is where “interstate relations are defined by fierce interstate 
competition over power and influence” (Fritsch 2011, p. 35). However, the 
fundamental message of realism in IR scholarship is not solely about conflict, but 
rather, more to do with competition and states always acting to ‘preserve themselves’ 
(Brown & Ainley 2009, p. 42; O’Byrne & Hensby 2011). In other words, a state’s priority 
is to design its foreign policy in order to protect its national interests, where technology 
can play a significant role (see McNeil 1982). This is reflected in the seminal work of 
Kenneth Waltz (1979) (often referred to as a neorealist), which takes a more systems 
approach to IR. A key aspect of realism/neorealism is that technology is viewed as an 
instrument to achieve power within the international system: 
“The hierarchy among states is the result of the system-wide 
distribution of power, which itself is the result of the distribution of 
capabilities. The emphasis lies on states’ relative equipment in 
various power categories. Although not explicitly mentioned, 
technology implicitly represents one of those capabilities.” (Waltz 
1979, p. 131; summarised in Fritsch 2011, p. 35) 
 Notably, realist/neorealist tradition deals with issues at the macro-level, e.g. 
national security, accumulation of power etc., therefore political forces are considered 
to be more influential and dominant than technology in the international system (Waltz 




neutral, and exogenous instrument” (Fritsch 2011, p. 36). Scholars Herrera (2006), 
Fritsch (2011) and Sylvest (2013) consider this narrow conception of technology to be 
key weakness in IR interpretations of technological change. This perspective of 
technology as a ‘passive force’ “tends to neglect the reciprocal relationship between 
technological evolution and structural change in world politics” (Fritsch 2011, p. 36). 
Nevertheless, the realist lens is useful to point out the central role of the state for the 
development and regulation of large sociotechnical systems such as transport and 
energy networks. Furthermore, IR’s realism/neorealism can strengthen STS 
perspectives by adding a ‘global dimension’ to approaches examining diffusion, or 
transfer, of large sociotechnical systems (Sylvest 2013, p. 122).        
For a technology such as CCS, where the state has a pivotal role, political interests 
become paramount in its development. CCS also has a sociotechnical mixed identity, 
where it is inextricably linked to large and mature technological systems. Given these 
conditions, both IR and STS interpretations of technology provide useful insights for 
analysing India’s rejection of CCS implementation during the study period (2007-10). 
The two core perspectives are summarised in Table 2.3 below, including their 
strengths and weaknesses. This summary table incorporates relevant elements from 
the literature discussed in this chapter, using both STS and IR concepts (e.g. technology 
realist/neorealist and sociotechnical systems), to form the basis of the interdisciplinary 
approach used to analyse the empirical evidence in this thesis. For clarity, the political 
frame used for analysis in the empirical chapters will be generally referred to as 
‘technology politics’ (with a realist lens). This term also broadly refers to the collection 
of IR scholars that specifically examine the inherent relationship between international 





Table 2.3: Summary of key analyses from the literature, including IR realist interpretations of technology, and specifically for mature 
sociotechnical systems (largely based on work of Herrera 2006; Fritsch 2011; Sylvest 2013). 





States  Redistribution of power between 
states 
 Interstate relations defined by 
competition over power & influence 
 Technology is a military power source 
or economic power source (i.e. state 
capabilities) 
 No centralized power 
 State v State; self-interest in 
anarchical realm of international 
politics 
 Acknowledges “the material 
underpinnings of global society, in the 
form of perceived needs (survival, 
prosperity), as well as the role of 
interstate competition for power and 
influence as the major driving force 
behind technological evolution” 
(Fritsch 2011: 36). 
 “Correctly points to the central role of 
the state for the development and 
global/national governance of 
technological systems” (Ibid.). 
 Especially relevant for large 
technological systems because 
“national governments often provide 
vital initial resources” (Ibid.). 
 Technology seen as “a passive, 
neutral, and exogenous instrument” 
(Fritsch 2011: 36). 
 “…tends to neglect the reciprocal 
relationship between technological 
evolution and structural change in 










 The “technological system can be both 
a cause and an effect; it can shape or 
be shaped by society. As they grow 
larger and more complex, systems 
tend to be more shaping of society and 
less shaped by it” (Hughes 1990: 51) 
 “…technological systems have life 
cycles. Different development stages 
generate different impacts on the 
system and units” (Fritsch 2001: 35) 
 Links well with entrapment & lock-in 
theories, especially when 
sociotechnical systems mature 
 Space and time are key aspects of the 
assessment of technological change, 
where constructivist arguments used 
to describe new technologies, and 
determinism used for mature 
technologies (Street 1992). 
 STS research tends to confine itself 
within national or functional borders 
– i.e. lacks the international 
dimension, and how technological 
systems affect global systems (Sylvest 
2013: 135) 
 Too focused on construction 
processes & user perspectives (Ibid.) 
 Security, welfare and sustainability 
largely absent from LTS literature – 
combining these issues has more 




Given the multiple actors and geographies involved in CCS technology 
development, de Coninck & Bäckstrand (2011, p. 368) applied IR theories to CCS 
politics and to “explain the growing diversity, overlap and fragmentation of 
international organisations dealing with CCS”.  When viewed through the realist lens, 
de Coninck & Bäckstrand (2011, p. 375) observe that the main proponents of CCS 
within the international arena are dominated by fossil fuel states (e.g. Australia, 
Canada, EU/UK, USA). Furthermore, the realist understanding of CCS politics assumes 
that international organisations ‘lack teeth’ in terms of enforcement and regulation 
(Ibid.). Therefore, the emphasis is on states; international organisations are not 
independent from state power and cannot influence preferences of sovereign states 
(Ibid.).  
In addition, when considering international technology transfer and development, a 
strong geographical dimension is added to technological change. Consequently, there 
are also geopolitical aspects to consider, which highlight “geographic factors as 
important determinants of government policy and major determinants of the relative 
power position of states” (Verma 2007, p. 3282). The geopolitical approach in IR 
scholarship “stresses the importance of locational factors in influencing relations 
among nations” (Ibid.), and demonstrates “how the uneven distribution of natural 
resources acts as a major source of global insecurity” (Dannreuther 2007, p. 77). 
Therefore, IR theories embracing politics provide a useful complement to more 
industry and production-focused STS theories (Sylvest 2013). When used in 
combination, STS and IR will allow for a fuller sociotechnical analysis of CCS in the 
Indian context.  
2.5 Conclusions 
Technology is a social construct, and therefore the conceptual framework for this 
study is multidisciplinary, drawing upon theoretical concepts from social science 
literatures in order to gain insights for understanding technology development that 
goes further than the customary science and engineering perspective. The review in 
this chapter largely pertains to theoretical concepts from STS, with insights relevant to 




transitions. With its social constructivist roots, STS scholarship has been most applied 
to the development of emerging technologies and their early stages of innovation. 
However, the sociotechnical systems concept, which deals with mature technological 
systems, seems to be a more appropriate fit for certain CCS technologies. This 
interpretation allows the view of CCS as a collection of incremental innovations. 
Though, some aspects of the CCS chain could be considered as radical innovations, 
depending on its use. Notably, CCS is not a single technology and it also has multiple 
potential objectives, such as EOR, hydrogen production and climate mitigation. 
Therefore, a key insight from the review in this chapter is that CCS has multiple and 
mixed sociotechnical identities, and STS frameworks embrace such mixed identities 
and social interpretations of technology. 
Notably, STS theories lack explicit attention to the international dimension, which is 
a key part in an increasingly globalised world, linked through trade and technology 
transfer. Furthermore, historically, there has been a flow of modern technology from 
industrialized nations to the developing world. This technology transfer process is 
essentially part of the legacy of colonization and imperialism and, therefore also needs 
to be considered in the context of this case study exploring CCS in India. Interestingly, 
the review of the STS literature shows that the empirical base is largely concentrated in 
developed countries, and notably for CCS, in those states specifically that have 
established experience and expertise with fossil fuel extraction and exploitation. 
Therefore, ideas about technology transfer help develop the ‘geography’ and contextual 
gap in STS, with their focus on developing countries.  
Given that current CCS innovation and R&D, i.e. the step that precedes technology 
transfer, is taking place in specific industrialized nations, it is important to explore the 
technology transfer process to developing countries from the development studies 
literature. The review indicates that due to the complexity of CCS technology, it cannot 
be transferred as a turnkey project, which has been the traditional method of 
technology transfer to developing countries. Furthermore, certain low-carbon 
technologies have additional specificities, because they are yet to be commercially 
developed and implemented. CCS in particular is at this stage, and therefore the 




design and capacity transfer processes. This implies that the country receiving the 
technology should also be involved in the R&D process in order to meet country-
specific conditions.  
Consequently, the state has a very crucial role within technology transfer processes, 
playing the role of customer, regulator and underwriter. Given the political processes 
associated with states, which are key actors within technological systems, there is a 
reciprocal (i.e. mutually constitutive) relationship between technological change and 
structural change in global politics. However, this reciprocity has been under-
represented in both STS scholarship and IR/IPE perspectives, even though technology 
is inherently political. Politics emphasises the importance of the state, which is useful 
for analysing sociotechnical systems. This has specific relevance to mature 
sociotechnical systems because they tend to be more affected by top-down policies and 
established interests. Therefore, an interdisciplinary approach combining concepts 
from STS and IR theory can provide an appropriate conceptual framework for CCS 
technology transfer to other countries. This combined approach is particularly of 
greater relevance where the state has ultimate control on technology development. In 
addition, technology transfer between nations involves diplomacy and international 
relations in order to reach multilateral agreements that facilitate technology transfer. 
The interdisciplinary analysis drawing on two core areas from STS and IR scholarship, 
e.g. sociotechnical systems and technology politics, is used throughout all of the 
empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) to explore the research questions regarding 
why CCS was not adapted in India in the period 2007-10. A more detailed discussion on 
interdisciplinary research can be found in the following chapter, which outlines the 





Chapter 3: Research Methods 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter explores the qualitative research methods used to collect and analyse 
data for this thesis. In order to facilitate research involving multiple disciplines, a 
research design that is flexible and accommodating of a variety of tools for gathering 
data was applied. Given the research questions outlined in Chapter One, combined with 
the theoretical framework discussed in Chapter Two, the case study method was 
thought to be most appropriate for this study. This is because the case study is an 
holistic approach and suitable for interdisciplinary research in particular. Accordingly, 
Gerring (2007) argues that much of what we know about the empirical world has been 
generated by case studies, and case studies continue to constitute a large proportion of 
the work generated by the social science disciplines. Hakim (2000, p. 59) describes the 
case study as the “social research equivalent of the spotlight or the microscope: its 
value depends crucially on how well the study is focused.” Furthermore, a case study is 
typically considered “as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of that 
study is – at least in part – to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring 2007, p. 20). 
This is because the case study allows the researcher to blend various research methods, 
and in particular, there is a strong overlap with other types of qualitative studies. It is 
also to do with the ability of case studies (because of their detail) to help develop 
theories and concepts, which can then be tested elsewhere. This attribute is crucial 
when dealing with the many facets of technological change and development, including 
the complexities that characterise a developing country.  
In the context of this study, there are essentially two case studies. First, there is the 
broader case study that explores why the attempted transfer of CCS technology to India 
did not occur during the study period. Second, there is a smaller case study on the 
Cambay Basin, which sits within a wider Indian CCS case study. These case studies 
allow exploration of the research questions, and provide some wider insights on the 
far-reaching implications of international politics on low carbon technology 




The tools used to gather data are discussed in Section 3.1. In addition, a discussion 
on the role of the researcher and how this influenced data collection is presented in 
Section 3.2. The evolution of this project and the practicalities of doing research with 
multiple disciplines is explored in Section 3.3. 
3.2 Data Collection 
The flexible nature of case study research allows the use of a variety of data 
collection techniques, giving a more rounded, holistic view than with any other 
research design (Hakim 2000; Marshall & Rossman 2006; Gerring 2007; Moses & 
Knutsen 2007). Some of the data gathered at times was technical, i.e. pertaining to 
geology or engineering, in keeping with the sociotechnical analysis used within the 
thesis (see Chapter 2). The following sections describe the techniques used for 
collecting data for this study, which are commonly employed in the fields of 
anthropology, sociology, history and political science and STS. These include 
participant observation, in-depth interviews, a survey, and unobtrusive measures for 
further triangulation. 
3.2.1 Fieldwork: participant observation 
Gerring (2007, p. 20) states that “an observation is the most basic element of any 
empirical endeavour” and, participant observation is a key method for gathering data in 
qualitative studies. Participant observation requires first-hand involvement and, can be 
described as a method in which “the observer participates in the daily life of the people 
under study, either openly in the role of researcher or covertly in some disguised role, 
observing things that happen, listening to what is said, and questioning people, over 
some length of time” (Becker & Geer 1969, p. 322). Therefore, ideally, the researcher 
needs to spend a significant amount of time immersed in the setting, in order “to hear, 
to see, and to begin to experience reality as the participants do” (Marshall & Rossman 
2006, p. 100). Moreover, the accuracy of information gathered through interviewing is 
highly dependent on the researcher's ability to infer and interpret certain processes. 
Therefore, participant observation allows the researcher to fill in the ‘gaps’ and is 
complementary to other social science methods, allowing one to collect any details that 




Consequently, the A5 notebook and pen was the most essential piece of ‘kit’ I required 
in the field, as crucial observations that added detail or context to interviews could be 
made during events or immediately after and reduce the risk of miss-interpretation of 
the topic discussed. 
The fieldwork for this research project was conducted primarily over three trips, 
which were all based around key events, such as conferences, workshops and specialist 
meetings (see Table 3.1). In most cases, I was speaking or presenting posters at events, 
giving me an opportunity to network and build relationships with a variety of 
professionals. Although the majority of the fieldwork was set in India, time was also 
spent interacting with Indian delegates in international settings such as the 
Greenhouse Gas Control Technologies (GHGT) conference in Washington DC or the UN 
climate negotiations in Copenhagen. The first two trips were primarily based in New 
Delhi, and the last trip was at the UNFCCC COP in Copenhagen, where I observed 
climate negotiations, as well as specific negotiations regarding CCS under the CDM (see 
Chapter 6). The time spent in the field varied, depending on the duration of the 
workshop or conference and, at times external events influenced the length of time that 
could be spent out in the field. For example, the first trip to India lasted nearly three 
months, where TERI was kept as a base, and interviews could be set up on an ad-hoc 
basis or, at times serendipitously due to being locally based. The second trip to India 
was meant to be of a similar duration, but was cut short due to the deadly terrorist 
attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. The impact this event had on the research itself 
is briefly discussed in Section 3.2.5.  
The network of contacts built over the first two field trips was used as basis for a 
selective stakeholder survey, described in Section 3.2.3, which was conducted in 2009, 
prior to the last field trip in Copenhagen.  The first two field trips were crucial, not only 
for getting to know who the main actors were in India, but also getting to interact with 
other interested parties, such as representatives of large multinational companies 
(MNCs). These individuals tended to be technical experts from countries who had an 
economic interest in developing CCS, i.e. the UK, USA, Canada, Australia and Norway. 
These companies not only had an interest in India as a potential market, but their 




towards their Indian counterparts who would not have necessarily attended some of 
the events outlined in Table 3.1. Section 3.2.2 includes a list of such informants22 (see 
Table 3.3.), and further discusses their role.  
A crucial element of participant observation is the personal reflections of the 
researcher, who once immersed in the setting of study, has “the opportunity to learn 
directly from his [or her] own experience” (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 100). 
Therefore, it is essential to consider “the role or stance of the researcher as a 
participant observer – her positionality” (Ibid.). My role specifically in the context of the 
fieldwork is discussed in Section 3.3.
                                                             
22 It should be noted that the term ‘informants’ has traditionally been used in the methodology 
analyses literature (e.g. Dexter 2006). However, more recent discourse on the subject is not 
comfortable with the use of the term to refer to people who are sources of information, due to its 
“sinister connotations” (Rossman & Rallis 2012, p. 160). For example, Rossman & Rallis (2012, p. 160) 
“do not see key sources of information and insight as spies or turncoats,” and therefore “invite 
suggestions for a new term for this role.” Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, the traditional 




Table 3.1. Fieldwork trips made during the course of this study, including key events and research activities for collecting data. 
Field Trip 
No. 
Dates Location Key Events Main Activities Interview Codes 





 EU Commission – India 
Working Group meeting 
on clean coal 
 DEFRA/British High 
Commission CCS 
workshop 
















 C1  
 C2 
 
2 Nov – Dec 
2008 
Washington 
DC, USA; New 
Delhi, India 
 IEA’s GHGT9 conference, 
(Washington) 
 EU Commission – India 
Working Group meeting 










3 Dec 2009 Copenhagen, 
Denmark 
 UNFCCC COP15  Participant 
observation  










3.2.2 In-depth Elite Interviews & Informants 
Interviewing is one of the most common tools used for gathering data in the social 
sciences, and it can range from the standardised or formally sampled and structured, to 
the non-standardised, open-ended and more informal format. The interviews 
conducted for this research are largely semi-structured and exploratory in nature, also 
referred to as in-depth interviews. These interviews “typically are much more like 
conversations than formal events with predetermined response categories”, in other 
words, “a conversation with a purpose” (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 101). For the 
more technical interviews, e.g. regarding a specific oil field in the Cambay basin, 
extensive preparatory background work was done in order to provide a set of 
questions in advance, indicating the kind of information required (see Cairn interview 
guide in Appendix D).  
For other general interviews, particularly with policy makers, an initial broad 
‘theme’ was used to initiate discussion, such as ‘India’s energy sector’, or for those 
interviewees met at a workshop, then the theme would be more specific to ‘the overall 
potential of CCS technology in India’. A few open-ended questions to get the interview 
started were sent to the participants prior to the interview, for example, ‘what are your 
views regarding CCS technology?’ or ‘what are the main issues regarding India’s energy 
sector, and how does India plan to address them?’ However, it should be noted that the 
‘opening questions’ depended on who was being interviewed and, the context in which 
we had made contact. Such planned interviews tended to be with Indian Government 
officials, and largely took place during the first field trip (see Table 3.1 and Table 3.2). 
Some interviews, such as those with security professionals were regarding energy 
security issues specifically to a certain topic connected with the CCS technology chain, 
e.g. interviews with the Indian police services on coal or electricity theft, and Indian 
Naval officers were asked to comment on the shipping of hydrocarbons. Therefore, 
their questions were different, but still, a broad and exploratory tone was maintained in 
order to initiate conversation, (e.g. what are the main security concerns regarding the 
supply of coal in India?). In some cases, initial planning was not always possible, as 
some interviews were serendipitous encounters, which then required quick thinking, 




Table 3.2. Detailed list of interviewees and their organisations. 
Elite Type Position Organisation Sector Date Location Interview Type Reference Code 
Political Minister Ministry of Science 
& Technology (MST) 
Government 
of India 
2 Feb 2008 New Delhi In person A1 

















New Delhi In person B1 




New Delhi In person B2 
Professional Policy Advisor Centre for Rural 
Development (CRD) 
NGO 12 Feb 
2008 
New Delhi In person B3 
Professional Director 
(Onshore) 






New Delhi In person B4 
Professional Director 
(Exploration) 






New Delhi In person B5 
Professional Chairman Planning 










Elite Type Position Organisation Sector Date Location Interview Type Reference Code 









- Telephone B7 
Professional Inspector (retired) 








- Telephone B8 








23 Nov & 13 
Dec 2008 
Washington DC & 
New Delhi 
In person B9 







New Delhi In person B10 
Professional Senior Advisor 
(CATs) – Climate 
Change & Energy 
Unit 








New Delhi In person B11 







7 Dec 2009 Copenhagen In person B12 









Elite Type Position Organisation Sector Date Location Interview Type Reference Code 




10 & 12 Dec 
2009 
Copenhagen In person B14 








Copenhagen In person B15 
Professional Senior Policy 
Advisor/Negotiator 




Copenhagen In person B16 
Professional Captain (Naval 
Attaché to Iran)23 




- Telephone B17 








- Telephone B18 
 
                                                             
23 Indian rankings of military personnel are the same as the British Armed Forces. Therefore, like the Royal Navy, Captain is a senior officer rank, equivalent to a 
Colonel in the British Army or Royal Marines.  
24 Indian Merchant Navy Officers follow the British System. The 1st Mate is the second in command to the Master, (or Captain), and is equivalent to Lieutenant 









Services Ltd.  
Industry 
(Private) 






Business Director - 
Subsurface  
 































Legal advisor - 
PSCs 
Business Head of CO2 
Shipping 




6 & 13 May 
2010 
London/- In person/ 
Telephone 
C4 






7 & 19 May 
2010 






The interviewees listed in Table 3.2 represented a total of twenty-five 
organisations. Majority of the interviews were conducted in person, and any further 
enquires were followed up by email or by phone. Also, some of the technical interviews 
were not necessarily with an individual, but rather, a small group of specialists that 
could address my questions with the relevant expertise (e.g. interviews C1 and C3 in 
Table 3.2). The interviews ranged from brief 15-20 minutes to in-depth interviews that 
lasted for at least an hour or more, depending on the situation. For example, at the 
UNFCCC COP delegates are constrained by a tight negotiating schedule, therefore 
interviews had to be shorter. In contrast, some interviews in Delhi lasted for over two 
hours.  
Discourse regarding CCS technology in India is exclusively within elite circles, and 
this is reflected by the list of interviewees in Table 3.2 (two political, eighteen 
professional and eight business elite individuals). The interviewees can all be classed as 
elite, or very important people, and can be divided into three broad categories: 1) 
professionals, traditionally having spent many years in education towards advanced 
degrees, such as law, medicine and academia; 2) business leaders or executives; and 3) 
community or political elites (Hertz & Imber 1995). In the context of this study, the 
majority of elite interviewees have specialist knowledge about CCS in India, or have 
been directly involved with the decision-making and/or political processes that have 
considered the suitability of this technology for India. The exceptions are from the 
security services, though their expertise on energy issues was useful for providing 
context to some challenges for India’s existing energy infrastructure. 
Elite individuals tend to be difficult to access due to their status and time 
constraints. In an interview, elite individuals generally take on the role of ‘teacher’, 
where they define what the problem or situation is, introducing their notions of what 
they regard as relevant (Dexter 2006). Paradoxically, elite individuals also expect 
researchers to know something and to have done their homework. Previous studies 
have shown that doing preparatory background work is essential for establishing the 
respect necessary for doing research with elites (Ostrander 1993).  Often, this 
groundwork requires the building of a network of ‘informants’, which is a common 




Informants are knowledgeable and well connected individuals that demonstrate the 
“capacity to adopt the standpoint of the investigator” (Dexter 2006, p. 20). It should be 
noted that informants were not interviewees themselves, and there is no overlap. 
Informants and their organisations, listed in Table 3.3, gives an indication of the kind of 
institutions that had an interest in CCS implementation in India.  




Government  British High Commission India 
 European Commission 
 UK DEFRA 
 UK FCO 
 UKTI 
 US EPA 
 
Industry  Alstom 
 Camco 
 Cairn Energy 




NGOs  Carbon Capture & Storage Association (CCSa) 
 Energy research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) 
 Global CCS Institute (GCCSI) 
 International Energy Agency GHG R&D (IEAGHG) 
 Imperial College London 
 The Energy Resources Institute (TERI) 
 University of Nottingham 
 University of Regina 
 United Nations University 
 World Bank 
 World Resources Institute (WRI) 
 
Informants play a critical role by providing the researcher with information on 




prove useful. This study relied on the expertise of twenty-three informants (see Table 
3.3.); these individuals assisted with access to elites or provided expertise to help me 
understand particular processes that I was not familiar with initially. This ranged from 
the technical intricacies of international climate change negotiations, to the particular 
skills required for dealing with India’s immensely bureaucratic and hierarchical 
Ministries. 
The literature discusses the importance of building a rapport with the interviewee 
that consists of both respect and trust (e.g. Ostrander 1993; Marshall & Rossman 2006; 
Dexter 2006; Hertz & Imber 1995; Lee 1993). Introductions from contacts aside, a 
researcher needs to be aware that gaining access is not the same as establishing the 
trust required for getting useful data, and should expect an ongoing process of being 
‘checked out’ (Ostrander 1993). Therefore, generally the initial contact with potential 
interviewees always included my CV and a single-page summary of the project with the 
goals and objectives.  
Interviews tended to be case specific: for example, an interview with an Indian 
Merchant Navy Officer was not on CCS, but more on the LNG trade route between India 
and the Middle East. Therefore, such interviews provided unique information that 
could be used to build a picture of that specific case study. General interviews on the 
prospects of CCS in India tended to complement each other, and rarely were there any 
major contradictions. This may be because the Indian Government had taken a unified 
position on CCS technology from the start, and their stance had an influence over other 
sectors, such as private industry (see Chapter 7). Also, at the time of this study, CCS was 
considered to be quite a sensitive topic in certain circles in India (see Chapter 6); 
therefore each participant was assured confidentiality, where the data would be 
anonymised prior to any interview, both verbally and in writing (see Lee 1993). 
Nevertheless, I also made it clear to interviewees that I would expect to draw upon the 
data collected in order to publish papers in professional journals. By setting these 
boundaries of my research, not only did I establish trust but, given the power of elite 
subjects, this was also a means for protecting the interests and integrity of the research 




3.2.3 Survey: structure and respondents 
A survey was designed to explore stakeholder views on the suitability of CCS for 
India and whether CCS could be developed and deployed in India if it was deemed to be 
appropriate for the Indian context. This was to triangulate my fieldwork, 
supplementing the observations and findings from participant observation and in-
depth interviews. Moreover, the second fieldtrip was cut short due to unforeseen 
circumstances (see Section 3.2.5); therefore, it was judged that the survey was an 
alternative method for gathering data, which could be obtained electronically rather 
than in person. It should be noted that although surveys are a convenient method for 
exploring attitudes and beliefs of a group of people, the researcher relies “totally on the 
honesty and accuracy of participants’ responses” (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 125).  
Drawing upon a network of professionals built up over the course of two field trips 
in 2008, the survey targeted a wide range of stakeholders with different levels of 
experience and previous knowledge of energy and CCS in India. By the time the survey 
was conducted in May/June 2009, over half of the elite interviews had taken place in 
India (see Table 3.1). Many of the survey respondents were contacts that had been 
passed on by interviewees or informants. The survey consisted of three sections, 
composed of seventeen questions in total, and is included in Appendix A. It should be 
noted that the results of this survey were used as a basis for a working paper on CCS in 
India, commissioned by Christian Aid (see Kapila et al. 2009). A summary of the results 
is provided in Appendix B, and an overview of survey participants is presented in 
Appendix C.  
The survey consisted of a combination of multiple-choice, ranking and open-ended 
questions, all of them giving participants the opportunity to express their expert 
opinion. The first section explored opinions on the importance of climate change and 
energy security for India. This section also asked for views on how energy and 
electricity supply in India might develop between now and 2050. The second section of 
the survey contained questions that explored viewpoints on whether CCS might have a 
role to play in India’s energy landscape. This included questions considering more 
detailed issues around how CCS technology could be deployed if it was decided that it 




was primarily aimed at gathering information about the respondents in terms of their 
profession and focus area of work. This was done to allow analysis of any significant 
differences between perspectives of different stakeholder groups. 
The survey was sent out to 65 individuals based in a wide range of stakeholder 
organisations in India, UK and the US. Regardless of the country they were based in, all 
individuals invited to participate were either working on, or had previously worked on, 
issues related to energy and India. The stakeholders were divided into two tiers, where 
tier 1 stakeholders were those who directly work on energy/environmental issues in 
India, and who would be affected by/or could influence any developments of CCS 
technology in India. Tier 2 stakeholders were those who at the time of the survey were 
not directly involved with work on energy/environmental issues in India, but either 
had been in the past and/or had an interest in how CCS could develop in India as it may 
affect their work in the future. The same proportion of tier 1 and tier 2 stakeholders 
were asked to participate in the research, with backgrounds ranging across academic 
institutions, private sector industry, Indian government, and international financial 





Figure 3.1: Background of survey participants in regards to (a) whether they work directly in 
the energy field, (b) the main focus of their work in the energy field, and (c) their profession. 
Eighteen stakeholders (out of the 65 contacted), predominantly tier 1 and from the 
energy field, answered the survey, giving a response rate of approximately 28%. Steps 
taken to increase the response rate included follow-up emails, however many 
stakeholders responded that they lacked the time. The professions of respondents were 
fairly consistent regardless of the sector (e.g. industry, academic etc.) they worked in 
and were primarily researchers, policy analysts, technical experts, and business 
planners as illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
3.2.4 Documentary analysis 
In addition to the data obtained from interviews and the survey, analysis of 
documents was also used to understand the different contexts of the case studies (i.e. 
India, and specifically, Cambay). Data collection that involves gathering items such as 




‘nonreactive research’ in the literature because it generally does “not require the 
cooperation of the subjects” (Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 124). Notably: 
“Unobtrusive measures are particularly useful for triangulation. 
As a supplement to interviews, nonreactive research provides 
another perspective on a phenomenon, elaborating its complexity.” 
(Marshall & Rossman 2006, p. 124) 
For the purposes of this study, key documents included publicly available Indian 
Government reports from the relevant ministries. Examples of such reports include a 
number of Working Group reports from the Ministries of Coal, Petroleum & Natural 
Gas, and Power that were submitted to the Planning Commission for the formulation of 
India’s Five-Year plans, specifically the 11th 5 year plan (2007-2012). In some cases, 
documents reviewed included brochures and company reports that were either 
recommended or provided by interviewees and informants. 
In addition, primary sourced documents included international and national 
climate legislation, as well as negotiated text from various plenaries and working 
groups, which were all obtained during the UNFCCC COP but are also publicly available 
from the UN secretariat. Secondary sources were also used to sometimes corroborate 
or add further detail to the data obtained through interviews. These include NGO 
reports, research-based working papers, legal and academic commentaries, journals, 
and media articles. 
3.2.5 Unanticipated shifts in research  
Quantitative data pertaining to oil, gas or coal assets are not available publicly in 
India, as they are considered to be commercially sensitive and, in certain cases, of 
importance to national security. Initially, it was envisioned that technical information, 
such as composite well logs and other offshore data, could be obtained to characterise 
reservoirs and their CO2 storage potential (e.g. see technical interview guide in 
Appendix D). However, permission to use such data lies with the Indian Government 
and not with individual companies that are operating the projects in designated areas 
offshore. Therefore, the original plan to have case studies based on a number of 




Government to gain access to such information, but permission was not granted. As a 
result, the some technical aspects of the thesis are constrained to just one site, the 
Cambay basin, for which some of the data was obtained during a series of interviews. 
Even then, permission to use the data was limited to what was already available on the 
company website. This prevented any quantitative analysis, particularly in terms of CO2 
storage. Moreover, official geological or nautical maps of Indian offshore areas were not 
permitted to be used for this thesis. Therefore, maps used in Chapter Seven, depicting 
geological storage potential, are generated by the IEAGHG (2008) report, which 
analysed data provided by the Indian Geological Survey (using GIS25).   
  Notably, the second field trip to India started during the Mumbai terrorist 
attacks of November 2008. The attacks started on the evening of the 26th, and Mumbai 
was under siege till the 29th. These dates coincided with the EU Commission/Ministry 
of Power Clean Coal workshop (see Table 3.1), and during this period New Delhi was 
under curfew. The atmosphere was very tense and senior-level Indian delegates could 
not participate in the workshop as they were called into emergency meetings of state. 
Those present at the workshop were following the events in Mumbai and, as there were 
fears that the attacks may spread to Delhi, there was very little discussion on clean-coal 
technologies. On the second day of the workshop, the EU delegation, which I was 
considered to be a part of, was taken on an impromptu visit of a power station over 
50km outside of the city. Therefore, the trip was cut short, and many of the 
interviewees were not interested in discussing CCS or any other energy related matters 
at that time. Some of the technical interviews with Cairn Energy on Cambay were not 
affected by this event, and they occurred as planned, though the attacks were a central 
point of discussion, particularly in terms of the security of India’s energy infrastructure. 
Nevertheless, most of the other planned elite interviews were cancelled due to the 
attacks. Therefore, some of these were followed up at a later date over the phone. 
Others were invited to participate in the survey (as discussed in 3.2.3). 
                                                             




3.3 The Researcher’s Role and the Influence of Personal Biographies 
“In qualitative studies, the researcher is the instrument. Her 
presence in the lives of the participants invited to be part of the 
study is fundamental to the methodology.” (Marshall & Rossman 
2006, p. 72)26  
With in-depth interviews, though “relatively brief but personal … the researcher 
enters the lives of the participants” (Ibid.). Therefore, this section discusses my 
personal characteristics, as the researcher, and how this has impacted my access to 
people and information.  Researchers themselves draw from different social 
experiences and perspectives, and their personal characteristics such as gender, 
ethnicity, age, marital-status, class etc. will have an influence on the data collected. 
Understanding the differences in cultures of the researcher and those being researched 
is essential for successful fieldwork (Momsen 2006). Sometimes, these differences 
create unequal power relations in fieldwork relationships, where gender can eclipse 
the influence of other traits such as age, race or class (see Warren 1998; Momsen 
2006).  
Notably, there are certain aspects of who I am, i.e. female, (relatively) young and of 
mixed racial heritage, which influenced the way I conducted interviews. For example, 
my British nationality and predominantly Western upbringing, combined with my 
Indian heritage and fluency in several languages of the sub-continent, have contributed 
to a unique research situation. The colour of my skin and my fluency in Hindi and 
Punjabi not only helped in setting up New Delhi as a research base, but it also allowed 
me to interact with informants and elites in a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic context. 
Some interviews had an easy conversational flow, switching between English, Hindi, or 
Punjabi, depending on the individual. This process helped me build networks and gain 
trustworthiness with participants.  
Furthermore, in the context of India, a hierarchy of authority and a polarization of 
gender dominate the culture. In my case, having family connections that were noted for 
                                                             




their public service, my surname was well known within Indian Government circles. It 
can be argued that I was also considered as one of the ‘elites’. Consequently, I gained 
access to certain senior officials, who are not readily accessible to most researchers. In 
a few instances, such interviews took place at the interviewee’s residence, rather than 
the office, as I was the ‘daughter/niece/grandchild of so and so, visiting from Scotland.’ 
The informal settings actually put the interviewee at ease, and perhaps they tended to 
be more frank and open than they normally would have been.  In addition, during the 
study period I was significantly younger than the predominantly male informants and 
elites that I crossed paths with; I was essentially assigned the role of a harmless 
adoptive daughter. Given my status or ‘daughter’ role, and New Delhi being quite a 
dangerous city for women, many of the interviewees provided for my safe travel to and 
from interviews, just as they would have done for their daughters27. This role aided my 
research because participants were in further ways willing to help, not only with 
contacts and useful information, but also to ensure that my fieldwork was safe and 
successful.  
3.4 Thesis Evolution and Working with Multiple Disciplines  
The original proposal for this PhD was prepared and accepted in 2007. Notably, 
around the time of the starting of this project (9th October), then Secretary of the 
Department of Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) of the UK 
Government, John Hutton, announced a competition for the demonstration of a CCS 
project in the UK. Specifically, this demonstration project had to be post-combustion 
capture on a coal-fired power station with offshore CO2 storage (UK House of Commons 
2007)28. Therefore, there was a keen UK interest in India, which relies on coal-based 
energy infrastructure. This background, combined with the circumstances discussed at 
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28 It was anticipated that the full CCS chain would be demonstrated by 2014, and it was expected 
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the beginning of Chapter One, influenced the original PhD proposal and research 
questions.  
The funding was set up as a joint effort between two UK research councils, Natural 
Environment Research Council (NERC) and the Economic and Social Research Council; 
the grant was managed and administered by the UK Energy Research Centre (UKERC). 
Therefore, there was a requirement to combine disciplines of the physical and social 
sciences, in order to provide an interdisciplinary contribution. As a result, this project 
initially had three supervisors, each representing a different discipline each (geology, 
law and engineering). Such a supervisory structure was challenging, particularly as my 
three supervisors had not worked together before, and were located in different cities. 
At the start, it was anticipated that, given the international momentum behind CCS 
at the time (see Section 1.1), India would be keener to collaborate, and there would be 
greater access to technical data29. This was because there was significant industry 
participation and research interest in the preceding years to the start of this project in 
October 2007. For example, in 2006 and the beginning of 2007, India’s National 
Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI) in Hyderabad hosted workshops on CCS and 
R&D challenges, and there was a strong presence of UK academics at these workshops, 
including my principal supervisor Prof. Stuart Haszeldine. As a result, it was anticipated 
that further contacts for collaboration would be made at the joint workshop between 
the UK Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Indian 
Department of Science and Technology (DST), which took place in January 2008, and 
this formed the basis for the first field trip (see Table 3.1). Furthermore, The Energy 
Research Institute (TERI), based in New Delhi, was initially keen to collaborate with 
Edinburgh University and support this research. It was decided that TERI would form 
the research base in New Delhi, and Dr. Suresh Babu, an engineer with an interest in 
gasification technologies, was named as a third supervisor. In addition, as discussed in 
Section 1.1, there was plenty of activity in various international legal fora, therefore the 
second supervisor to show interest was an energy lawyer, Prof. Peter Cameron, based 
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at Dundee University. However, due to differences in interest and time constraints, I 
was left with a single supervisor by the end of my first year, Prof. Stuart Haszeldine, a 
geologist at Edinburgh University.  
Given this background, the original plan was to have 2-3 case studies focused on 
specific geological basins with good storage potential, i.e. case selection was on the 
basis of geology. However, the constraints on access to technical data led to a more 
sociotechnical framing of the challenges to CCS technology transfer. Therefore, the 
thesis has evolved into a social science PhD, and the advisor for the social science 
aspect of this thesis is Dr. Heather Lovell, who is a Human Geographer. Significantly, the 
research questions had to be altered shortly after the research project was started, 
when it became apparent that the Indian Government was against CCS implementation 
in India. Rather than explore the potential of CCS in India, the research questions now 
focus on why the technology was not accepted as a viable option during the study 
period. 
3.4.1 Interdisciplinary Versus Multidisciplinary Research  
UKERC PhD projects were set out to be interdisciplinary. However, some of the 
difficulties I have had in framing my PhD are to do with the way it was set up as 
interdisciplinary. One of the challenges was having supervisors from completely 
different disciplines who didn’t really know each other, and who were not in the same 
place. The interdisciplinary PhD is a widely used model now in academia to encourage 
academics to talk to each other and network, though the responsibility to manage these 
relationships generally falls on the student. Nevertheless, the interdisciplinary PhD is 
the future of academia, providing good training for an increasingly interdisciplinary 
academic environment, where researchers are encouraged to collaborate with external 
counterparts as much as with different departments within the same institution. 
However, given that a multidisciplinary framework (see Chapter 2) forms the 
theoretical basis of this thesis, a distinction should be made at this point between 
interdisciplinarity and multidisciplinarity. Both forms of research approaches involve 
multiple disciplines, where generally there is the application of at least two disciplines 




2014). The crucial difference between the two is that the interdisciplinary research 
process is more integrative, whereas multidisciplinarity has low integration between 
disciplines, which are working more in parallel (Ibid.). This distinction is described as 
follows: 
“… like multi-disciplinarity, inter-disciplinarity involves several 
unrelated academic disciplines, each with their own contrasting 
research paradigms, but it does so in a way that forces them to 
cross subject boundaries. In the process of striving toward a 
common research goal, the concerned disciplines integrate 
disciplinary knowledge in order to create new knowledge and 
theory.” (Baveye et al. 2014, p. 3)  
   The difference is to do with the outcome of the research project. In the 
multidisciplinary setting, “neither discipline will be particularly affected in the long 
term by the interaction” required for answering research questions (Baveye et al. 2014, 
p. 3). Moreover, Baveye et al. (2014, p. 4) have discovered that often interdisciplinary 
projects “drift towards multi-disciplinarity,” despite best efforts. This is attributed to 
the challenge that is integrative research, which involves bringing “together different 
epistemologies” (Ibid.). In other words, this requires “researchers to become immersed 
in one another’s knowledge cultures, to understand the fundamental differences in 
their basic theories and axioms” (Tress et al. 2005 in Baveye et al. 2014, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, there is still a benefit of the multidisciplinary approach because, “each 
discipline adds new knowledge from its own perspective to complete the picture like 
pieces in a jigsaw puzzle” (Ibid.). 
Significantly, in the overall context of this thesis, the perspectives and principles 
from STS and IR have been integrated in order to analyse the empirical evidence, and is 
therefore, interdisciplinary. Although the two core concepts of sociotechnical systems 
and technology politics were introduced in parallel in Chapter Two, they have been 
integrated throughout the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7) to provide 
interdisciplinary insights. In other words, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  
Interestingly, some of the technical information gathered from the interviewees 




background of the physical sciences allowed for me to network and build a rapport 
with technical specialists, whether it was a power plant engineer or a naval architect. 
Indeed, I would argue that interdisciplinary research is, in essence, an extensive 
linguistic exercise. Therefore, the learning process over the course of this study has 
been quite integrative. For example, I had the opportunity to take a number of LLM 
courses on international environmental law, specifically on climate and energy law, and 
law of the sea. This way, I learnt the language of lawyers and policymakers, which was 
excellent preparation for the UNFCCC COP. Whilst in the field at COP15, I was asked to 
brief country delegations on CCS deployment issues, and also asked to prepare a legal 
brief for a negotiator from a developing country (see Chapter 6). In order to familiarise 
myself with the literature of another discipline, again almost another language had to 
be learnt. As a result, having this ‘multilingual’ ability seemed to be a crucial attribute 
for doing interdisciplinary research. I would add that conversing with people from 
different disciplines was also one of the more enjoyable and very interesting aspects of 
doing interdisciplinary research.  
3.5 Summary & Conclusions 
Case studies allow for rich analyses, which can span multiple aspects, including the 
social and technical, and are therefore useful for interdisciplinary research. Data was 
collected by a variety of tools from the social sciences, including participant 
observation, in-depth elite interviews and the use of informants, a survey and review of 
official documents. The empirical evidence was gathered over three field trips; the first 
two were based in New Delhi, India. The first trip took place in the beginning of 2008 
(lasting 3 months), and the second trip lasted roughly a fortnight towards the end of 
2008. The latter trip had to be cut short due to the terrorist attack in Mumbai, as Delhi 
was under curfew whilst Mumbai was under siege. Notably, activities related to CCS 
technology were limited to specialised and elite circles of Indian society. This is 
demonstrated in the type of data gathered, where fieldwork predominantly centred on 
high-level events in the capital or in an international setting, and a series of elite 
interviews and a selective survey ensued. 
Over the course of 2008, through networking at various events and making several 




surveyed in 2009 to gather opinions of CCS technology and its potential in India. Out of 
the sixty-five surveys that were sent, eighteen responded, and this survey data, plus 
various official documents, are used to triangulate the interview material. It should be 
noted that although originally access to quantitative data was anticipated, in reality it 
was difficult to obtain permission from the Indian Government due to their stance on 
CCS, therefore the analysis is based on qualitative methods. Furthermore, personal 
characteristics, such as gender, age, background and ethnicity have had an influence on 
how and what data was collected.  
The multidisciplinary theoretical framework discussed in Chapter Two is used for 
analysis throughout the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). Through the 
empirical case study, I seek to integrate the two core concepts together, and therefore 
the overall approach is described as interdisciplinary.  Interestingly, the key to effective 
interdisciplinary research is to learn the ‘language’ of different disciplines, which helps 
not only with the interpretation of data, but also to engage with and gain access to a 






Chapter 4: CCS Technology 
4.1 Introduction 
The Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technology that is the focus of this thesis 
involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from large point sources, 
specifically, fossil-fuel based combustion processes associated with power generation 
and industrial operations. The captured CO2 emissions are then compressed and 
transported to be permanently stored within a suitable geological formation. It is 
important to note that the objective here is the permanent disposal of CO2 for 
mitigation purposes, i.e. CO2 is considered a waste product. Therefore, this 
conceptualisation of CCS technology involves three parts of a chain (capture, transport, 
storage), which are combined in an effort to reduce atmospheric emissions from large 
polluting sources. 
However, as discussed in Chapter Two, technologies operate in a social, political 
and economic context. Therefore it is essential to consider both the social dynamics, as 
well as the technical, in order to understand how a technology is developed and 
transferred. Therefore, in terms of the sociotechnical perspective, how should we 
define CCS technology? Is it a radical innovation, consisting of a suite of new 
technologies that could create a technological revolution? Or is it best conceptualised as 
part of an existing large sociotechnical system, making it more of an incremental 
innovation? Or perhaps it is a combination of the two? The definition of the technology 
varies, as CCS is seen as something different by different groups of people. As briefly 
discussed in Section 2.2.2, countries such as the US refer to CCS as ‘CCUS’, where the 
focus of R&D activities also includes ‘Utilization’ and storage of the CO2 emissions, i.e. 
CO2 is considered a commodity and a waste. Therefore, building upon the themes 
presented in Chapter Two, this chapter shows that CCS as a technology is still open to 
interpretation due to the multiple identities and flexible nature of the technology, 
making it a challenge to view it as a coherent sociotechnical system.  
The different stages of the CCS chain and their technical aspects are presented in 




highlighting some of the political dimensions and underlying commercial objectives, 
which also gives CCS a mixed identity, and this has implications for its transfer. 
This chapter explores CCS technology through the sociotechnical lens because both 
social and technical aspects of CCS contribute to its mixed identity, as well as the 
subsequent failure to be transferred to India. Therefore, it can be argued that the way 
CCS was initially presented, or rather, defined, is a key reason for the unsuccessful 
technology transfer to India during the period of this study. Moreover, the political aim 
was to present CCS as a coherent technological system for climate mitigation, as 
another tool in the climate change toolbox. However, at the same time, there were 
strong underlying business objectives to this political endeavour, supported by the 
view of CO2 as a commodity, or something that had market value. 
4.2 CCS Technology: evolution & development 
The prospect of CCS technology being used as a tool for climate change mitigation 
became popular during the first decade of the 21st century, the concept stems from 
earlier isolated academic research in geo-engineering in the 1970s and 80s. According 
to the historical review by Herzog & Drake (1996), the first conceptualisation of 
capturing CO2 emissions from large point sources with the aim of isolating it from the 
atmosphere came from the work of Marchetti (1977). However, the research proposed 
during this period predominantly explored the permanent disposal of CO2 in the deep 
oceans (see Marcetti 1997; Hoffert et al. 1979; Albanese & Steinberg 1980 cited in 
Herzog & Drake 1996).  
The full CCS chain for mitigation began to take shape in the 1990s as a result of 
growing international concern regarding climate change. In 1991, Hendriks et al. from 
the University of Utrecht published their research on the option of CO2 disposal in 
depleted gas fields, once captured from power plants and transported via pipelines. In 
the same year, the International Energy Agency (IEA) formed its research and 
development programme on greenhouse gas technologies (IEAGHG), based in 
Cheltenham, UK. Governments began to take notice of academic research in this area 
and during this decade the US Department of Energy (USDOE) supported a series of 




Energy laboratory. These studies looked at various options for CO2 capture and 
sequestration from fossil-fuel based power plants (Herzog & Drake 1996). This period 
essentially marks an increase in the coordination of R&D activities on CCS technology, 
whilst simultaneously there was a rise in political action over climate change. A 
timeline showing CCS research alongside international climate change related activities 
is presented in Table 4. 1.  
At the turn of the 21st century CCS gained prominence in the global energy and 
climate agendas of several states, multilateral institutions and international 
organisations. The UK Government conducted its own feasibility studies during this 
period, with the notion to build capability for export. This is discussed in further detail 
in Section 4.3. Such activities at both national and international levels, coupled with the 
growing interest in CCS R&D, prompted the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to conduct an assessment of the CCS literature in 2002, leading in 2003 
to the commissioning of the IPCC Special Report on Carbon Capture and Storage 
(2005). India was not involved in any of these initial CCS discussions; India’s 
engagement with international initiatives specifically on CCS started in 2006 (see 
Section 6.2.1). 
The following sub sections explore in more detail the three different stages of the 
CCS chain: capture, transport and storage. It is important to outline these technical 











Table 4.1: Key stages regarding international climate change activities and CCS R&D 
activities since the 1970s (table content based on Herzog & Drake 1996; Birnie et al. 
2009; table layout inspired by Evar et al. 2012). 
International Activities on Climate 
Change 
Period CCS R&D Activities 
 1970s & 
1980s 
 Initial stand-alone academic 
research & beginning of 
conceptualisation 
 1990: UN creates the 
Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee (INC); negotiations 
begin on climate treaty 
 1992: The Rio Framework 
Convention on Climate Change is 
adopted by 143 countries 
(referred as UNFCCC) 
 1995: Berlin hosts 1st Conference 
of the Parties (COP-1) to the 
UNFCCC; the Climate Technology 
Initiative (CTI) is formed, 
specifying the need for further 
research on longer-term 
technologies to capture and 
remove greenhouse gases 
1990s  1991: IEA forms the IEAGHG, 
coordinating research on CO2 
capture, use and storage 
 1992: University of Utrecht, The 
Netherlands, hosts 1st 
International Conference on 
Carbon Dioxide Removal (ICCDR-
1) 
 1990-1997: series of feasibility 
studies supported by US DOE 
 2005: G8 + 5 meeting at 
Gleneagles; target set to have 20 
full-scale CCS demonstration 
plants by 2010 
 2005: UK-China bilateral 
agreement on Near-Zero 
Emissions Coal with CO2 Capture 
and Storage (NZEC) programme 
2000 – 
2006  
 CCS included alongside 
renewables to form a portfolio of 
green technologies considered for 
future energy & climate change 
plans 
 2003-05: series of feasibility 
studies by UK DTI 
 2005: IPCC Special Report on CCS 
technology 
 2007: Amendments made to 
London Protocol and OSPAR 
convention to enable offshore CO2 
storage 
 2008: EU CCS Directive agreed by 
EU Council & Parliament 
 2009: Amendment made to 
London Protocol allowing 
transboundary export of CO2 
 2010: Agreement reached at 
Cancun COP16 to include CCS 




 2007: launch of UK CCS 
demonstration competition 
 2007: launch of NZEC initiative 
(Phase I) 
 2008: 9th IEAGHG Conference on 
CCS, Washington DC 
 2008: EU Commission – India 
Working Group meeting on 
Clean Coal, New Delhi 
 2008: DEFRA & British High 
Commission International CCS 
Workshop, New Delhi 
 2010: 1st International CO2 
Shipping Conference, London 





Herzog & Drake (1996), notably point out that initially the motivation behind CO2 
capture had nothing to do with the mitigation of greenhouse gases, but rather: 
“… the idea gained attention because of the potential economic 
benefits of this source of CO2, especially in enhanced oil recovery 
(EOR) operations in which CO2 is injected into oil reservoirs to 
increase the mobility of the oil and, therefore, the productivity of 
the reservoir.” (Ibid., p. 147) 
Their review states that a number of commercial CO2 capture plants were set up 
during the 1970s, though due to the drop in oil prices in the 1980s the capture plants 
had to be closed because EOR operations were too expensive (Ibid.). Therefore, in this 
context, CO2 capture technology by itself is an existing technological concept with an 
entirely different purpose. It can also be considered an incremental innovation, as it is 
used to augment fossil fuel production, and is therefore already part of an existing 
sociotechnical system, specifically, the sociotechnical system of oil and gas exploitation 
(i.e. the system includes exploration, production and distribution).  
Currently three main design approaches are being developed to capture CO2 from 
electricity generation based on fossil fuel or biomass: post-combustion, pre-combustion 
and oxyfuel combustion capture (see Figure 4.1). These approaches are generally 
viewed as being the most commercially advanced methods available for early 
deployment, where potentially 90% or more of the carbon emitted could be removed 





Figure 4.1: Main current technology options for CO2 capture from fossil fuel usage (source: 
CO2CRC (www.co2crc.com.au [2011])). 
In post-combustion capture the CO2 is removed at the final stage of the process, 
after the fossil fuel has been burned and just before the combustion products are 
vented to the atmosphere. One method involves wet scrubbing with aqueous amine 
solutions at relatively low temperatures (around 50C) to remove CO2 from the waste 
gas. The amine solvent then has to be regenerated for re-use by heating it to higher 
temperatures (approx 150C), during which the CO2 is removed, before the solvent is 
cooled and recycled. Lastly, the CO2 captured during the regeneration process is dried, 
compressed and transported to a safe geological storage site (Figure 4.1). This 
particular approach is very energy intensive and consequently results in the high costs 
associated with CCS capture technologies (Gibbins & Chalmers 2008). Even though 
post-combustion capture is an established method, when scaled-up, it could consume 
25-40% of the fuel energy of a power plant and be responsible for 70% or more of the 
additional costs to CCS (House et al. 2009). 
Pre-combustion capture entails the removal of CO2 prior to the combustion process, 
where fossil fuel or biomass can be partially combusted (e.g. gasified or reformed). 
Different technology options exist (e.g. gasification with oxygen and steam at high 
pressure), but a common feature of these options is that a gas, or ‘syngas’, comprised of 




reforming process for natural gas) is an established method where the syngas can be 
used to power turbines or in industrial applications such as fertiliser production. When 
water (steam) is added to syngas, the temperature is reduced and the CO converts to 
CO230, which can then be separated using a physical solvent (e.g. one which releases 
captured CO2 when pressure is increased) to leave a hydrogen-rich fuel gas (USDOE 
2006). Given that no heat is required to regenerate the solvent in this process, the 
direct energy requirement in pre-combustion capture technology may be half of what 
will be required for post-combustion capture. However, there are additional efficiency 
penalties associated with the pre-combustion capture system. This is because 
hydrogen-burning gas turbines have a lower efficiency than conventional natural gas or 
syngas units, mainly due to higher heat-transfer coefficients for combustion products 
from hydrogen-rich fuels (Gibbins & Chalmers 2008).  
Oxyfuel combustion involves burning the fossil fuel in an oxygen-rich environment 
(approx 95%) rather than air, where the main separation step is oxygen from nitrogen, 
as shown in Figure 4.1. This process produces a flue gas that is largely comprised of CO2 
and condensable water vapour. In this case, any components in the flue gas that are not 
CO2 can be separated relatively easily during the CO2 compression process. In the case 
of coal, oxides of nitrogen and sulphur (NOx and SOx), plus other pollutants will all need 
to be removed from the product gas before or during the CO2 compression process 
(USDOE 2008a). 
When comparing the capture technologies in terms of application to power 
generation using fossil fuels, a study by the IEAGHG in 2006 indicated that higher 
capital costs are associated with coal-fired power generation, rather than gas-fired, 
where post-combustion capture on gas is the least expensive option with the highest 
thermal efficiency. In addition, post-combustion capture on coal using best current 
commercial technologies are predicted to have higher thermal efficiencies for 
conversion to electricity than pre-combustion integrated gasifier combined cycle 
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(IGCC) designs, and is the least expensive option out of the three technologies for coal 
(IEAGHG 2006). There is, however, substantial uncertainty associated with the costs 
reported by this study (and others completed with technologies at this stage of 
development). More recent analysis by Mott MacDonald (see UKERC 2012, p. 7) also 
indicates that the total capital costs associated with CO2 capture at gas-fired power 
plants are the lowest in comparison with the other coal-based power plant 
technologies that were assessed. In terms of efficiency, Mott MacDonald’s report found 
that the energy penalty is roughly ten percentage points when CO2 capture is included 
on a coal power plant, meaning that the plant’s efficiency would be lowered from 42% 
to 32% (UKERC 2012, p7). Therefore, CCS is not without costs, and its role as a solution 
to climate change is not straightforward. 
4.2.2 Transport 
The majority of studies assume that once captured, the CO2 is pressurised to around 
110 bar to 150 bar, reducing its volume and forming a supercritical fluid (with density 
that is liquid-like, but viscosity that is gas-like) that can be transported away from the 
source to the storage site via dedicated pipeline infrastructure. Transporting liquefied 
CO2 by ship is also possible. Pipelines are generally feasible when the distance between 
the source of emissions and storage sites is in close proximity (GCCSI 2011). Again, the 
transport of CO2 using pipelines is not a novel concept, and it is an established 
technology both on land and under the sea. At present, approximately 50Mtpa31 of CO2 
is transported in 6,000km of pipelines in North America, where the majority of this 
network lies in the US and has been developed over the past 40 years (Ibid.). This 
pipeline network supports the US oil and gas industry, where CO2 is transported and 
used to augment oil production (see following section for more detail). The USDOE is 
currently considering how this existing network can also be used or adapted to support 
potential CCS projects (Ibid.). Therefore, similar to CO2 capture, transport technology 
using pipelines was designed for a different purpose, and is essentially a part of an 
established sociotechnical system, i.e. fossil-fuel production. 
                                                             




However, there are still some technical issues that need to be considered, chiefly 
the corrosive properties of supercritical CO2 and its impact on the durability of the steel 
pipes, as well as the purity of the CO2 stream captured that is to be transported in order 
to meet health and safety standards (IPCC 2005). Other factors that can influence CO2 
transport through pipelines are geographical location, terrain, and territorial 
boundaries. Still, pipelines are advantageous for large quantities and relatively short 
distances, provided that a steady state flow is received (Svensson et al. 2004), i.e. a 
continuous flow from the point source to the final storage site, thereby allowing for a 
possible elimination of buffer storage (see Figure 4.2). This implies that the 
requirement of steady flow may not suit the intermittency associated with some 
capture and injection technology, and therefore shipping would be more appropriate.  
 
Figure 4.2: CO2 transportation using pipeline infrastructure going to an offshore injection 
site (source: Anthony Veder (www.anthonyveder.com [2011])). 
In cases where the large point source of CO2 is not in close proximity to suitable 
storage sites, a more flexible and cost-effective way to transport the CO2 emissions 
could be via shipping vessels. This is particularly relevant for India as suitable storage 
is limited and predominantly offshore (see Chapter 7). Shipping CO2 is already a viable 
technology, though only on a kilo-tonne scale (IEAGHG 2004). A marine transportation 
system essentially consists of a CO2 liquefaction system, intermediate storage and 
loading facilities, CO2 transporting ship, and receiving facilities (see Figure 4.3). As with 
pipelines, gaseous CO2 is fairly inconvenient cargo for shipping, because its volume at 




essential prior to shipping in order to reduce the volume. CO2 transportation by ship 
has a number of similarities to the current transportation of Liquefied Petroleum Gas 
(LPG) and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). Consequently, for the design of the ship, tank 
form and onshore loading system, the existing technology for LPG transport has been 
the starting point for the development of CO2 transport (Aspelund et al. 2006).  
Figure 4.3: Main processes in the marine transport system (source: Anthony Veder 
(www.anthonyveder.com [2011])). 
Studies by the IEAGHG (2004) and Aspelund et al. (2006) describe the processes of 
the chain illustrated in Figure 4.3 in detail. As noted above, once the CO2 has been 
captured, it needs to be liquefied and stored at an intermediate storage facility. A 
typical liquefaction plant is expected to deliver CO2 at 6.5 bar and -52C to the 
intermediate storage tanks. If an onshore CO2 hub were to be introduced, intermediate 
storage facilities matching the incoming amounts of liquefied CO2 from a range of CO2 
sources would be needed. The CO2 is stored at the bubble point32 in semi-pressurised 
storage tanks until the ship berths at the quay. The loading system at the quay transfers 
the liquefied CO2 from these storage tanks at the liquefaction plant to the ship. The 
system includes all the necessary piping between tanks and ship, as well as pumps, and 
infrastructure for marine loading and offloading (Aspelund et al. 2006). Usually two 
parallel product pipes are provided between the tanks and the loading mechanism for 
discharging CO2 and a return line for CO2 vapour generated at the ship.  
                                                             




The offshore unloading system will unload the ship using an appropriate system 
given the location of the planned CO2 storage. The availability of the unloading system 
is of high importance to ensure a cost effective transport chain. Furthermore, a rapid 
unloading rate is important to increase the ship utilisation and reduce the total 
transport costs (Aspelund et al. 2006). 
Finally, the capacity, service speed, number of ships and shipping schedule that is 
planned will have to take into account the capture rate and injection rate of CO2, 
transport distance, and any social and technical restrictions (IEAGHG 2004). 
4.2.3 Storage 
The last stage of CCS is the most critical for the purpose of climate change 
mitigation. Given the amount of CO2 produced and captured at point sources, mitigation 
efforts require the permanent storage of the CO2 in deep underground geological 
formations. These formations that are expected to be most relevant for CCS have the 
natural trapping mechanisms that have led to the formation of oil and gas fields and 
that are also expected to be able to retain CO2 for millennia; and so they are considered 
to have the capacity to accommodate large volumes of CO2 for tens of thousands of 
years. Storage of CO2 is achieved by injecting CO2 at depths of around 800m or more 
below the surface, where at that depth and pressure it will be a supercritical fluid33 
(which is different from the fluid state that it is transported in), and seeps into the 
microscopic pore spaces of sedimentary basins34 (Holloway 2001). Sites considered 
suitable for storage include depleted oil and gas fields, unmineable coal-seams, or deep 
saline formations (see Figure 4.4). Other options are also being explored, such as the 
potential of CO2 storage in flood basalts35, which may be of significance to India. This 
                                                             
33 CO2 turns into a liquid state or becomes ‘supercritical’ when both its temperature and pressure go 
above their critical points, which is 31.1˚C and 7.39MPa respectively. 
34 Basins in this context are structural formation of rock strata, depressions, and usually of 
considerable size. 
35 Continental flood basalts are the result of huge volcanic eruptions, which coated vast areas of land 
with basalt lava in volumes of thousands of cubic kilometers (Hancock et al. 2000). Flood basalt areas 




option is further explored in Chapter Seven, which covers specifically India’s geology 
and storage potential.  
Figure 4.4: Different options for geological storage of CO2 (source: CO2CRC 
(www.co2crc.com.au [2011])). 
The concept of CO2 storage is based upon the experiences of the hydrocarbon 
industry, which have been injecting CO2 into the deep subsurface since the 1970s for a 
practice known as enhanced oil recovery (EOR). Generally, hydrocarbon fields consist 
of a layer of porous rock containing liquid oil and gas, which is sealed by an 
impermeable rock-layer, or a ‘caprock’ above the reservoir. The oil or gas is extracted 
from the deep subsurface through drilling boreholes through the caprock. This 
subsequently decreases the pressure within the reservoir rock, and it can be increased 
back to original pressures by injecting additional water (referred to as ‘brine’ in this 




injected with brine because it can chemically dissolve into the oil, decreasing the 
viscosity of the fluid, which then flows more easily to the surface (see Figure 4.5).  
Figure 4.5: Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) with CO2 injection (source: CO2CRC 
(www.co2crc.com.au [2011])). 
The caprock and subsequently other geological features trap the CO2 and prevent it 
from returning to the surface. Pre-existing boreholes that have already punctured the 
natural seal of the caprock would, however, need to be monitored as potential leakage 
pathways (Haszeldine 2009). Depleted oil and gas fields tend to be the preferred option 
for CO2 storage because they are well characterised, including the understanding of the 
three-dimensional geometry of rock structures, which is derived during the exploration 
and production of hydrocarbons (Haszeldine 2011). With EOR, CO2 injection 
technology is demonstrated and developed at a transferable scale, requiring similar 
mechanical and fluid engineering that is currently used by industry to circulate such 
large volumes of fluid on a daily basis (USDOE 2008b). For example, presently the US 
handles roughly 16 million bbl36/day of fluid hydrocarbons and 38 million bbl/day of 
water injection on a routine daily basis (Haszeldine 2011). This opens up the potential 
for the existing infrastructure to be recycled, which is likely to be cost effective. 
Additionally, some aspects of these mature technologies have already been transferred 
                                                             





to or used in other countries via multinational oil companies. Again, this prior use and 
existing infrastructure is important in understanding the commercial and political 
appeal of CCS technology. Notably, this existing infrastructure has a dual nature, as in 
some respects it can encourage uptake of CCS, e.g. low investment risk due to 
established injection technology know-how; but it can also be a hindrance, e.g. the extra 
cost for an entirely new large-scale pipeline networks required solely for CO2 
transportation.  
Coal beds are considered as good sites for potential CO2 storage due to their 
substantial capacity of coals to store gases by adsorption on their surfaces and within 
their porous structures. Whilst coal is underground it is coated with a layer of methane 
(CH4), and coal-beds generally can be a major source of natural gas. Since the 1970s CO2 
has been considered as an effective means to remove methane from coal in a process 
known as Enhanced Coal Bed Methane (ECBM) recovery (White et al. 2005). Similar to 
the EOR concept, ECBM involves injecting CO2 or a mixture of gases into a coal seam, 
where the CH4 is displaced when CO2 adsorbs onto the coal in its place. ECBM is most 
useful in unmineable coal seams, which are defined as deep underground coal for 
which mining is economically unfeasible, usually constrained by costs, sale prices and 
available technology (USDOE 2008c). This can be due to the natural conditions of the 
seam, where the coal is at an excessive depth. Additionally, this storage option is not 
receiving that much attention in many places due to relatively limited expected overall 
capacities for storage (GCCSI 2011).  
CO2 injection into deep saline formations is not as well explored or demonstrated, 
and is consequently far more challenging. However, they do offer a potentially 
enormous capacity for CO2 storage, more so than hydrocarbon fields, where potentially 
they could store decades or hundreds of years’ worth of CO2 emissions (Holloway 2001; 
IPCC 2005). Deep saline formations (or aquifers) are porous rocks filled with very salty 
water, which makes them unsuitable for providing water for drinking or agricultural 
practices, and are also more commonly found offshore. Out of all the CO2 storage 
options, this is one of the most significant in terms of capacity and potential, however 
less is known about deep saline formations compared to oil and gas fields. Nonetheless, 




demonstrating CO2 injection into deep saline formations for a number of years. A 
review of the experience gained from such projects by Michael et al (2010) concluded 
that CO2 storage in deep saline formations is technically feasible, but further 
demonstration at a much wider scale with fully integrated CCS projects is needed. 
Moreover, deep saline aquifers are more prevalent globally, and even though India is 
limited in storage in terms of its hydrocarbon fields, this geological option may have 
potential, particularly in the future, if CO2 emissions were to be shipped elsewhere.  
The following section considers the complexities and challenges associated with 
presenting CCS as a coherent and integrated technology, given its mixed history of quite 
separate functions, using an STS approach. This leads to a discussion on the political 
dimensions and underlying commercial objectives of CCS technology, which adds to its 
mixed identity. 
4.3 CCS: is it a coherent system or just a political project? 
Capturing CO2 and storing it permanently for climate change mitigation and 
emissions abatement can be considered a radical idea or vision. However, as highlighted 
in the previous section, the three parts of the CCS chain, i.e. capture, transport and 
storage, build upon existing technologies, which were designed for a different purpose 
entirely (i.e. the driver was not climate change mitigation). There are presently very 
few projects that are at scale, and technically integrate all the parts of the CCS 
technology system from capture through to permanent storage. Therefore, it can be 
argued that each of these stages are individually established technologies, and in 
essence are a collection of incremental technological innovations. Based on the 
technology conceptualisation diagram presented in Chapter 2 (see Figure 2.1), they can 
be visualised as separate entities, each with its own culture, regulations, institutions, 
market etc. (see Figure 4.6). In this way, it is misleading to describe CCS as a 
technology; it is actually more like a system, comprising multiple technologies, 






Figure 4.6: STS concept diagrams of the existing technologies that contribute to the CCS 
technology chain. 
Across the CCS chain, within the three different stages there is flexibility with a 
variety of options, allowing CCS to be adapted to different conditions. There is currently 
no optimum combination between these technology options, and variations in site-
specific factors are likely to determine which suite of technologies will be best for a 
particular purpose. However, this advantage of flexibility can also be a weakness, 
adding more complexity to the system, which in turn becomes more challenging to 
define boundaries and present a coherent system. Based on the previous figure, CCS 
technology is presented as a schematic diagram in Figure 4.7, illustrating the 
complexity associated with creating a coherent system. This coherence is an important 
issue, for example, for the UK Government, which was trying to present CCS as a viable 
climate mitigation tool to India and other developing countries. The configuration of 
CCS below is just a visual example, and this can change depending on which 




different stages could be incorporated into the CCS chain, therefore making the red 
circle in Figure 4.7 bigger. Also, over time these boundaries may change, as specialist 
areas emerge and the need to borrow directly from existing fields could diminish, 
therefore reducing the size of the red circle. Therefore these boundaries of a CCS 
system are changeable, contributing further to its flexible nature. 
Figure 4.7: An example of a STS concept diagram for a CCS technology chain. 
Moreover, the previous section also highlights the need to tweak, or adjust, the 
existing technologies specifically for CCS purposes. These could be considered as 
incremental innovations. However, their purpose is not to enhance the existing 
technology, rather, they are incremental innovations for a radical vision. Furthermore, 
the motivation behind such innovations does not necessarily match the ethos of the 
established technologies in Figure 4.6. For example, the hydrocarbon industry 
historically is based upon the extraction of resources from geological formations, rather 
than trying to contain a substance permanently within the strata (see Haszeldine 2011). 




reducing power available for export from a power plant, and therefore bringing down 
the overall efficiency of a power plant if it is using a CO2 capture facility. Therefore, a 
different philosophy is needed for CCS, though how does one achieve that, when there 
are different cultures already imbedded within the technologies required to make it 
work? This is a fundamental issue when it comes to defining CCS, contributing to its 
mixed identity. In essence, CCS technology calls for a technological revolution (see 
discussion in Chapter 2). This is not based on a cluster of radical innovations, but rather 
a cluster of incremental innovations from other combined systems in order to have a 
long-term impact on society. Again, this description indicates a mixture of identities, 
and therefore CCS challenges the theories discussed in Chapter Two, which set out the 
boundaries of technology and innovation as much more discrete and simple. As a result, 
it is difficult to define CCS as a coherent technology that can be transferred to other 
countries: it is more akin to a sociotechnical system.  
This changing identity of CCS makes it difficult to develop and transfer 
internationally. Notably, the representative from the Indian Ministry of Science and 
Technology opined that CCS didn’t come across as very “innovative” or “cutting-edge” 
compared to nuclear37 technology, stating that CCS seemed to be “old kit being dressed 
up and sold as something new,” and rather felt like “a step backwards” (Interview A1, 
2008). Another interviewee, from India’s National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd, 
(NTPC) thought the CCS vision would be considered more ‘novel’ and have greater 
appeal to India if the CO2 could somehow be converted into material for use, e.g. as 
feedstock for cement production; injecting CO2 underground seemed like a waste 
(Interview B9, 2008). Therefore, the CCS vision at this stage was still open to 
interpretation due to its mixed identity, and its role in mitigating climate change was 
not fully embraced in India. 
In addition, like many technologies, CCS transcends sectors and can also cross 
geographical boundaries. Current research is being driven by commercial Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) and Governments of those countries that have a historical 
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and stakeholders that participated in the survey. This comparison and its relevance to India’s energy 




aptitude with exploiting hydrocarbons and have very advanced industrial sectors, 
adding very a strong political dimension to the CCS system. This dimension is best 
viewed through a technological political realist lens, where the state has a significant 
role, and is a rational actor motivated by self-interest. The aim is “to gain influence 
among political elites and to secure markets for their goods” via technology transfer 
(Josephson 2006, p. 151). One way to achieve this would be to claim that CCS is a 
proven technology or viable concept as indeed was attempted by the UK and others in 
India during the study period. These political aspects of CCS are discussed more detail 
in the following section. 
CCS is being actively developed in Europe, North America and Australia, and 
according to the Australian-based Global CCS Institute’s (GCCSI) most recent report, 
there are eight large-scale projects currently in operation with a further six in 
construction (GCCSI 2011). These fourteen projects are listed in Table 4.2, where it is 
estimated that their combined storage capacity would total at over 33Mt of CO2 
annually (Ibid.). To put it in the context of mitigation, the GCCSI describes this number 
to be the equivalent of “preventing the emissions from more than six million cars from 
entering the atmosphere each year” (Ibid., p. 10). It should be noted that an EOR-based 
project cannot be considered a ‘full’ CCS project, or mitigation option, without 
monitoring, measurement and verification (MMV). Therefore, some of the older 
projects listed in the table below exhibit the initial capture, transport and injection 
aspects of CCS, but would require “further MMV systems and processes to be consistent 
with the demonstration of permanent storage” (Ibid., p. 12). Nevertheless, the GCCSI 






Table 4.2: Current Large-Scale Integrated CCS Projects (operational/ in construction); table adapted from GCCSI (2011). 
Location Project Name Status Industry/ Capture 
Technology 
Storage Type CO2 
Injected 
(Mtpa) 
Year of Operation 









3 - 4 2015 
Canada Boundary Dam with 
CCS 
In construction Power/ Post-
combustion 
EOR 1 2014 
Canada Agrium CO2 Capture 
with ACTL 
In construction Fertiliser/ Pre-
combustion 
EOR 0.6 2014 










USA Val Verde Natural Gas 
Plants 
Operational Gas processing/ Pre-
combustion 
EOR 1.3 1972 
USA Enid Fertilizer Plant Operational Fertiliser/ Pre-
combustion 






Location Project Name Status Industry/ Capture 
Technology 
Storage Type CO2 
Injected 
(Mtpa) 
Year of Operation 
USA Shute Creek Gas 
Processing Plant 
Operational Gas processing/ Pre-
combustion 
EOR 7 1986 
USA/ Canada Great Plains Synfuels 
Plant & Weyburn – 





EOR with MMV38 3 2000 
USA Century Plant Operational Gas processing/ Pre-
combustion 
EOR 5 2010 
USA Lost Cabin Gas Plant In construction Gas processing/ Pre-
combustion 
EOR 1 2012 
USA Illinois Industrial CCS 
Project 





USA Kemper County IGCC In construction Power/ Pre-
combustion 
EOR 3.5 2014 
                                                             
38 The Weyburn/Midale fields have been operational carbonate oil fields since the 1950s, however, CO2/water co-injection started in 2000 for EOR with an 




The committed projects listed in Table 4.2 are predominantly based on EOR and 
gas processing, highlighting further the dominant role of the hydrocarbon industry. Of 
the eight currently operational projects, none are in the power sector, largely due to 
issues of cost, scaling-up and improving the efficiency of the capture process. However, 
despite these challenges, several are now in the planning process or in construction, 
such as the Boundary Dam project in Canada with post-combustion capture, or the 
Kemper project with IGCC in the USA, indicating a shift towards developing CCS 
capability for electricity generation.  
Nevertheless, CCS in the power sector remains a high-risk option, where the GCCSI 
has highlighted the lack of financial and policy support as the primary reasons why 
projects have been cancelled or stalled (GCCSI 2011). The IEA’s recent World Energy 
Outlook report predicts that the cost of electricity generation can increase from nearly 
40 to 65% (depending on fuel source and technology used) if CCS technology is added 
to power plants (IEA 2011a). The power projects noted earlier receive considerable 
support from the US and Canadian Governments in terms of funding for R&D. In 
Europe, CCS power projects that were in the planning stages have been cancelled, 
including the Longannet project in Scotland, largely due to financial factors (White 
2014). The Vattenfall project in Jänschwalde, Germany, was cancelled primarily due to 
large-scale public opposition to onshore CO2 storage, citing environmental and safety 
concerns, along with the rejection of the CCS Bill in Germany’s Bundesrat (upper 
house) (Reuters 2011).  
Therefore, it is important to note that CCS is a radical vision, which has yet to be 
widely materialised even in developed states. Consequently, India is suspicious about 
the prospects of CCS, where the majority of stakeholders surveyed ranked ‘technology 
readiness’ as the top challenge for both initial projects as well as for widespread 
development (Survey 2009, Appendix B). The general feeling amongst stakeholders 
was that CCS had to be technologically demonstrated in developed countries before it 
could be applied to India (Ibid.). One survey respondent was of the opinion that “the 
developed nations will first need to show that they are using CCS on their own grounds 
otherwise political acceptance of technology will be an uphill task and long winded” 




“In our reading, [CCS is] an unproven technology with unknown 
costs, unknown environmental implications and unknown energy 
implications of transportation of CO2, hence we don’t favour it.” 
(Respondent 16, Survey 2009, Appendix C)  
There are a limited number of CCS projects in developing countries, which are, like 
India, largely waiting to see how the technology will develop in industrialised nations 
first. Other than the In Salah project in Algeria (Table 4.2), which was initiated by BP, 
there are a few projects planned in the UAE39 which are centred on pre-combustion 
capture with EOR (Masdar 2012). China has also shown a growing interest by focusing 
on domestic R&D in CCS technologies, with seven projects currently in the planning 
stages (GCCSI 2011).  However, China is not seen as an innovator, and these projects 
put more emphasis on utilizing CO2, either for EOR or the soft-drink industry. 
Researchers observed that the technology used in China was nearly twenty years old, 
and not necessarily being used with the aim of climate mitigation (Carrington 2012). 
There have been a few initial feasibility studies by international organisations, such as 
the IEAGHG’s research on the CO2 storage potential in the Indian sub-continent 
(IEAGHG 2008), and the World Bank’s report on deployment issues in southern African 
states (Kulichenko & Ereira 2011). However, there are no projects planned in these 
regions, and the IEA’s CCS roadmap considers them unlikely to develop there until 
2020 (IEA 2010). 
The reoccurring issues with all the projects reviewed above is cost and policy 
support, highlighting the importance of the economic and political dimensions of 
technology development. These issues are discussed further in the following section.  
4.3.1 The Political Project with a Commercial Objective 
Traditionally energy policy has been based upon economic and security concerns, 
where energy is seen as “a foundation for economic growth, prosperity and military 
power” (Meadowcroft & Langhelle 2009, p.17). However, given that the motivation for 
CCS is climate change mitigation, then there is a need to: 
                                                             




“… [position] environmental issues at the heart of energy policy, 
and [insist] on the need to radically restructure the energy 
economy in order to decouple economic activity from 
environmental pressures, and bring resource use and waste 
generation back within the supportive capacity of natural 
ecosystems.” (Ibid.) 
This implies a substantial overhaul of our current energy system, and Meadowcroft 
& Laghelle (2009, p. 18) point out that the contribution of CCS needs to be “judged in 
relation to the wider challenge of developing a carbon neutral energy system, as well to 
the requirement of sustainable development.” Climate change is a global problem, and 
if CCS is to be part of this movement towards a low-carbon economy, then political 
support is paramount for any long-term changes to global society. 
  However, there can be a conflict of interests, specifically, between the traditional 
drivers of energy policy and environmental concerns. Economic concerns are still a 
very strong driver for technology development and the “costs and risks must be 
considered as well as promised benefits” (Ibid.). Therefore, the costs associated with 
developing CCS at scale can impede technology development. Nevertheless, this section 
demonstrates that there was a very strong underlying power-based interest and 
business case objective for developing CCS technology.  
 It is no coincidence that CCS R&D activities are concentrated in specific developed 
nations. According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), the onus is on Annex 1 nations (developed countries) to act first to combat 
climate change, leading the way for Annex 2 nations (developing countries), although 
ultimately, action by all countries will be crucial. The review in the previous section 
highlights the dominance of highly industrialised CO2 emitting countries that are key 
hydrocarbon producers and exporters, and are strongly influenced by energy and fossil 
fuel industry interests. These countries are Australia, Canada, Norway, UK and the USA, 
all of whom have actively engaged in the UN climate change negotiations and have 
“shown considerable technological and policy interest in CCS” (Meadowcroft & 




This situation can be described further using political IR theory, where the work of 
de Coninck & Bäckstrand (2011, p. 377) highlights that “international institutions 
mirror the material interests of the most powerful states”, when looking at CCS politics 
through the realist lens. Notably, they point out the diminished role of UN agencies 
such as the IPCC, for international coordination on CCS, and the increased prominence 
of the International Energy Agency (IEA): 
“While the IPCC initially provided governance functions, such as 
the supply of information and legislation on CCS in national 
inventories, its role decreased in 2006. The IEA has gradually 
replaced IPCC as the key provider of information on CCS. The IEA 
is attuned to the interests of industrialized countries that are 
dependent on fossil fuels and possess large stakes in CCS 
technologies. The GCCSI also provides publicly available 
information. However, as an advocate for CCS, its legitimacy and 
independence are questionable.” (de Coninck & Bäckstrand 2011, 
p. 377) 
 The observation above is of particular significance to this specific chapter, as well 
as the overall thesis. It should be noted that the technical references for this chapter 
rely heavily upon IEA, IEAGHG, GCCSI reports, as well as government reports from the 
UK and the US. This coincides with the developments in CCS’s R&D history, depicted in 
Table 4.1 (Section 4.2) and the fact that the focus of this study is on the period after 
2006. Furthermore, this development illustrates the shift of political influence away 
from the UN, and dispersed over various international organisations, where “no single 
organisation can be held responsible” (Ibid.). This is explained further in terms of 




“CCS only advantages governments with strong fossil fuel 
interests if climate mitigation is pursued. The primary interest of 
such states as Canada, Australia and the United States is not to 
deploy and roll out CCS, but to delay aggressive climate abatement 
policies while symbolically promoting CCS research and capacity 
building.” (de Coninck & Bäckstrand 2011, p. 377)40  
This analysis is made in light of the initial international efforts made regarding CCS, 
which are listed in Table 4.1. Additionally, de Coninck & Bäckstrand (2011, p. 377) 
argue that after the 2005 IPCC Special Report, “the UN no longer acts as a node in the 
international coordination of CCS; political influence is diffused over a large group of 
international organisations, [where] no single organisation can be held responsible.” 
Since that time, there is still no fully functioning and integrated CCS technological chain 
being realized in any of the countries listed in the above quote. Subsequently, the 
researchers conclude “a fragmented regime complex on CCS without substantial and 
regulatory commitments to CCS suits the national interests of such states” (Ibid.).  
In addition to such political dimensions, there was also a strong business 
imperative for developing CCS technologies, and this objective is important to consider 
not only for technology transfer purposes, but in regards to the identity of CCS as well. 
The remainder of this section looks at how CCS development unfolded in the UK in 
particular, where the key advocates of CCS technology transfer were keen to highlight 
the potential application of CCS in emerging economies such as India and China.  
In February 2003 the UK’s Department of Trade & Industry (DTI) released an 
Energy White Paper presenting the need for urgent global action to combat climate 
change, and aimed to set the UK on a path to cut its CO2 emission by 60% by 2050 (UK 
DTI 2003a). Notably, the White Paper also acknowledged that fossil fuels had a role to 
play in a low-carbon economy and recognized that coal-fired generation was still a key 
part of the energy mix, both in the UK and internationally, provided that its CO2 
emissions could be reduced. Furthermore, the document declared the Government’s 
longer-term strategy of developing cleaner coal technologies as well as CCS (UK DTI 
2003, p. 12). At the same time, the DTI was already reviewing the potential of CCS in 
                                                             




the UK, releasing a report later in the same year, which explored the technical 
feasibility of CCS in the UK (UK DTI 2003b). CCS was presented as a three-step process 
that entails the capturing of CO2 from power plants or industrial process, then 
compressing and transporting the gas, which is then injected into the subsurface for 
permanent storage. 
From the onset, the UK Government saw CCS development as of strategic 
importance in terms of security of supply by keeping fossil fuels central to the energy 
mix, but also as a mechanism for cutting CO2 emissions in order to meet the 60% 
reduction target (UK DTI 2003a). However, another key element of UK energy policy 
was to develop cleaner fossil fuel technologies in order to give UK a competitive edge: 
“By making our intentions clear we aim to provide the signals 
needed for firms to invest – and to help British manufacturers to be 
ahead of the game in developing the green technologies that we 
expect to play a large part in the world’s future prosperity.” (UK 
DTI 2003a, p. 13) 
Furthermore, the 2003 White Paper also stressed the importance of technological 
innovation in order to develop these technologies for the potential of international 
technology transfer, particularly to the developing world:  
“… we will work both through our own national programmes and 
through a range of international collaborations and multilateral 
programmes which will enable us to maximise the return on 
our participation. We will work actively with partners in the G8 
and the EU to develop climate change technologies which will be 
of benefit not only in helping us meet our own carbon reduction 
ambitions but also in helping others, especially in the developing 
world, to meet theirs.” (UK DTI 2003a, p. 16)41 
There are two key things to note from the quote above, first the phrase “maximise 
the return” implies a commercial interest or a business case. Second, there is a call to 
collaborate with the G8 and the EU – developed nations – in order to develop 
                                                             




technologies potentially of use to developing countries. Not only does this last point 
highlight the importance of international relations to achieve such collaborations, but 
also it indicates where the main location of innovation and R&D is to take place, i.e. 
within developed countries. The aim here was to present CCS a coherent ‘product’, so 
that it could be transferred to the developing world in the future (see discussion at the 
beginning of Section 4.3).  
Subsequently, as part of its Cleaner Fossil Fuel Programme, the DTI released a 
series of reviews, firstly on CCS (UK DTI 2003b), then on CO2-based EOR (UK DTI 
2004), culminating in its Carbon Abatement Technologies (CAT) Strategy (UK DTI 
2005), which presented a suite of technologies for cleaner fossil-fuel use, which 
included CCS with the potential to reduce CO2 emissions by 85%. The CAT strategy was 
developed to signal the Government’s support for the commercial development and 
deployment of these technologies for both UK and global markets, and CATs were 
presented as complementing renewables, as part of the “family of sustainable energy 
technologies for tackling climate change” (UK DTI 2005, p. i).  
These developments have a significant bearing on the identity of CCS. Notably, CCS 
was described as “the most radical of the CAT options” that “involves the deployment of 
a chain of technologies for CO2 capture, transportation and storage,” rather than just 
focusing on the combustion process alone (UK DTI 2005, p. 5)42. It seems that CCS was 
being presented as something revolutionary, which would have a major impact on 
society globally. However, Section 4.2, as well as the discussion at the beginning of 
Section 4.3, shows that the capture, transport and storage parts of the CCS chain are all 
mature and established technologies in their own right. Moreover, the technologies of 
each of the stages are mature only in their application contexts, and will therefore 
require further development for use in the new application of CCS. Therefore, the 
‘radicalness’ of this vision is more to do with linking plus adapting all of these 
components together and at a far more significant scale, as well as introducing a new 
                                                             




policy objective of CCS – climate mitigation. These new additions bring complexity to 
the CCS sociotechnical system, its development, and subsequently its transfer. 
Moreover, the UK CAT strategy had specific developing countries in sight for 
potential technology transfer, highlighting that by 2030 China and India would likely 
account for nearly half of the energy demand (and subsequent emissions) of the total 
developing country demand (UK DTI 2005, p. 4). In fact, there is an entire section 
dedicated to engagement activities with China and India within a special report of the 
House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (UK House of Commons 2006, 
p. 32). Therefore, it can be shown that from the beginning CCS was being developed as 
a coherent package to be exported, targeting emerging economies with increasing 
energy demand in particular. This ambition reflects the overall approach of UK foreign 
policy at that time, which was to combine China and India together and view them as a 
single entity. The twinning of these two countries in the context of CCS was best 
demonstrated at the 2005 G8 Gleneagles summit, and later within the Stern Report in 
2006 (see section 1.1). As Chapter One demonstrates, however, this linking of China 
and India was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Indian social and 
political context.    
Interestingly, in the House of Commons report it was noted by Brian Morris, the 
head of the DTI CAT strategy at the time, “China had responded far more positively 
than India to the UK’s approaches regarding CCS” (UK House of Commons 2006, p. 32, 
Paragraph 68). Furthermore, it was noted that “the major obstacle to the adoption of 
CCS technologies by countries such as India and China is still the lack of value attached 
to carbon internationally” (Ibid., p. 33, Paragraph 70). This highlights the importance of 
an economic incentive in order to encourage adoption of the technology, e.g. additional 
revenues from EOR, which is why it is the dominant storage option in proposed 
projects (see Table 4.2). Notably, a survey respondent commented, “from the Indian 
point of view CCS has very limited application unless this technology is packaged with 
Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery options” (Respondent 1, Survey 2009, Appendix C). 
In the context of technology transfer, the exporting opportunities were also 
considered by the UK Government, stating that “opportunities for UK companies are 




UK is more likely “to sell the knowledge” because it is expected that “China and India 
would build their own equipment very quickly” (UK House of Commons 2006, p. 35, 
Paragraph 74). The discourse alludes to CCS as a fully-formed product, which could be 
easily sold abroad, however in reality a full scale CCS demonstration project was yet to 
be developed and constructed in the UK at the time the House of Commons 
commissioned the report. 
Subsequently, CCS became an important feature of the UK Government’s position in 
the run up to the December 2009 UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen. In June 2009, 
the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) released a report stating its 
strategic ambitions regarding CCS and its role within the negotiations: 
“In October [2009] the UK will be co-hosting with Norway the 
Carbon Sequestration43 Leadership Forum (CSLF) where we aim to 
scale up international action on Carbon Capture and Storage 
demonstration and build the momentum for an ambitious outcome 
at Copenhagen.” (UK DECC 2009a, p. 49) 
The report emphasised the importance of international collaboration in the 
development of new technologies, particularly to “identify innovation gaps” and 
encourage cooperation between developed and developing countries, plus the private 
sector “where appropriate to accelerate development and demonstration of specific 
technologies” (Ibid.). Notably, there was a spotlight on the EU-China Near Zero 
Emissions Coal (NZEC) initiative, to which the UK government provided nearly £3.5 
million (UK DECC 2009a, p. 50). The aim of the NZEC initiative, which was launched in 
2007 (Phase I), was to assess the CCS options in China, and the Phase 1 conclusions 
were launched in Beijing, a month prior to the Copenhagen negotiations (Ibid.). In 
addition, DECC also stressed the need for UK-India collaboration, specifically on 
intellectual property rights (IPR) related barriers to the transfer of low carbon energy 
technologies (UK DECC 2009a, p. 47). These particular aspects of the DECC report 
indicate not only the strategic importance of India and China for technology transfer 
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purposes, but also demonstrate the UK Government’s international political agenda to 
raise the profile of CCS technology as a viable climate mitigation tool. 
The fact that India was so strongly against CCS at this time is interesting, 
particularly as this was a period when the popularity of CCS technologies was on the 
rise globally. Moreover, CCS was being lauded as an option for climate change 
mitigation that allowed the continued use of fossil fuels – something that emerging 
economies are heavily reliant upon. In comparison, China was already actively engaged 
with the NZEC programme, which was led by the UK, looking at options for CCS 
demonstration on coal in China (UK House of Commons 2007). Interestingly, the 
memorandum from BERR to the Select Committee on Science & Technology stated that 
the UK “is actively pursuing a similar project in India” (Ibid.). Essentially, at the start of 
the study period (2007), I was part of a key academic team that was aligned with the 
UK Government’s ambitions. However, the reality on the ground was far different from 
what was anticipated. Therefore the focus of this study shifted towards the political 
and social aspects of India’s refusal to consider CCS, (and the UK and EU's persistence 
in India).  
4.4 Conclusion 
CCS technology is complicated. It comprises of the linkage of three stages: capture, 
transport and storage of CO2 emissions, all of which are based on existing technologies 
with varying application contexts. This gives CCS a mixed identity, making it difficult to 
define in sociotechnical terms, primarily because it does not fit within the traditional 
boundaries of technology innovation theories, as it is not a discrete technology unlike 
most of the empirical case studies. CCS is best viewed as a sociotechnical system, rather 
than a technology. Given that its raison d’être is climate mitigation, CCS could be part of 
a technological revolution, transforming the wider energy sociotechnical system and 
thereby global society, by contributing to the transition to a low carbon economy. 
However, in reality, CCS is a cluster of incremental innovations, combined discursively 
in order to create a radical vision. The ‘radical’ aspect of CCS is the linking and 
integration of the three incremental innovations, though this has not been materially 





There is flexibility within the CCS sociotechnical system, where for example, there 
are multiple technical options for the different stages of the technology. For example 
CO2 can be captured either pre or post combustion, it can be transported either by 
pipelines or ship and it can potentially be stored in depleted oil fields or deep saline 
aquifers. There is no set configuration for the CCS chain, and various combinations of 
the different technologies can be applied, depending on the social and technical 
context. Illustrative examples include a coastal power plant uses shipping transport to 
an offshore storage site, or an onshore facility can pipe CO2 to another country for 
disposal. This added flexibility is useful for technology transfer and increases potential 
for application in different country contexts. However, this flexibility also contributes 
to the mixed identity of CCS, and therefore it is a challenge to consider CCS as a 
coherent technology. This lack of coherence made it more difficult for the UK 
government to market and promote CCS as a viable mitigation tool; there were far too 
many ‘unknowns’ and India felt that the technology was not yet ready to be deployed. A 
primary concern was that CCS had yet to be demonstrated at scale in developed 
countries, where several projects had been stalled due to rising costs involved or lack 
of public support.  
Moreover, the mixed identity of CCS is also reflected in the political and economic 
dimensions of the technology, particularly as it builds upon the existing dynamics of 
sociotechnical systems such as oil and gas production, as well as electricity networks. 
These sociotechnical systems involve large national infrastructures, which imply the 
dominant role of the state, as well as commercial MNCs, which tend to operate across 
political borders. Therefore it is important to also consider the international political 
and economic objectives regarding CCS development. Technological political realism in 
particular highlights the dominant political influence of key developed nations, which 
have a strong history of hydrocarbon production and dependence, and this would allow 
them a competitive advantage.  
In addition, it can be argued that CCS was marketed as a coherent technology, i.e. a 
simpler product than it really is. This was done in order to make it seem less 
challenging for technology transfer purposes. CCS was also specifically targeted at the 




due to the mixed identity of CCS, it is open to interpretation, and therefore, some 
countries, notably the USA and China, have focused on the potential of utilising the CO2 
emissions. Notably, India also shows interest in using the CO2 rather than storing it, and 
this shifts CCS away from the original central objective of climate change mitigation. 
CCS can therefore also be viewed as a product where the cost and risks can be accepted 
for both environmental and monetary gains. However, this mixed identity does not set 
a clear development pathway for CCS technology, and could have implications for its 
potential technology transfer to another country. As a result of its mixed identity, India 
was sceptical and did not accept the CCS vision set out by the UK Government. The 
following chapters focus in more detail in explaining why. Chapter Five details India’s 
energy context, looking specifically at how CCS could be integrated into this system, 
based on the characteristics of the technology discussed here, and India’s historical and 





Chapter 5: India’s Energy Context 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter illustrates the complex and multi-faceted nature of CCS 
technology. Accordingly, if CCS were to become a part of India’s energy system, then 
how can this be realised? How would this technology be received and integrated into 
the existing system? What are the challenges for innovation and deployment? These 
questions were being considered by the elite decision makers interviewed during the 
period of my research (2007-10). It was found that aspects of India’s rich and complex 
history had a bearing upon the answers to all of these questions. The conceptual 
frameworks presented in Chapter Two provide a useful framework for analysis, and 
are discussed throughout this chapter under three general themes for understanding 
how India’s historical and present context can influence CCS technology transfer: 
innovation; technology transfer; politics and international relations (IR).  
This chapter aims to answer the questions raised above by reviewing notable 
historical events that have influenced India’s technological innovation and how this has 
affected the development of its energy sector. The aim is to explore the historical and 
contemporary Indian context in order to understand the potential for CCS technology 
transfer in India. Providing broader historical context is crucial because of the close 
relationship between Indian culture and innovation, as observed by MacLeod and 
Kumar (1995): 
“It is no mere coincidence that two great events, the Industrial 
Revolution and the process of colonisation, took place almost 
simultaneously… It all began with the expansion in commercial 
activities. The flag followed the trade, and both were conscious of 
the importance of scientific discoveries and technological changes. 
The story of India’s colonisation is no exception to this rule.” 
(MacLeod & Kumar 1995, p. 11) 
As previously discussed in Section 2.2.1, the theoretical approaches to technological 
change, innovation and the international aspects of these phenomena highlight an 
intricate and interwoven relationship between technology and society. Therefore, it is 




colonialism, where “socio-economic changes are often influenced, if not determined, by 
particular technological events” and “colonisation affected the social, economic, 
political and cultural processes of both the colonised and coloniser” (MacLeod & Kumar 
1995, p. 8 & 11). This is of particular relevance to India, which was under British 
colonial rule until 1947 and as a consequence colonisation has not only shaped India’s 
energy sector, but has also influenced institutions for indigenous R&D as well as 
technology transfer mechanisms. Furthermore, how India’s relations developed with 
the rest of the world post-independence gives clues to the international characteristics 
of India’s receptivity to modern technology. These aspects are factors in determining 
whether CCS can be integrated into India’s energy sector, particularly, as demonstrated 
in Chapters Two and Four, CCS R&D is largely taking place outside India. 
With just over 60 years since it was carved out of the Indian sub-continent, India is 
a relatively young nation. Yet, the energy characteristics that defined the region under 
British rule still persist today. These include a disparity between urban and rural 
populations, each with different energy consumption patterns; a centrally controlled 
energy production system, where pre-1947 it was mostly owned by the British private 
sector, and now it is the Central Government; and lastly, a limited supply of resources 
for electricity generation. Resolving these issues is considered critical for achieving 
energy security and poverty alleviation, not only for India, but the region as a whole 
(see Ebinger 2011; Chellaney 2012). 
In terms of direct CO2 emissions, a sector-by-sector analysis by Parikh et al. in 2009 
indicates that the majority of emissions (84%) come from six key sectors: electricity, 
manufacturing, steel, transport, cement and commercial services. Drawing on the 
discussions regarding the multiple identities, flexibility and applications of CCS (see 
Chapters 2 and 4) and it is apparent that CCS technologies could potentially be applied 
to a number of key industries in order to cut down CO2 emissions. However, to better 
understand the challenges for CCS technology transfer to and within the Indian energy 
system, it is important to consider the historical events and decisions that have shaped 
and influenced the present-day energy system. The historical background also provides 
an insight into how India innovates, for example, the development of its National 




the NSI approach emphasises the importance of localised competence and learning 
(Lundvall et al. 2003) and that understanding a country’s capacity for innovation is 
crucial for realising the potential of CCS technologies transfer to different country 
contexts. This also links with other approaches discussed in Chapter Two, regarding 
the movement of technology from developed to developing countries, through 
international relations and technology transfer mechanisms, which are key aspects of 
establishing a large sociotechnical system, but have been traditionally neglected in the 
literature (Fritsch 2011; Bridge et al. 2013). There are specific historical and political 
circumstances that have influenced such transfers, particularly in the context of India’s 
energy sector, which are presented in Section 5.2. Furthermore, given the current 
status of CCS technologies (see Chapter 4), the current pattern of energy use and 
development within India’s relevant sectors also indicates the potential for CCS 
technology application, especially in terms of early deployment. This discussion is 
presented in Section 5.3. 
5.2 Energy History: Science & Technology Innovation in the 
Postcolonial State 
Here I examine India’s past, highlighting events that have not only influenced how 
India acquired technology and subsequently developed its own capabilities, but also 
shaped the energy system that is in place today. Analysis starts from the build-up to the 
Second World War, when India was still under British rule, to the newly independent 
state under Nehru’s leadership, and through to an era governed by his daughter, Indira 
Gandhi, which was a time of significant nationalisation and protectionism. Finally, in 
the last decade of the 20th century a number of economic reforms were introduced, 
which led to a period of rapid economic growth coming into the 21st century. All of 
these periods in India’s past have not only determined the state of the current Indian 
energy sector, but they also shaped India’s innovation system and the relevant 
institutions and organisations supporting indigenous research and development 





5.2.1 Pre-independence (Pre-1947): Colonial Science and Early Technology 
Transfer 
In comparison to the “colonies of settlement”, i.e. Canada and Australia, India 
already had “a long and rich history of distinctive indigenous techno-scientific 
traditions” when the British arrived (MacLeod & Kumar, 1995, p. 9). However, under 
colonial rule, all science and technology related policy in India was designed and set by 
the British Government (MacLeod & Kumar 1995). However, science policy was not 
well-defined because it wasn’t considered necessary for the development of the colony, 
and even though there had been calls for the promotion of science in colonial India, 
particularly for the improvement of agriculture and industry, there remained a laissez-
faire approach (Abraham 1998; Narasimha 2008; Rao 2008). MacLeod & Kumar (1995, 
p. 8) describe colonial science as being primarily concerned with the discovery of 
natural resources, where exploratory activities and research focused on “geology, 
meteorology, botany, agriculture and forestry”. Furthermore, MacLeod & Kumar (1995, 
p. 9) also highlight the importance of political drivers for science and technology policy 
during this period, which is described as: 
“… a global system which by custom exchanged raw materials for 
manufactured goods, [where] the leading imperial question was 
how best to encourage local innovation and investment through 
technology and its associated skills, without losing control of its 
profitable and portable benefits.” (MacLeod & Kumar, 1995, p. 9) 
The established Indian universities of that period were predominantly focused on 
‘scholarship’ rather than ‘research’, and trained subordinate personnel for colonial civil 
service (VijayRaghavan 2008). Nevertheless, a few individuals and leading business 
families were driving indigenous research and innovation, notably the Tata family, who 
with the help of the Maharajah of Mysore, established the Indian Institute of Science in 
Bangalore in 1909 (Piramal & Herdeck 1986; Narasimha 2008). These individuals were 
instrumental in establishing the foundations for India’s innovation system prior to 
independence. As the work of Hughes (1983) demonstrated, the role of individual 
actors whose support and promotion of particular technologies led to the 
electrification in the West, similarly, these historical figures were India’s ‘system 




India’s innovation, and the more current context is discussed later in Section 5.2.4. 
Therefore, this can be seen as an important aspect of how India develops technology, 
and will need to be considered when it comes to CCS. Both in terms of fostering 
innovation and having political power, it indicates that such system builders might be 
required within India in order to support a sociotechnical system such as CCS.  
During and between the two World Wars, the colonial state conceded that modern 
science and technology was key to its national security. Even though Britain was keen 
to ensure that “no commercially or military sensitive technology became available to 
the ‘natives’” (Narasimha 2008, p331), a number of ordnance factories and production 
facilities for defence goods were set up, in addition to the Indian Industrial Commission 
in 1916 and Munitions Board in 1917 (Abraham 1998). This is how ‘modern science’ 
was introduced to India, representing the initial method of technology transfer by 
which India acquired modern technology. By the time of WWII, and through to Indian 
independence in 1947, “the national question became one of deciding how best to 
transform modern modes of production and means of control into research 
organisations and institutions run by Indians, following agendas set by a democratic 
India” (MacLeod & Kumar 1995, p. 9). This period is marked by a surge in investment 
in indigenous research institutes and national laboratories, including the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) (1929), the Council of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (CSIR) (1942), the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) (1949), and 
significantly, the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research (TIFR) (1945), which 
pioneered India’s nuclear energy programme (Abraham 1998; VijayRaghavan 2008).  
The development of the electricity sector in the transition period from colonial rule 
to independence, set the tone for India’s power sector for years to come. Commercial 
energy44 was largely produced by private sector companies, which were British owned 
and operated (Ebinger 2011). The electricity mix consisted of coal, oil, and 
hydroelectricity, where most of the electricity produced was for industrial purposes 
                                                             
44 Commercial energy is defined here as energy that can be bought and sold, and therefore easier to 
quantify; includes oil, gas, coal, hydroelectric power, nuclear power and renewable energy resources 
such as solar and wind. Non-commercial energy in this context would include resources that 




rather than civilian needs, and “the hydro: thermal generation mix was almost 50:50” 
(Sudarshan & Noronha 2009, p. 11). In the lead up to independence, large-scale 
electricity production and distribution was minimal and confined to large cities such as 
Calcutta and Mysore (Ebinger 2011). Large thermal power plants were scarce during 
this period, and India’s annual consumption per capita was just 1% of Britain’s 
consumption, and India’s total generation capacity was 1,500 MW (Sudarshan & 
Noronha 2009, p. 11). 
Notably, this period of India’s energy history illustrates how, as a post-colonial 
state, India inherited form the UK an existing sociotechnical system in the form of coal-
based thermal generation and hydropower. In other words, its energy system was 
acquired under colonisation, where the institutions and infrastructure were influenced 
by the British regime. India has had a long history of international technology transfer 
in the energy sector, influenced by colonisation. The following sub-section considers 
this aspect further in the context of nuclear technology.  
5.2.2 Post-independence: Nehru, Nuclear Power and the National System of 
Innovation 
The previous section presents the foundations of India’s energy system, 
highlighting not only the influence of British colonial rule, but also the importance of 
indigenous system builders. This combination of international technology transfer and 
indigenous R&D was also an essential part of the development of India’s nuclear sector. 
The parallels and implications for establishing a similar sociotechnical system, such as 
CCS, are discussed in this sub-section. 
Nuclear energy in India is relevant to CCS technology transfer because: (1) both are 
essentially competing options for base-load electricity generation (e.g. Tavoni & van 
der Zwaan 2011); (2) both have the capability to significantly reduce CO2 emissions; 
and also (3) because there are parallels that can be drawn upon issues such as the 
significant role of the state, construction of large infrastructures and risks associated 
with geological storage (UKERC 2012). In terms of meeting India’s electricity demand, 
all survey respondents listed nuclear as one of the top three important energy 




contributor to the current electricity supply mix.45 It is expected to have an even more 
important role in the future; it is anticipated that by 2050 nuclear would be ranked 
second to coal in importance according to survey respondents (Ibid.). Furthermore, 
during the study period of this thesis, nuclear was considered the top investment 
priority by the Indian Government in the context of developing a low-carbon future, 
demonstrated by the Indo-US nuclear deal (discussed further in Box 5.1). Notably, all 
survey respondents considered nuclear and solar as the key investment priority for the 
Government presently and over the next forty years, with CCS only becoming a priority 
after 2030, if successfully demonstrated elsewhere (Ibid.).  
There are certain aspects of how nuclear technology was developed in India 
historically that can provide some insights into how CCS may or may not have a role 
within India’s energy system. Firstly, I examine the impact of the system builder on the 
sociotechnical system. Science was considered to be an integral part of India’s future, 
and a number of exceptional Indian scientists46 were “a major cultural force that 
changed the country’s perception of itself and its people’s abilities” (Narasimha 2008, 
p. 331). Even before the first government of independent India was formed in August 
1947, the Congress Party, lead by Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhash Chandra Bose, had 
deliberated upon issues related to science and national development and had 
established its own science policy (Narasimha 2008; Rao 2008). Nehru was also a great 
friend and collaborator to many of India’s scientists at the time, in particular, the 
physicist Homi Bhabha, who pioneered India’s nuclear energy programme. Together 
they had envisioned a future based on atomic energy for the country’s development 
needs, and both went to great lengths to make it a part of India’s energy system.  
Both Nehru and Bhabha were akin to Thomas Hughes’s ‘system builders’, and given 
the independence movement at the time, they are also considered to be part of the 
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present and through to 2030; Coal was ranked number one, and hydro as second (Appendix B). 
46 There were significant developments taking place in science due to the efforts of a number of 
exceptional Indians, even 75 years prior to Indian independence. Notable examples are H. Bhabha, 
J.C. Bose, S.N. Bose, C.V. Raman, S. Ramanujan, and M.N. Saha, who were all ‘products of the 




founding fraternity of India. Therefore, atomic energy can be associated with India’s 
national identity as well as the institutions that are a part of India’s NSI. When Nehru 
became India’s 1st Prime Minister, he put in place a series of policies that dictated 
public and private participation in scientific and industrial development. Nehru 
believed that science and technology were tools with which “to transform a civilization 
in distress”, and the solution for alleviating poverty (Narasimha 2008, p. 332). These 
beliefs formed the basis for his ‘Scientific Policy Resolution,’ proposed to Parliament in 
1958: 
“The dominating feature of the contemporary world is the intense 
cultivation of science on a large scale, and its application to meet a 
country’s requirements. It is this, which, for the first time in man’s 
history, has given to the common man in countries advanced in 
science, a standard of living and social and cultural amenities, 
which were once confined to a very small privileged minority of the 
population.” (Government of India, 1958) 
Ideologically, Nehru was advocating a ‘socialistic society’, and a foreign policy of 
‘nonalignment’, looking disfavourably upon foreign influence and admission of market 
capitalism into the country (Abraham 1998; Narasimha 2008). Therefore, he also put 
more emphasis on ‘self-reliance’ whilst developing the public sector and domestic 
private sector: 
“Science and technology can make up for deficiencies in raw 
materials by providing substitutes, or, indeed, by providing skills 
which can be exported in return for raw materials. In 
industrialising a country, heavy price has to be paid in importing 
science and technology in the form of plant and machinery, highly 
paid personnel and technical consultants. An early and large scale 
development of science and technology in the country could 
therefore greatly reduce the drain on capital during the early and 
critical stages of industrialisation.” (Government of India, 1958) 
However, this objective of ‘self-reliance’ actually stemmed from a number of 
science and defence strategies proposed to the Indian Government just before and after 
independence. A series of internal reports prepared by British scientists stressed the 
need for self-reliance in the design and manufacture of war materials, and were of the 




growth in the institutions of science” (Abraham 1998, p. 56). One report in particular, 
by biologist A.V. Hill, who was Secretary to the Royal Society in 1944, suggested “a 
centralised system of scientific administration, expansion of the funds dedicated to 
scientific activities, and the formation of institutes of technology on the model of the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology” (Abraham 1998, p. 55). This part of India’ 
history is more reflective of arguments posed by Fritsch (2011) and Sylvest (2013), 
which is that the STS approach to understanding national infrastructure systems 
should also take account of the role of international actors and security drivers, issues 
focused upon by IR scholarship. Subsequently, Nehru’s Government invested a 
significant part of its resources in creating quality institutions of higher education and 
research, including the establishment of the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) 
(Narasimha 2008). The Government also set up several modern industries in the public 
sector, including heavy electrical machinery, machine tools, electronics and telephones 
(Narasimha 2008).  
Second, I consider the significance of international political relations on India’s 
energy sector, specifically, nuclear electricity generation. The period reviewed thus far 
signifies the foundation of India’s NSI, which entails key institutions, such as the 
aforementioned IITs that were formed then, and are still central to the country’s 
innovative capacity today. This NSI was viewed for nearly thirty years as a model for 
other developing countries to follow, and it remains a source of national pride 
(Mashelkar 2008; Rao 2008; VijayRaghavan 2008). Furthermore, the NSI was capable 
of supporting and fostering innovation in India’s atomic energy R&D programme. Box 
5.1 (below) presents the historical foundation of India’s nuclear programme, not only 
highlighting the socio-political drivers within the country at the time, but also 




Box 5.1: India’s love for nuclear power 
Nehru had always been a strong advocate for science and technology, seeing it as a means for 
enhancing economic development and lifting his people out of poverty. He was even more passionate 
about nuclear energy; and his fascination with its potential was evident as soon as he became the 
Prime Minister of a newly independent India in 1947, two years after the destruction of Hiroshima. 
The timing of India’s independence and “the sudden possibility of access to enormous and  cheap 
sources of energy seemed too good to be true – it had to be divinely ordained” (Abraham 1998, p. 7). 
 
“Atomic energy was an opportunity that could not be missed, both for its tremendous power 
potential and because it was one area where the most developed and least developed states 
would be beginning on relatively even footing.” (Ibid.) 
 
Within one year after independence, Nehru had established the Indian Atomic Energy Commission 
(AEC) within the Department of Scientific Research, and by 1954 a separate department for atomic 
energy was formed that reported directly to the Prime Minister.  
Nehru was also on very good terms with a renowned Indian physicist, Homi Jehangir Bhabha, who had 
returned from Cambridge just before India’s independence. With the help of Bhabha’s former 
colleagues in Britain, India was able to set up an operational reactor by 1956. Since this period India 
has been pursuing both conventional (natural uranium-based) and advanced (enriched uranium-
based) nuclear energy technologies. Today, India has 20 operational reactors, with a combined 
capacity of 4,391 MW, and another 5 reactors are under construction, which have a combined capacity 
of 3,564 MW (Ebinger 2011, p. 46). 
Bhabha’s Thorium Strategy: 
India’s nuclear energy ambitions have always been about thorium. Although enough quantities of 
uranium had been discovered to power a few conventional reactors, by the mid 1950s the AEC realised 
that its most extensive resource was thorium (India has 25% of the world’s thorium reserves). Bhabha 
had decided that any self-sustaining long-term strategy had to be thorium based, which could not be 
used directly as a fuel, unless combined with plutonium. And so came the idea for breeder reactors: 
“Thus the first step to utilising thorium is to produce sufficient quantities of plutonium. 
Plutonium, which is produced in a reactor as an end-product of fuel burnup (regardless of 
whether the fuel is enriched or natural uranium), can be used to ‘blanket’ thorium in a second-
stage reactor, allowing it to become fertile, and thus to produce the highly fissile isotope of 
uranium, U-233. The U-233 produced in this way can be used as fuel in a third stage ‘breeder’ 
reactor. The planned culmination of the Indian strategy was a family of breeder reactors 
fuelled by U-233, which because of the physics of these elements in the core, would produce 
as much new fuel as was being used up.”(Abraham 1998, p. 92) 
However, for this strategy to work, India needed access to plutonium, which is best known for the first 
generation of military nuclear weapons: the atom bomb. And so, getting unimpeded access to 
enriched uranium had been impossible for decades. Bhabha and Nehru hadn’t fully considered the 
political ramifications of this strategy. Nonetheless, it is important to note, “at the time of embarking 
upon this strategy, the technology for breeder reactors did not exist. The Indian AEC’s long-term 
strategy was based on scientific principles – the physics and chemistry of atoms and its knowledge of 




 Indo-US Nuclear Deal: 
With a change in geopolitics, two nations, who had once been at odds during the Cold War, are now 
working together to realise Bhabha’s dream. The US-India Agreement on Civil Nuclear Cooperation 
was signed into law in December 2008. This provides India with access to the international market for 
civilian nuclear technologies, without having to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a result of this 
agreement, India is now able to source its uranium from other countries such as Mongolia, Russia and 
Australia. The aim of this agreement is to ensure security of supply for the nuclear fuel cycle associated 




India is still very keen on a breeder reactor programme based on a thorium fuel cycle, and R&D has 
remained a priority for the Government. A fast breeder test reactor has been operating since 1985, 
and a 500 MW prototype fast breeder reactor is currently under construction. Though, public pressure 
has led to the passing of stringent legislation concerning civil liabilities from potential nuclear damage 
in 2010. This piece of legislation is particularly discouraging private international nuclear vendors 
because it “renders suppliers liable for damages” if they are considered at fault for an accident 
(Ebinger 2011, p. 47). However, state-backed companies are not so concerned, such as those in France, 
Russia and South Korea, as they are hoping the state will help cover the risk (Ibid.). Nevertheless, in 
the wake of the 2011 Fukushima earthquake, there has been substantial public opposition to the 
construction of nuclear power plants with mass demonstrations temporarily halting the construction 
of a joint venture plant with Russia in southern India (Bajaj 2011). Therefore, it may yet still be some 




Even though India had comparable depth and talent to the West when it came to 
scientific expertise, Box 5.1 highlights the importance of international technology 
transfer as well as political drivers for supporting its nuclear ambitions. This is both for 
India’s initial reactors, as well as for the current Government’s development plans. 
Building upon the discussion in Chapter Two regarding the geographies of energy 
transitions, Bridge et al. (2013, p. 332) acknowledge the importance of international 
factors in innovation processes, i.e. the movement of technology beyond national 
borders. For such shifts to occur, the political relationships between different countries 
are a key determinant for technology transfer (see Herrera 2006 & Fritsch 2011). For 
example, Box 5.1 illustrates how existing relations with Britain at the time of 
independence influenced the development of India’s first operational reactor. However, 
during the cold war, India’s relations with the Soviet Union were strengthened through 
technology transfer (Mehrotra 1990), which was looked upon unfavourably by the USA, 
and the political ramifications of this relationship slowed down the development of 
India’s nuclear capabilities (Abraham 1998). In terms of IR theory, this period of India’s 
energy history can also be viewed through technology politics with a realist lens, 
demonstrating how interstate competition for influence and power is a strong driving 
force behind technology transfer and development. However, the events described in 
Box 5.1, as well as the earlier discussion on Nehru’s National vision indicates how a 
government’s survival, legitimacy and pride can be strongly linked to technological 
innovation and development. This builds on the work of Street (1992) on the central 
role of the state as customer, regulator, and underwriter of technology, and also the 
approach of Fritsch (2011), who highlights the reciprocal nature between technological 
development and politics and international relations (see Chapter Two). 
Furthermore, the case study in Box 5.1 also showcases India’s capability to 
innovate and develop the beginnings of its own particular type of nuclear 
sociotechnical system, which was envisioned by Bhabha through his thorium strategy. 
Civil nuclear technology is poised to have a significant role within India’s development 
plans and ambitions for a low-carbon energy sector, and is also considered to be 
important for energy security reasons (Ebinger 2011). Given these drivers, within India 




5.2.3 Post-independence (1947-1989): Nationalisation of the Energy Sector, 
Industrialisation and System Entrapment  
The previous section describes how Nehru set out to establish India’s NSI and 
explores the case of India’s civil nuclear programme, and its implications for CCS 
technology transfer. Over the years post-independence, India was set on a path 
towards industrialisation, and the Indian state became more significantly involved with 
national infrastructure systems. This period of history has consequences on the 
existing energy-related sectors to which CCS would need to be applied to. This section 
explores some of the issues of this period in India’s energy history that presented 
challenges to contemporary CCS technology transfer in the period 2007-2010.  
India gained independence amidst destruction, violence and chaos when 
partitioned into Pakistan and East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Faced with huge 
development challenges, there was a major drive for electricity generation for nation 
building and to boost new industrial growth. Since colonial rule, the technology for 
coal-fired thermal plants and hydroelectric power was readily available, and therefore, 
naturally became the starting point for independent India’s power sector. In addition, 
one of the legacies of British rule was an excellent railway network, which was ideal for 
transporting fuel throughout the country, and so gave another advantage to coal use 
(Sudarshan & Noronha 2009). Still, private British firms had originally controlled coal 
production, and consequently Indian coal producers had to rely on outmoded 
technologies and production techniques after independence (Ebinger 2011). It could be 
argued, that unlike nuclear, which symbolised national innovation, coal-fired thermal 
plants were an inheritance from the Raj, and this cultural context has subsequently 
influenced the competition between the two technologies (Interview A1 2008; 
Interview B6 2008; see also discussion in previous section). Such aspects clearly 
demonstrate the sociotechnical nature of technology development. 
Prior to independence, private sector investment was not forthcoming, and 
therefore had not “developed the capacity to support such a robust industrialisation 
agenda”, and therefore the responsibility for setting up the energy industry fell largely 
on the public sector (Ebinger 2011, p. 21). Subsequently, Nehru introduced the 




1948, where collectively, these policies expanded the Government’s role and gave 
significant state control to key energy and industrial sectors such as hydrocarbon 
production, nuclear energy, electricity generation and distribution, and steel 
production. The Electrification Act of 1948 in particular gave almost exclusive control 
to the state; it created the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) to develop a 
comprehensive electricity policy, and the state electricity boards (SEBs), were 
responsible for integrating utilities that produced and distributed electricity at the 
state-level (IEA 2002b). The measures within this Act resulted in the publicly owned 
share of electricity capacity to increase from 42% in 1951 to 65% over the next decade 
(Ebinger 2011).  
Within this period India achieved very little progress in terms technological 
innovation in the power and coal sectors, and some of the inefficient power stations 
and labour intensive mining practices from this period are still present in today’s 
energy infrastructure (IEA 2002a; IEA 2002b; Chikkatur 2008; Sudarshan & Noronha 
2009). According to Ebinger (2011), post-independence India’s public-sector coal 
production became an ‘unscientific process’, where Government targets could not be 
met. Reasons included inadequate geological data as well as poor decisions made by 
the Indian Government: 
“The Nehru administration staffed a number of industry and 
energy organisations with bureaucrats rather than business and 
technical experts; as a result, state-run industrial organisations, 
including those involving hydrocarbon production and electricity 
generation and distribution, were largely underfunded and poorly 
staffed.” (Ebinger 2011, p. 21) 
Similarly, even after establishing the Indian Bureau of Mines, the National Coal 
Development Corporation and expanding the Geological Survey of India, coal 
production from the public sector fell short of its target out of the total set by the 
Government47. The oil and gas sector was in a similar situation, where the 
Government’s Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC), formed in 1956, could not 
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boost public sector production, even though it was given exclusive onshore exploration 
and production rights (offshore fields were already under production by the private 
sector) (Ebinger 2011). It is important to note that the fossil fuel related sectors were 
developed from existing systems, inherited at the time of independence, and therefore, 
it could be argued that India was already set on a pathway to carbon ‘lock-in’ (Unruh 
2000) since its inception (see discussion in Section 5.3). 
Further initiatives for nationalisation were taken up by Nehru’s successors, most 
notably under his daughter Indira Gandhi48, whose policies had a significant impact on 
national development for more than twenty years, until liberal reforms commenced in 
1991. From 1947 through to the 1980s India’s economy grew only 3% a year49; with a 
similarly slow growth for the following decade, India’s ‘development performance’ was 
considered ‘as less than satisfactory’ (Arun & Nixson 2000, p. 19). This performance has 
been linked to the more protectionist approach taken by the government in regards to 
its science and technology policy in the 1980s (Arun & Nixson 2000; Lall & Urata 2003). 
The objectives of the Technology Policy Statement of 1983 were to focus on more ‘self-
reliance’ and ‘development of indigenous technology’, as well as ‘the efficient 
absorption and adaptation of imported technology appropriate to national priorities 
and resources’ (Government of India 1983). And so, compared with most other 
developing countries at the time, India had some of the strongest scientific and 
technological institutions in place, though there was little benefit to the country’s 
industrial sector (Krishnan 2003). 
In the energy sector in India during this period the public sector gained further 
control of key energy industries. In particular, the coal sector went through ‘a two-
stage nationalisation process’, where the public sector share of overall production went 
from 35% in 1971-72 to 53% in 1972-73 and then to ‘a staggering 97% in 1973-74’ 
(Ebinger 2011, p. 24). The sector grew based largely on international technology 
transfers. The Soviet Union was one of the largest trade partners, contributing 
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significantly to India’s industrialisation through projects relating to coal mining 
machinery, oil exploration and refinery equipment, turbines, steel and aluminium 
plants etc. (Mehrotra 1990). This was coupled with heavy subsidies for certain 
petroleum products, chiefly diesel, along with LPG and kerosene, leading to the 
‘dieselization’ of the Indian industry (Ebinger 2011). Diesel became a crucial fuel; not 
only for the transport sector, but also for off-grid power generation by industry, as 
electricity availability from state facilities was becoming more and more unreliable. 
Towards the mid-1980s, India’s electricity sector was the most inefficient and 
unprofitable in all of Asia, operating at an average of 23.5% plant-based efficiency, 
where “even Bangladesh, by no means a beacon of power efficiency, operated thermal 
plants above 25%” (Ebinger 2011, p25). 
This period of strong nationalisation in India’s energy history illustrates the 
marked increase of ‘centralisation’ in the administration of key energy-related sectors, 
indicating the rise of the role of the state. As noted by Street (1992), there is a 
reciprocal nature to the relationship between the state and technology: 
industrialisation via technology transfer was crucial for the development of India post-
independence, but at the same time the government’s survival depended on their 
ability to develop the technology.  
Furthermore, in terms of innovation, this period reflects the observations of Walker 
(2000) on the ‘entrapment’ or ‘inertia’ associated with mature technological systems in 
both developed and developing countries (see Chapter Two). This is an important 
consideration in relation to this thesis because these are the sectors that prospective 
CCS technology transfer would have been connected to. In addition, this period also 
shows a marked reduction in technological innovation, particularly in the key sectors of 
coal and power generation (see Chikkatur 2008; Sudarshan & Noronha 2009; Ebinger 
2011). Again, this fits in with Walker’s argument of system inertia (see Walker 2000), 
particularly when the state becomes a significant actor, and therefore has enough 
influence to hinder the effective adaptation of new technologies or different 
technological pathways. Therefore, this kind of institutional environment, which still 
persists today, posed a challenge to any potential CCS technology transfer in the period 




Despite the inward-looking stance of India’s technology policy, extensive 
international technology transfers took place during this industrialisation period, and 
the type of contract depended on the collaborating nation. For example, earlier 
proposals with the USA on the Bokaro steel plant (1980s) were essentially on the basis 
of material transfer or turnkey contracts, where the training was only provided at the 
operational and maintenance level but not at the design or construction stages. Also it 
was expected that the US Steel Corporation would not be handing over control to 
Indian management till after a period of five to ten years (Mehrotra 1990, p. 78). This 
type of transfer has a tendency to ‘black-box’ technology, preventing innovative activity 
(see discussion in Chapter Two, Section 2.3.3). In comparison, the Soviet proposal, like 
the Americans, put design and construction control “almost exclusively in Soviet hands” 
though “management remained in Indian hands from the beginning”, making this a 
“near-turnkey” contract (Mehrotra 1990, p. 78). 
These technological choices were strongly influenced by the wider geopolitics at 
the time. Significantly, during this period of history India had fought two wars with 
Pakistan (1965 & 1971), and its relationship with the US deteriorated; the US declared 
Pakistan as an ally, pushing India towards the Soviet Union and its socialist policies. 
These events in the 1960s pushed India further towards nationalization and 
introverted policies, in addition to increased defence spending and raising public debt 
(see Noronha & Sudarshan 2009; Ebinger 2011). Both Mehrotra (1990) and Abraham 
(1998) highlight particular events that took place, specifically the India-Pakistan war of 
1971, but also the overarching power struggle in the region between China-Russia-USA, 
which strengthened India’s relationship with the Soviet Union rather than the US, and 
hence its earlier infrastructure and design of the energy sector is heavily influenced by 
R&D capabilities of the Soviet Union. This included construction and design choice of 
power plants, turbines, and fossil-fuel extraction methods, which were all key elements 
of Indo-Soviet technology transfers at the time (Mehrotra 1990). This is an example of 
not only the interstate competitiveness for influence, i.e. realism, but also illustrative of 
the ‘external’ international shifts that impact the geographies of transitions (see Bridge 




The following section moves away from the energy sector, to explore in more 
general terms a period lasting nearly twenty years prior to the period of study for this 
thesis, showing how India has formed its own style of innovation.  
5.2.4 Economic liberalisation and India the international innovator (1990-2007) 
Previous sections have highlighted the significant role of the Indian state in 
establishing its national energy infrastructures. Yet how does this impact the way India 
innovates today, especially in relation to CCS? What changed to take India from the 
poor third world country with the ‘Hindu rate of growth’ to the emerging economy, 
internationally known as a technological innovator? This section answers these 
questions by examining India’s remarkable economic growth leading into the 21st 
century, and the implications this has had for CCS technology transfer. 
In 1991 there was a change in government, which brought in radical economic 
reforms, including liberalizing many sectors within the economy, encouraging private 
sector participation, and creating more efficient means of public sector investment 
(Arun & Nixson 2000). It is during this period that the private sector, coupled with 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), started investing more in R&D activities. The services 
sector made the greatest contribution to the economy post-liberalisation, growing at 
the annual rate of over 8% from 1997-2002, which was double the rate of the industrial 
and manufacturing sector (Krishnan 2003; Dutz 2007). This included a great number of 
Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) alumni that had made their fortunes in Silicon 
Valley (USA), and who began to invest in the Information Technology (IT) sector in 
India, an area where there was hardly any government intervention (Das 2002). 
Consequently, the IT services sector today accounts for over half of India’s GDP, leading 
some analysts to conclude that the country has by-passed an industrial phase and 
transitioned directly to a service-dominated economy50 (Kirshnan 2003). This is 
important to consider when thinking about innovation potential in other sectors, such 
as energy. Unlike the Indian energy sector, the IT sector has had very little state 
intervention. It suggests that India has the potential for a particular innovation style, 
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separate from the structured NSI approach demonstrated by policies under Nehru, 
which might also influence the way India innovates in other less regulated sectors.  
Research shows that India does have the capability to innovate, though not in the 
orderly fashion usually associated with countries such as Sweden or Japan (Bound 
2007). Often described as a ‘license-Raj’, India is encumbered with a highly inefficient 
bureaucracy, which is associated more with its more mature systems, such as energy. 
This phenomenon is epitomised by India’s IT industry, which grew before the 
government understood what it was (see Das 2002). 
Another symbol of India’s innovation is a contraption of Punjabi origin, known as 
the Jugaad – an improvised vehicle, usually constructed by carpenters by fitting a diesel 
engine on to a cart, and used in rural areas (see figure 5.1). Jugaad is also a Hindi term 
for creative opportunism from meagre resources, and is used as much to describe 
enterprising street mechanics as for political fixes. As with innovation, three key 
constraints are needed in order to invoke Jugaad: space, time and resources. The 
difference is usually a greater level of urgency, and solutions are not for the long-term; 
it is entirely made for the moment, where efficiency (and aesthetics) takes a back seat. 





Despite that, India’s Jugaad mentality has produced some notable low-cost 
innovations, such as the Nano, the world’s cheapest car made by the dynastic Tata 
Motors. As discussed in previous sections, individual actors have had a considerable 
impact on India’s innovation system, particularly the presence of powerful business 
families, who have historically contributed significantly to the country’s R&D activities. 
The Tatas, Ambanis and Birlas have played roles as noteworthy as the Carnegies, 
Rockefellers and Fords did in the US (Piramel & Herdeck 1986). These industrialists 
also actively engaged with international firms under technology transfer initiatives, 
which started with near-turnkey or licensing contracts that were quickly adopted with 
in-house projects (as discussed in previous section). Therefore, what started out as 
frugal engineering and improvisation is now considered a savvy business approach for 
maximising resources, where Jugaad is a widely accepted method for low-cost R&D, 
and is becoming a popular innovation and management strategy globally (Radjou et al. 
2012).  
Conversely, there are calls for India to move away from the Jugaad mindset 
altogether. A more systemic approach to innovation is being encouraged, particularly 
for addressing bigger societal challenges, such as developing cleaner energy 
technologies. This includes critical reforms to public R&D institutions, crucially 
addressing the social barriers to innovation, such as the hierarchical structures and 
non-questioning culture within India’s education system (Krishnan 2010). This 
approach may be more appropriate for supporting innovation for CCS technology in 
India because it aims to tackle the issues associated with system entrapment or inertia, 
which could potentially block any type of transfer (discussed in the previous section).  
However, it could be questioned how useful it is to compare the innovative style of 
a nascent sector of IT services with a mature sociotechnical system such as power 
generation, transmission and distribution. What are the implications of private sector 
innovation in the IT sector for CCS? The effect of energy liberalisation policies that 
were introduced during this period was quite significant – allowing for much greater 
private sector investment – and the impacts began to properly manifest in the years 
leading up to and during this study, i.e. the economic boom from 2005-2010 (see 




Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh, his finance minister at the time, brought in 
reforms to India’s hydrocarbon industry, whereby domestic exploration and 
production was opened to the private sector; by this time the cost of imports were 
increasing due to, inter alia, the oil shock in 1991 prompted by the First Gulf War 
(Ebinger 2011). Nonetheless, pricing policies and obstructive regulations discouraged 
foreign investment, until the New Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) was introduced 
in 1997, which initiated the necessary technology transfer of more modern and 
efficient processes within the energy sector (Carl et al. 2008; Ebinger 2011). NELP has 
been crucial for bringing in a significant amount of investment into India, as well as the 
much-needed technological knowledge and expertise; it is directly responsible for the 
recent discoveries of domestic oil and gas by the international firm Cairn Energy 
(Interview C3, 2008). This is an example of how the NELP policy has impacted 
international technology transfer projects in the relevant sectors for CCS application, 
e.g. fossil fuel refinery operations, pipeline transport structures, and offshore 
operations in general. Most notably, this type of technology transfer involves more 
knowledge exchange through joint ventures and other types of capacity transfers, 
which in the long run foster indigenous R&D and innovation.  
The sudden economic boom in the period 2005-07 discussed in Chapter one (see 
Section 1.1.1), meant that a reliable and robust energy infrastructure is essential to 
India, to maintain this kind of development trajectory. It was apparent that India’s 
energy sector had to provide the back bone to upcoming innovative sectors, such as the 
IT services industry, and consequently meet the growing energy demands associated 
with increasing economic development (Interview A1 2008; Interview B6 2008). 
However, it was also recognised that the environmental consequences of meeting the 
increased energy demands also needed to be addressed; and it was within this context 
and this period that CCS was being promoted internationally as an option for carbon 
abatement. The context of CCS technology transfer to India is considered further in the 
following section, which explores some of the challenges and opportunities within 




5.3 India’s Current Energy Use, the Coal Raj and Carbon Lock-In  
Previously, it was discussed how India’s history has shaped its energy system, and 
this section looks at the current rate of energy consumption in the crucial areas of 
electricity generation and industry, which are heavily reliant on fossil fuel. Also, 
presented is analysis of the contemporary energy sector, with a focus on present CO2 
emissions, infrastructure, and the state of India’s natural resources, specifically coal. All 
of these aspects are important to consider when examining the social and technical 
feasibility of CCS technology transfer. This section discusses the specific characteristics 
of India’s energy sector that created challenges for CCS implementation in the period 
2007-10. 
Out of the total CO2 emissions of the Indian economy over half (57%) are from the 
use of coal and lignite (Parikh et al. 2009). As expected, the energy intensive sectors of 
electricity, manufacturing, steel and cement made up 91% of the direct CO2 emissions 
from coal use (Parikh et al. 2009), and this trend amongst the different industrial 
sectors is expected to continue for the next 20-30 years, as the Indian government 
develops the country’s infrastructure (TERI 2006; IEA 2007; Planning Commission 
2011).  
In 2008, India was ranked fifth in the world in terms of total primary energy 
consumption51, and the IEA expects this to double by 2030 (IEA 2011c). India’s 
economy is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, where a large portion of the energy 
demand is met by coal. The total primary energy consumed by India in 2008 was 
around 621 Mtoe52, where the largest share (approximately 40%) of the primary 
energy source was coal (see Figure 5.2)53 (IEA 2011c). The second largest share is 
provided by biomass, and it is an indication of India’s large rural population, which is 
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the largest in the world (828 million people in 2008) and relies mostly on non-
commercial energy such as waste vegetation and dried cow-dung (Sethi 2009). 
 
Figure 5.2: The breakdown of the total primary energy supply in India in 2008 (621 Mtoe) 
(source: IEA 2011c). 
Even though Indian researchers (see TERI 2006) and Indian policymakers (see 
Planning Commission 2006) use differently configured models and data, the consensus 
is that India’s future in the next thirty to fifty years is inextricably linked to the major 
use of fossil fuel. Coal production in India is essentially a monopoly, dominated by Coal 
India Ltd. (CIL), a public sector enterprise that employs over 450,000 people, and 
consequently has a powerful lobby (Sudarshan & Noronha 2009). Therefore, any 
reforms that could force competition, change labour laws, or reduce the importance of 
CIL in any way, are always met with strong opposition (Ebinger 2011). This has 
implications for introducing a technology such as CCS into an energy system heavily 
reliant on coal; the technology will need the support of a politically powerful faction, 
notably the CIL. CIL indicated that they were particularly interested to see how CCS 
developed in other countries, because it allows coal to remain within the supply mix, 
and would prolong the importance of coal within the energy system in the future 
(Interview B2, 2008). However, it was also noted that the Ministry of Power had the 




the Ministry of Coal or CIL54, adding that India was not obliged to cut its carbon 
emissions, therefore it was unlikely that CCS would have a role to play till much later 
(20-50 years), if those conditions changed (Interview B2, 2008). Survey respondents 
held similar views, ranking CCS as third, after nuclear and solar, when it came to 
Government investment priorities by 2030 and 2050 (Survey 2009, Appendix B). One 
respondent stated that “CCS will eventually become important for India, but not until 
the technology has been developed and demonstrated in the US, Europe and China” 
(Respondent 10, Survey 2009, Appendix C).  
Moreover, with both supply (through CIL) and demand (power companies) being 
almost exclusively under government control, the price of coal has been kept below 
global prices, and therefore continues to be (artificially) cost competitive (Sudarshan & 
Noronha 2009). Therefore, with the restriction on foreign investment, coupled with a 
belief that India’s coal supplies are limitless, there is a sense of complacency within the 
energy system (Carl et al. 2008; Ebinger 2011). A central finding is the paramount role 
of the Indian Government in these key sectors for CCS. There is evidence of 
technological determinism linked to this important role of the state, where the 
technology, in this case power generation from coal, has established “a particular set of 
power relations” (Street 1992, p. 31). This points to a situation described by Geels 
(2011, p. 25), whereby any changes to technology and the related sector would require 
changes in policies, and this in turn “entails politics and power struggles, because 
vested interests will try to resist such changes”. Building upon that, Walker (2000, p. 
834) argues further that in a mature sociotechnical system, powerful individuals or 
organisations can sometimes reduce diversity and create “technological monocultures” 
in order to ensure the survival of their particular organisation or “preferred solutions”. 
In terms of innovation and technology transfer via foreign investment, CCS needed to 
have strong political support from powerful state actors, such as the Ministry of Power, 
in order to have a chance of being integrated into the energy sector during the period of 
study, 2007-2010.  
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The circumstances described above also resonate with the discussion in Chapter 
Two regarding Unruh’s (2000) concept of ‘carbon lock-in’, and, more specifically, 
regarding the ‘globalizing carbon lock-in’, where, due to historical development paths 
coupled with accelerated industrialisation, transition economies such as India will 
struggle to escape carbon lock-in (Unruh & Carillo-Hermosilla 2006). Therefore, the 
case for integrating CCS technologies into India’s energy sector becomes stronger given 
the imperative need to de-carbonise. However, there are a number of sociotechnical 
challenges specific to India’s energy sector, which were identified as having impeded 
CCS technology transfer, and these are presented and analysed below. 
5.3.1 India’s Coal Supply 
Given that coal is the predominant fuel for India’s energy sector, coal production 
plays a significant role within India’s energy system. If CCS technology transfer to India 
were to occur, then carbon capture technologies specifically designed for coal-based 
thermal generation would be needed. Therefore, this section looks at the current 
technical issues surrounding India’s coal reserves, as this directly impacts the type of 
innovation and international transfer of CCS technology.  
After the USA and China, India is the world’s third largest producer and consumer 
of coal, and it has plans to remain an important player in the world coal market (see 
IEA 2007 & IEA 2011a). However, the current supply of indigenous coal is unlikely to 
meet the demands of the growing economy, and India has now become a significant 
importer of coal. According to a regional exploration and resource assessment in 2005 
that was commissioned by India’s Ministry of Coal, out of a total coal resource of 
248GT, only 38%, or roughly 93GT was considered as ‘proved resources’55 (Ministry of 
Coal 2006). However, Chikkatur et al. (2007) highlighted several problems with the 
Indian coal resource assessments, such as the inclusion of reserves that are already 
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depleted due to mining, and resources that cannot be mined due to surface and 
geotechnical constraints. Moreover, Chand (2007) noted that the analysis of India’s coal 
resource does not include those at deeper depths. Subsequently, 62% of the explored 
coal resources occur at shallow depths (0-300m), which is essentially the depth 
accessible through opencast mining (Ministry of Coal 2006; Chand 2007; Chikkatur et 
al. 2007). The Central Mine Planning and Design Institute (CMPDI)56 estimated that 
only 52GT (56%) out of the 93GT of proved resources can be considered as 
extractable57 coal (see Ministry of Coal 2006). After the Ministry’s assessment, India’s 
Planning Commission has since then increased the estimated range of extractable coal 
reserves to 56-71GT (Planning Commission 2006). Given the discrepancies between 
the classification of reserves, and that nearly 8GT of coal has already been mined, other 
analysts have brought the Government’s tentative estimates down to roughly 44GT 
(Chand 2007; Chikkatur 2008).  
The key point is that with these estimates, and depending on the rate of domestic 
production and use, a relatively short lifetime is projected for India’s coal reserves, 
lasting for the next 30 – 60 years (Chikkatur 2008). The interviewee from CIL 
emphasised that mines were already being operated unsustainably to cope with 
increased demand, and believed that with current rates of consumption, the extractable 
coal is likely to run out by 2030, unless deeper coal seams are exploited, for which the 
technology is currently unavailable in India and it is a more costly process (Interview 
B2, 2008).  
These projections are substantially less than previous estimates from international 
organisations such as the IEA, which assumed Indian coal supply could last nearly 275 
years (IEA 2002), or the BP Statistical Review of World Energy in 2007, which listed 
India’s proven reserves to production ratio as 207 years (BP 2007). Researchers have 
indicated that these inflated estimates, coupled with discrepancies in the national 
classification system, have given Indian policymakers a false sense of security: 
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“The comfortable, opiating belief of possessing huge quantities of 
coal has contributed to a stagnation of energy policy initiatives and 
an insufficient investment in research and infrastructure that 
might have aided the use of alternatives such as natural gas or 
distributed renewables.” (Sudarshan & Noronha 2009, p12) 
Therefore, the idea that India’s indigenous coal reserves are vast, and plentiful 
enough to meet the country’s needs for hundreds of years, still persists within certain 
energy institutions, both nationally and internationally (Ebinger 2011). It helps explain 
why there was a push from the international community for CCS technology as a 
mitigation option for industrialising countries, particularly those with coal-based 
economies such as India and China. In other words, in addition to being a method for 
decarbonising their own energy sectors, developed countries such as the UK and the 
USA viewed India and China as prospective customers of CCS technologies due to their 
large coal reserves (see also Chapter Four). 
The foreseeable shortages in the future remain largely unacknowledged, and coal is 
set to remain the dominant fuel in India’s future planning for their energy system. For 
example, the Chairman of the Expert committee on Coal Sector Reforms stated in a 
report to the Ministry of Coal: 
“Our analysis contained in the Report establishes beyond any 
reasonable doubt that coal should be considered the primary source 
of energy to the country. The coal resources of India, in spite of the 
quality being poor and their unevenness in geographical dispersal 
represent the most valuable and reliable source of energy to the 
economy.” (Ministry of Coal 2006, p. 1)  
Even though the Ministry of Coal encourages the Indian Government to consider 
coal as the primary source of energy to the economy, it has noted that there is a 
substantial gap between supply and demand. The committee recommended a thermal 
coal import of around 30-40 Mt of high-grade coal by 2011-12 as a short-term measure 
(Ministry of Coal 2006). Typically, India has relied on imports of coking58 coal for its 
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steel industry, owing largely to the high ash content and high moisture content of 
Indian coals (IEA 2002a). However, there has been an increase in the imports of non-
coking59 coal to meet the shortfalls in power generation, and this trend is likely to 
continue and exceed coking coal imports. It is anticipated that India will import nearly 
114 Mt of coal by the end of the fiscal year (2012), compared to 82 Mt in 2010/2011 
(Mukherjee & Lalmalsawma 2011) and 73 Mt in 2009/2010 (Singh 2010).  
Consequently, India is in the midst of a coal crisis, where domestic production 
cannot meet demand, and acute shortages of coal plus rolling power blackouts are 
common place. Almost a third (30 out of 95) of India’s power stations are currently 
running on less than a week’s worth of coal stock, and a further 19 power stations are 
running on only four days of coal stock (Indian Express 2012). In comparison, between 
January 1995 and October 2009, UK power stations kept on average a monthly stock 
level of 95 days, where the minimum was 29 days in March 1996, and the maximum 
was 342 days in August 2009 (Wilson et al. 2010, p. 4101). Aside from the uncertainty 
of reserves and the low production rates, another reason for these shortages is due to 
logistics.  
                                                             
and porous material. This coke-fuel is used largely for industrial processes such as steel 
manufacturing.   
59 Non-coking coal does not have the chemical properties that allow it to be ‘coked’ (see previous 





Figure 5.3: Map of India’s main coal-fields and major cities (population: 4+ million) (map 
adapted from Sheorey et al. 2000). 
As shown in Figure 5.3, the majority of India’s coalfields are in the north and east of 
the country, and far away from the main urban centres of demand. Consequently, many 
power plants in the south and the west prefer the cost-competitive option of imports, 
as they are close to key ports, and “because India’s coal logistics system is so antiquated 
that often it is difficult to get coal to those end-use markets on a timely basis” (Ebinger 




can at times lead to spontaneous combustion, where substantial amounts of fuel are 
lost before it reaches the market (Ibid.). 
Given these general conditions of India’s coal sector, then there are two things of 
note to consider in regards to CCS innovation and technology transfer pathways. 
Firstly, if Indian coal were to remain the primary fuel, then capture technologies would 
have to be developed specifically for Indian coal conditions, e.g. high-ash content. This 
would entail a significant amount of in-house R&D, requiring support from the Indian 
Government. It should also be noted that coal is not uniformly distributed across India 
(Figure 5.3) and certain states would require more resources and fiscal support than 
others. The political and technical challenges associated with this particular pathway 
are discussed in further detail in Chapter Seven. 
Alternatively, if India based its new fleet of power stations on imported coal, then it 
may be possible that capture technologies designed elsewhere could be transferred, for 
example, through an international joint venture. Meaning that CCS R&D could 
potentially take place outside India, designed to function on foreign coal, and therefore 
less involvement of the state in regards to technological innovation. However, there are 
strong political dimensions associated with this pathway, which can influence how CCS 
technology transfer occurs. For example, India’s relationship with coal-rich nations will 
not only effect security of supply, but also influence the type of CCS technology adopted 
(see again Chapter 7). 
Essentially, the type of fossil-fuel affects the design of the power plant required for 
electricity generation, and this in turn influences the type of CCS technology transfer 
pathway. Therefore, the power sector is also a crucial sector to consider in this context. 
Again, the technical intricacies of a potential CCS chain in India are discussed further in 
Chapter Seven, and the primary aim of the following sub-section is to give an overview 
of the present state of India’s fleet of power plants.  
5.3.2 India’s Behemoth: The Power Sector 
The previous section examined the limitations related to India’s coal reserves 




power sector, and hence electricity generation is another crucial element of India’s 
energy system. This section therefore presents the current state of the power sector 
and what the challenges and opportunities there were during the study period (2007-
10) for CCS to be applied, in order to abate carbon emissions from electricity 
generation. 
The power sector is the main driver for India’s increased energy demand, where 
presently 70% of the country’s total generation comes from thermal-based power 
plants, and this is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. During the 10th Five 
Year Plan (2002-07), around 9 GW of new coal-based capacity was installed, and 
another 48GW of new capacity was outlined for the 11th plan (2007-12) (Planning 
Commission 2006). Figure 5.4 shows that most of the coal capacity has been added 
over the last 30 years, and gas capacity has increased in the 1990s. The addition of gas 
to the energy mix is a direct result of the economic reforms that were set in 1991, 
which liberalised the market (see Section 5.2.4), allowing industrial consumers to be 
less reliant on public supply of coal by building their own gas plants.  
 
Figure 5.4: Age structure of India’s existing power capacity (source: IEA 2011c). 
According to the Central Electricity Authority (CEA), the total installed capacity in 
India by 31st March 2008 was 168GW, out of which 143GW (roughly 85%) was owned 




illustrated in Figure 5.5, and due to load factors and the operation of plant, the installed 
capacity tends to be different from the actual electricity generated. Historically, the 
power sector has been predominantly under state control, though the Electricity Act of 
2003 has opened up generation and distribution to the private sector (see Planning 
Commission 2006). This was mainly due to pressure from industrial consumers, who 
required a consistent and larger volume of electricity (Joseph 2010; Tankha 2010).   
 
Figure 5.5: India’s installed generation capacity and gross electricity generation 
(Fiscal year 1 April 2007- 31 March 2008) (source: IEA 2011c). 
India’s current operating fleet of coal-fired power plants is the third largest in the 
world, and, as is shown in Figure 5.6 below, where apart from the recent exception of a 
supercritical power plant, the power fleet is based on older and less efficient subcritical 
technology60 (IEA 2012).  Presently, the average net efficiency of India’s entire coal-
fired fleet is roughly 29%, where the more modern subcritical units (500MW) have an 
                                                             
60 The efficiency of pulverized coal-fired power plant technologies is affected by the steam 
conditions, where the temperature and pressure is lower in subcritical plants, giving them a typical 
efficiency of 39%. In comparison, supercritical and ultra-supercritical technology allows for higher 
temperatures and pressure for its steam conditions, giving it a typical efficiency of 42% and 47% 
respectively (see IEA 2012, p. 11). It should also be noted that local conditions such as maintenance 




average of 33%, though some very old power plants are still in operation (Chikkatur et 
al. 2009). In comparison, the fifty most efficient coal-fired stations in the US have a net 
efficiency average of 36%, and the fleet’s average is 32% (Chikkatur 2008). In terms of 
CCS applicability, the low efficiencies of current Indian power plants made it 
uneconomical to retrofit them with carbon capture technology. A survey respondent 
stated that “due to the age of the plants in India, their efficiency is about 35% and 
therefore not suitable for CCS, as 40% is recommended as a good figure for installing 
capture capability” (Respondent 9, Survey 2009, Appendix C). Therefore, only the 
newer power plants constructed would be able to meet the efficiency conditions 
suitable for CCS, and the potential of such plants is discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Seven. However it should also be noted that in regards to overall efficiency, CCS was 
also viewed by one stakeholder as contributing further to the problem of inefficiency, 
where “additional fossil fuel emissions, auxiliary power consumption, deterioration in 
efficiency of the generation and the cost involved in supplementing the generation due 
to the loss of efficiency” (Respondent 5, Survey 2009, Appendix C). 
Figure 5.6: Age of current coal-fired operating fleet in India (supercritical (in blue) & 
subcritical (in red) power plants) (Source: IEA 2012). 
One of the biggest factors that lead to the low efficiency of India’s power plants is 




50%) (IEA 2002a: 103) and high moisture content, which varies between 4-20%, 
depending on the monsoon season (IEA 2002a: 26; Ghosh 2010). As a consequence, 
Indian coal has low calorific values (between 2500-5000 kcal/kg) (IEA 2002a), 
whereas the global average is roughly 6000 kcal/kg (Ghosh 2010). This lower calorific 
value of Indian coals implies more coal usage to deliver the same amount of electricity. 
On the other hand, Indian coal has very low sulphur content, approximately 0.2-0.7% 
(IEA 2002a: 103) in comparison to other coals; Ohio coal in the US has a sulphur 
content of 1.8% (Chikkatur 2008). Nevertheless, high-ash content can cause significant 
problems for operating a power plant, including high fly-ash emissions, ash disposal 
requirements, corrosion of boiler walls, and complications with coal washing61 (IEA 
2002a). Furthermore, the quality of Indian coal supplied to power plants has decreased 
since the 1970s, and over the past three decades the ash content is consistently 40-
45% (Chikkatur 2008). This coincides with an increase in opencast mining (up to 
300m) and production from inferior grades of coal, and is expected to dominate 
production for the next 20-30 years (Ministry of Coal 2006). Consequently, in 2008 the 
auxiliary consumption62 of coal in India was an average of 8.3% of total gross power 
produced (CEA 2009), which is high in comparison to the average auxiliary 
consumption of 5.7% in European power plants the same year (IEA 2011c). Moreover, 
there is scope for bringing down this consumption by improving maintenance and 
management practices, especially in state-operated power plants (Chikkatur et al. 
2009; IEA 2011c). This is an area where international technology transfer can play a 
useful role, though may be hindered by the significant state control of the sector. 
                                                             
61 Coal washing removes ash and impurities from coal, leading to improved combustion and, 
therefore, higher power plant thermal efficiency. However, Indian coal has the general 
characteristics of Southern Hemisphere Gondwana coal, whose seams are inter-banded with mineral 
sediment (IEA 2002a). Consequently, the ash tends to be intermixed quite well into the coal 
structure itself, making the physical methods for coal washing even more difficult. The higher levels 
of alumina and silica in the ash can also increase ash resistivity, which can in turn increase emissions 
(Chikkatur 2008).   
62 ‘Auxiliary consumption’ of coal refers to the amount of fuel used to run the power plant itself. For 
example, auxiliary units are used to power machinery that is essential to move coal, air, combustion 
gases, and water through the process of electricity generation in the power plant (see p2-1 & 2-2, 
EPRI 2011). Auxiliaries influence the overall efficiency of the power plant, whereby the “sub-optimal 
operation of auxiliaries unduly increases heat rate resulting in what is essentially ‘wasted 




 A fundamental challenge to CCS technology transfer in India was identified as the 
high-ash content of Indian coal, which impacts plant efficiency: capture technology 
would need to be designed in such a manner as to accommodate the high-ash. Several 
stakeholders participating the research survey cautioned that CCS in India might not 
cope with the high-ash content of Indian coal, or whether it would require imported 
coal as its fuel base (Survey 2009, Appendix B). Over half the respondents (11/18) 
stressed that if India were to come closer to adopting the technology, then research 
specific to Indian coal conditions would be needed (Ibid.). Therefore, this demonstrates 
the need for India-specific CCS R&D. However, as discussed earlier, this will require 
support from the state, or a ‘system builder’ (see discussion on nuclear power in 
Section 5.2.2). 
Another significant contributor to inefficiencies within the power sector is the state 
of the national power grid; India has some of the highest transmission and distribution 
losses in the world, which are difficult to quantify. In terms of technical and commercial 
factors, on average, losses of 32% of total electricity generation were reported by the 
CEA, with some states reporting losses as high as 50% (CEA 2009). Recent analysis by 
the IEA found that due to overloading of the distribution equipment during periods of 
peak load, electricity losses could exceed 45%, and therefore recommended designing 
systems with sufficient reserve (IEA 2011c). Moreover, there are also significant losses 
due to non-technical reasons such as theft and corruption, which are far more difficult 
to quantify. A high proportion of these losses come from the illegal tapping of lines as 
well as faulty electric meters that underestimate consumption, and therefore less 
payment is collected (IEA 2011c). In an interview with a security professional, it was 
mentioned that there are a significant number of cases of corruption at the State 
Electricity Board (SEB) level, where faulty electric meters remain unchecked on 
purpose, or bribes pass hands so that unpaid bills never get questioned (Interview B8, 
2008). In addition, it was stated that there are many cases of illegal tapping of 
electricity lines, that are generally ignored, and were only considered a priority if 
deaths are an outcome (Interview B8, 2008). This interview findings are supported by 
the research of Golden & Min (2012), who examined theft and electricity loss in the 
state of Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state. Their work concluded that power 




rather, aligned with local or state elections. Furthermore, a higher proportion of line 
losses occurred in agricultural areas, particularly to power privately owned tubewells, 
implying wealthy farmers, who already reap benefits of subsidized electricity from the 
government (Golden & Min 2012, p. 24). In addition, analysis by Joseph (2010) shows 
that in the state of Karnataka, nearly 40% of the electricity supplied goes unmetered, so 
theft is likely to account for more than what is recorded by the state.  
The issues discussed above had relevance to the potential for CCS technology 
transfer in the period under study (2007-10). This is because local politics and 
irregularities within the system, such as theft and corruption, were identified as 
discouraging foreign investment (Interview B5 2008; Interview C1 2008; Interview C3 
2008). In the context of CCS, transmission and distribution is a key part of the energy 
system, and the upgrade and development required in order to accommodate new-
build power stations on the grid was a factor in consideration of CCS. Such security 
concerns over India’s energy sector and their impact on potential technology transfer 
are returned to in Chapter Seven. 
Recently, the Indian government has been putting in more effort to attract FDI and 
joint ventures to the Indian power sector, and during the past five years, Chinese 
manufacturing companies have entered the market. Notably, the Shanghai Electric 
Group is the main supplier for India’s first supercritical power plant, the Mundra power 
station in Gujarat, constructed by Adani Power Ltd. in 2010. Furthermore, this 
particular project is eligible for Certified Emission Reduction credits (CERs) under the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and its crediting 
period under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) runs from 2008 to 2018 
(UNFCCC 2010). Even though Chinese products are cheaper and becoming more readily 
available, India’s domestic manufacturers, Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL), 
has stated that ‘a number of Indian power companies were moving away from Chinese 
products because they were of inferior quality’ (Ebinger 2011, p. 140). Consequently, 
the CEA has started pushing for more supercritical and ultra-supercritical technologies, 
where, in 2010 a letter was sent to encourage every state-run power company to rely 
on domestic manufacturers for super-critical power plant equipment (Ebinger 2011, p. 




roughly 20% on imported power equipment (Economic Times 2012a), with further 
calls to impose duties specifically on equipment for mega and ultra-mega power plant 
projects greater than 1000 MW (Economic Times 2012b).  
By 2030, the Indian Government’s Planning Commission anticipates the installed 
capacity of coal-based power plants to be within 200 to 400 GW, including the Ultra-
Mega Power Plants (UMPPs)63 that are expected to come online post 2012 (Planning 
Commission 2006). According to the government’s Power Finance Corporation, the 
total number of UMPPs envisaged is sixteen, out if which four contracts have been 
already been awarded (Interview B10, 2008). Given this rate of expansion of the power 
sector in the next 20 years, it is likely that the majority of the currently estimated 
extractable coal will be utilised over the course of the 40-50 year lifespan of power 
plants (Chikkatur et al. 2009). Therefore, key strands of India’s draft energy strategy 
for the 12th five-year Plan (2012-2017) include developing in situ gasification to tap 
coal resources difficult to mine through conventional technology, as well as increasing 
coal production through competition and building further coal import facilities 
(Planning Commission 2011). Furthermore, a reduction in demand of domestic coal 
could be achieved by increasing the costs for consumers, but this will impede on India’s 
development ambitions as well as national energy security concerns. The 12th five-year 
plan has also indicated an interest in Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle (IGCC) 
technology, as well as stating: 
“Development in technology for Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) needs to be carefully monitored to assess the suitability and 
cost effectiveness of this technology for Indian conditions.” 
(Planning Commission 2011, p. 42) 
In addition, the government is keen to diversify into cleaner fuels for power 
generation, where the energy security brief ‘Hydrocarbon Vision 2025’, issued by the 
Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, calls for an expansion into electricity generation 
from natural gas because it is cleaner and more efficient than coal or oil (Ministry of 
Petroleum & Natural Gas 2001). 
                                                             




The newer power plants discussed above are an area where there is strong 
potential for CCS technology transfer, and this is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
Seven. The UMPPs based on imported coal would cut down the technical challenges 
associated with high-ash coal, in addition to being a more efficient plant in overall 
maintenance and operations. Given the Indian Government’s keenness to upgrade its 
power fleet, there is potential for an increase in international collaboration and 
knowledge exchange. Similarly, there is potential to adapt newer gas-fired plants with 
CCS technology, which is currently being explored by the US and UK (GCCSI 2011). 
However, during the study period (2007-10) there was a lack of political will to support 
CCS implementation in India. India’s reforms for improved efficiency in power plants 
during this period were not only a start for cutting carbon emissions, but they also 
created favourable technical conditions for potential CCS implementation. 
Nevertheless, despite such conditions, during the study period, for social and political 
reasons, the Indian Government did not favour implementing CCS with the new fleet of 
power stations. These aspects are discussed further in Chapters Six and Seven.  
5.3.3 India’s Large-Scale Industries 
Private industries are now beginning to play a role within India’s energy system, 
and their newer efficient power plants were also considered as an alternative route for 
CCS technology transfer by some Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) during the study 
period (2007-10). Regardless of the inefficiencies and inconsistencies in the power 
sector, India’s large-scale industries remain a key consumer of electricity, where over 
40% of the electricity generated in India went to the industrial sector in 2007 (see 
Figure 5.7). However, a growing trend in many industries is to install their own power 
plants, known as ‘captive power plants,’ in order to ensure consistent quality and 
supply of power to meet their requirements. Of the 25GW of captive power plants, most 





Figure 5.7: Total final energy consumption in India in 2007 (394 Mtoe) (source: IEA 2011c). 
Moreover, the government is actually encouraging industry to build captive plants, 
as a means for bringing in reform to the power sector. The Electricity Act of 2003 
contains an open access clause, which takes away the authority of the State Electricity 
Boards (SEBs) to veto the transmission of electricity through their lines, allowing any 
surplus electricity generated by captive power plants to be sold to the grid (see 
Planning Commission 2006). Analysis by Joseph (2010) indicates that an increase in 
captive plants and the sale of their surplus power, has given rise to “a parallel economy 
alongside the state-run electricity sector”, where roughly 20% of India’s installed 
capacity comes from captive power (Joseph 2010, p509). This has allowed politicians to 
invigorate private sector participation, whilst maintaining the support of key political 
constituencies at the state level (Joseph 2010).      
The key industries in India are iron and steel, aluminium, cement, chemicals and 
petrochemicals, and they provide various inputs to other sectors such as power 
transmission, construction and transportation (Dutta & Mukherjee 2010; IEA 2011b). 
The increase in production in India’s large-scale industries is a direct result of the 
reforms and liberalisation in the 1990s (Dutta & Mukherjee 2010).  Some of these 
industries are not only essential for developing the country’s own infrastructure, but 
they also contribute significantly to the national and global economy through exports. 
India is rich in iron ore and bauxite (the raw material for aluminium) and the largest 




customer, and 5.87 Mt of iron ore was bought for re-construction after the Fukushima 
earthquake in 2010, and the demand for finished steel products is likely to increase in 
the coming years for many economies in transition (Bhattacharya & Roy 2011). The 
breakdown of India’s main exports for the fiscal year of 2007/08 is shown in Figure 5.8. 
Figure 5.8: India’s main exports for the fiscal year 2007 (source: Dun & Bradstreet 
Information Services Pvt. Ltd. (http://www.dnb.co.in). 
Even though India has limited oil resources, it has developed a very robust refining 
and petrochemical sector, and has the largest refining capacity in Asia. The world’s 
biggest oil refinery is in Jamnagar, in India’s western state of Gujarat, which has a 
capacity of 1.24 million barrels per day, and it is owned by Reliance Industries (Ambani 
family) (Ebinger 2011). There are also another 25 refineries across the country (BP 
2012). The refining of petroleum products is a key part of India’s export strategy, and 
also a crucial industry for many countries that have the resources, but may not have the 
facilities to process them. For example, India was the third largest market for Iranian 
crude in 2009/10, and at the same time its main exports to Iran included, inter alia, 
refined petroleum products and petrochemicals (Ministry of External Affairs 2012). 
India is expected to emerge as Asia’s largest exporter of refined petroleum products by 




The variety of industries discussed above all have the potential to integrate CCS 
into their systems if there is a strong incentive to cut carbon emissions. There is 
potential to capture carbon emissions from captive power stations, as these plants are 
likely to be newer and efficient build, but also they would be subject to less state 
control. However, a survey respondent pointed out that:  
“Private power generators such as Reliance have little incentive to 
be involved in CCS since they have no influence over pricing of 
electricity. The central and state governments decide the tariff 
structure for electricity. This implies that the private players have 
no way of increasing the tariff, especially if they implement CCS 
and pass on the cost to the consumer” (Respondent 5, Survey 
2009, Appendix C).  
In addition, it was commented further “the private sector (non-PSU companies) will 
play a much smaller role in low carbon technologies than the Government and PSUs”64 
(Ibid.). Overall, majority of survey respondents felt that CCS would not be an 
investment priority for the private sector industry in India due to its links with large 
Government controlled sectors such as electricity transmission and distribution 
(Survey 2009, Appendix B). Survey results indicated that the top ranked technologies 
for private industry investment were mostly renewables (solar, wind, hydro and 
microgen) (Ibid.).  
Nevertheless, CCS does not necessarily have to be applied to electricity generation. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, there is potential to capture CO2 emissions from other 
industries such as, cement production and refineries. However, the forthcoming 
chapters in particular demonstrate the challenges associated with CCS technology 
transfer to India. For example, Chapter Six illustrates the clear lack of political will to 
consider CCS in India, and how the position of the Indian Government prevented any 
technology transfer during the period under study. Moreover, CO2 capture is only one 
element of the CCS sociotechnical system (see Chapter 4), and this section has largely 
                                                             
64 PSU stands for Public Sector Undertakings. This is a term commonly used in India for a 
government-owned corporation (company in the public sector). The term is used to refer to 





considered India’s energy context in terms of capturing the major sources of emissions. 
In order to fulfil the purpose of CCS, these emissions will not only need to be captured, 
but also safely transported and permanently stored deep in the subsurface. Therefore, 
the feasibility of the full CCS technology chain in an Indian context is considered in 
detail in Chapter Seven. 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter highlights the complexities of the Indian energy sector, not only by 
examining the current fuel mix and infrastructure, but by also exploring the historical 
influences on the establishment of this large sociotechnical system. One of the insights 
from this review is that India is already locked-into a carbon-intense energy system 
and there is potential for CCS to play a role in decarbonisation of the sector.  Since the 
time of India’s inception, coal has been a dominant feature in India’s energy mix, 
especially for power generation, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Fossil 
fuels are also the principal source of energy for India’s industries, including the energy 
intensive sectors of steel and cement production. Given the flexibility and multiple 
identities currently associated with CCS technologies, there are potentially a number of 
areas, namely power generation and large-scale industries, where CCS technologies 
could be applied in order to cut CO2 emissions.   
Furthermore, India demonstrates an historical tradition for innovation as well as 
participation in international technology transfer. Science and technology development 
played a crucial role in India’s struggle for freedom and the foundations for its NSI, 
which developed shortly after independence, is a source of pride for the Indian people. 
India demonstrated its capacity for indigenous innovation and R&D through its nuclear 
power programme. However, at the same time, other key energy sectors were 
neglected, notably, India’s coal based energy system, which was inherited from British 
colonisation. This particular aspect of India’s energy sector became more and more 
nationalised over time, which created state monopolies over the coal and power 
sectors, preventing any reforms. Consequently, India is presently locked into a highly 
regulated energy sector, which is heavily dependent on coal, and relies upon an 




challenge for CCS implementation, requiring not only state support, but also 
concentrating almost exclusively on new-build power stations.   
Although post-independence is a period marked by stagnancy and meagre 
resources, even so, it brought out India’s unique innovation style, or Jugaad. This 
entails more of an improvised ‘quick-fix’, which can support the SMEs predominant in 
the IT sector, but not large technological systems, such as CCS. Nevertheless, India’s 
history with nuclear energy demonstrates that through international technology 
transfer and local R&D, it is possible to establish and manage an energy-related 
sociotechnical system. However, survey findings strongly indicated that nuclear is seen 
as a higher investment priority for the Indian Government than CCS. Moreover, Box 5.1 
illustrates the importance of state support, political drivers and international relations 
for such technology transfer to occur. Political will, both in the domestic context and in 
terms of international linkages is crucial for CCS implementation, particularly at the 
state-level, but has not been strong enough in the period 2007-2010. These aspects are 
further explored in Chapter Six and Seven. 
Energy demand outstrips supply, where power outages and unreliability of 
electricity supplies further impede India’s economic development. One of the 
challenges of implementing CCS has been the uncertainty associated with Indian coal 
reserves, and therefore imported coal is becoming more reliable, particularly for large 
industries, which are also opting more for captive power plants. Further technical 
challenges to CCS technology transfer have been India’s poor quality of coal, due to 
high-ash content, hence relying on imports. In addition, India currently relies on an 
aging and inefficient energy infrastructure, including a fleet of power stations based on 
old technology. These, along with electricity transmission and distribution systems, 
required substantial upgrades in order to support any CCS deployment. These factors 
acted against prospective CCS implementation in India. Also, there were additional 
non-technical issues, such as security concerns over electricity theft and corruption, 
which contributed to the significant overall losses (i.e. technical and commercial losses) 
from the energy system, which also disadvantaged CCS. The following two empirical 
chapters explore the feasibility of CCS technology transfer to India in 2007-2010 in 




the domestic situation. The aim is to analyse in more detail the specific sociotechnical 
challenges in India that have obstructed the introduction of CCS technology, building 




Chapter 6: Feasibility of CCS in India – International Context 
6.1 Introduction 
The period under study for this thesis was from October 2007 through to August 
2010. During this period CCS was a prominent feature of international discourse on 
climate change mitigation. This period was also important for Indian engagement 
internationally on CCS research and development (R&D). It included two specialist and 
high-level meetings between the European Commission and Indian Government 
representatives from relevant energy sectors, both held in New Delhi, one in January 
and one in November 2008. In addition, the UK government hosted a technical CCS 
workshop and the Norwegian Government were the chief sponsors of the 2008 Delhi 
Sustainable Development Summit (DSDS).  
In parallel, during this period CCS technology was also of strong interest in the 
broader climate policy debate, notably the international climate negotiations. 
Therefore, this chapter on the international context of CCS technology transfer is split 
into two core sections: Section 6.2 examines India’s international position on climate 
change, and how this in turn influenced its international engagements, specifically on 
CCS; and Section 6.3 considers the overall debate in the UNFCCC forum, specifically the 
dialogue under the CDM workstream. 
This chapter draws upon data gathered first-hand in field notes collected at each of 
these events, where the author was a participant observer. Table 3.1 (Chapter 3, p. 70) 
gives a summary of the relevant field activities, and details of the interviews that are 
used to provide insights for this chapter can be found in Table 3.2 (Chapter 3, p. 72-75). 
As discussions in previous chapters have shown, CCS is a complex, multi-
dimensional technology – best characterised as a sociotechnical system rather than a 
discrete technology – with strong international political dimensions to its innovation, 
development and subsequent transfer. Moreover, complexities associated with its 
mixed identity makes CCS technology transfer a multifaceted and highly political 
process between states, and international relations and good diplomacy have an 




reluctance to embrace CCS technology. In addition, the broader international context of 
CCS technology transfer is explored, highlighting the key drivers behind the initiative. 
Since the domestic and international context are inherently overlapping, there are 
connections between this chapter and Chapter Seven which deals with the domestic 
context. The Cambay Basin case study (see Chapter 7) explores further the linkages 
between the domestic and international context.  
6.2 India’s Position: Common but Differentiated Responsibility 
The clues for understanding India’s official position on CCS technology can be found 
within its domestic environmental policies, and by examining its broader approach to 
climate change. For example, some of the key elements of the National Environmental 
Policy 2006 include the priority and right to development, as well as strict abidance to 
the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) (Government of 
India 2006). In this context, CBDR refers to Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration (1992) 
and it is an important aspect of international environmental law, thereby connecting 
equity and justice with environmental conservation (see Birnie et al. 2009; Cullet 
2010). Moreover, within the international domain “issues of justice are largely 
structured around states”, especially the relationship between developed and 
developing nations (Cullet 2010, p. 162). Therefore, the notion of CBRD can be 
described as follows: 
“Although responsibility is common to all states, developed and 
developing alike, higher standards of conduct are explicitly set for 
developed states on the grounds that they have both contributed 
most to causing problems such as ozone depletion and climate 
change and that they also possess greater capacity to respond than 
is generally available to developing states.” (Birnie et al. 2009, p. 
133) 
It is this principle of global environmental responsibility that lies at the heart of 
India’s stance in the broader international discourse regarding climate change 
mitigation and adaptation. India is an active contributor in international climate 
negotiations; it is a party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol, in addition to being a member of the Asia 




US65. Rajamani (2008, p. 422) points out that within these international fora India has 
maintained a consistent stance, arguing that “given its limited role in contributing to 
the problem thus far, its overriding development needs, and the historical 
responsibility of industrialised countries, India cannot be expected to take on 
mitigation commitments.” The significance of this position is the coupling of 
development objectives and addressing climate change. Therefore, the key question for 
India during the period of study was: how does CCS technology contribute to 
sustainable development? This question was also raised extensively by other 
developing countries in the climate negotiations, as the concept of CBRD is also a 
central element of the “burden-sharing architecture” of the UNFCCC and its Protocol 
(Rajamani 2008, p. 425) and this is discussed in more detail below (section 6.3).  
India’s international stance involves the twinning of development and climate 
goals, and is best understood by examining India’s domestic policies. India’s overall 
approach to GHG mitigation is based on the ‘logic of co-benefits’ (Rajamani 2009). In 
the context of climate mitigation policies, the term ‘co-benefits’ refers to other non-
climate benefits, such as sustainable development, and is defined by the IPCC as 
follows: 
“The benefits of policies implemented for various reasons at the 
same time, acknowledging that most policies designed to address 
greenhouse gas mitigation have other, often at least equally 
important, rationales (e.g. related to objectives of development, 
sustainability, and equity).” (IPCC 2007c, p. 98) 
This concept derives from the principle of CBRD, and forms the central ethos of 
India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), which was launched in 2008. 
It is an approach whereby climate change measures will only be taken that also 
promote development objectives, i.e. which simultaneously yield “co-benefits for 
addressing climate change effectively” (Government of India 2008, p. 2). This is because 
the Indian Government is “convinced that the principle of equity that must underlie the 
global approach must allow each inhabitant of the earth an equal entitlement to the 
                                                             




global atmospheric resource” (Ibid.). The NAPCC goes on further to state that “India is 
determined that its per capita greenhouse gas emissions will at no point exceed that of 
developed countries even as we pursue our development objectives” (Ibid.). Hence, this 
is the official stance that India has maintained throughout the international 
negotiations on climate change, and Rajamani (2008, p. 425) notes that India’s position 
is arguably legitimate, though “not a sagacious one”. This is because, as discussed in 
Chapter One, India is likely to be one of the most vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change, even though it has contributed little to causing it (see Section 1.2). 
Nevertheless, it helps explain why India has been reluctant to take on any large-scale 
mitigation commitments, such as CCS. It also helps explain aspects of the international 
politics regarding climate change and India, as demonstrated by the following comment 
made by a respondent to the stakeholder survey in regards to energy and climate 
change mitigation: 
“India is not under Kyoto obligation to cap emissions, yet it is on 
course to have 40% clean electricity by 2020 [as envisioned by the 
NAPCC]. Yet there is a lot of propaganda in the western press, 
clubbing India with China about growth of emission. Most 
developed countries have failed to achieve their Kyoto targets; the 
US has not even ratified the Kyoto treaty. To expect anything more 
from India is unjust.” (Respondent 16, Survey 2009, Appendix C) 
Linked to this perception of receiving unwarranted pressure from the developed 
world regarding its emissions, India deliberately chose to distance itself from CCS-
related dialogue in the UNFCCC forum, and this is analysed in further detail below. Here 
the implications of India’s position within the climate negotiations and its impact on 
how CCS technology is perceived by India, is discussed in the following subsections, 
which analyse international engagement activities on CCS research and technology 
transfer. This analysis draws upon data gathered during the two fieldwork trips made 
to India in 2008 (see Table 3.1). 
6.2.1 India’s International Engagement on CCS Activities   
In 2005, India was a key participant in the G8 + 5 dialogue at Gleneagles, where CCS 
technology was specifically promoted as a crucial element of the G8 Gleneagles Plan of 




p. 5), developed at the first Ministerial-level meeting in July 2005. Notably, the aim of 
the meeting was to “accelerate the development and commercialisation of Carbon 
Capture and Storage technology by… working with industry and with national and 
international research programmes and partnerships to explore the potential of CCS 
technologies, including with developing countries” (Ibid.). One of the strategic 
partnerships highlighted in the Gleneagles Communiqué was with the Carbon 
Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF), which was founded by the US in 200366. 
Subsequently, India signed a pact with the US in 2006 on the FutureGen project and 
related CSLF research activities (PTI 2006). The CSLF endorses research in India that 
focuses on the storage potential of basalt formations, which underlie much of the 
subcontinent (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2.3). Another key outcome of the Gleneagles 
Summit was the setting-up of clean coal workstreams by the European Commission, in 
order to “support programmes and external elements such as technology cooperation 
with key countries on CCS” (Fujiwara & Egenhoffer 2008, p. 36). A direct result of the 
Gleneagles dialogue was also a series of international workshops held in India on CCS 
and R&D challenges, starting with two held at the National Geophysical Research 
Institute, Hyderabad in 2006 and 200767.  
The workshops that followed shortly after, in 2008, form the basis of fieldwork 
activity for this thesis (see Table 3.1), and these events are the primary source of data, 
gathered either through participant observation or through one-to-one interviews with 
elite stakeholders, present at these events. In addition, on the basis of these workshops, 
a network of key stakeholders was created who were then surveyed in order to elicit 
further opinions on the prospects of CCS technology in India (see Chapter 3; Appendix 
A, B & C).  
However, despite India’s participation in these meetings and CCS research 
initiatives, India’s Government position on CCS in the period 2007-10 can be 
                                                             
66 The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) is a Ministerial-level international climate 
change initiative that is focused on the development of improved cost-effective CCS technologies. It 
is comprised of 22 member states and the EU Commission (see: http://www.cslforum.org). 
67 An outcome of this international dialogue has been the establishment of the Indian CO2 




characterised as one of reluctance, particularly within the UNFCCC discourse regarding 
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Issues regarding CCS within the CDM are 
discussed in detail below (section 6.3), however they are introduced here to give a 
sense of the tone and content of discussions, based on my participant observation 
fieldwork. The UK and EU sponsored events attended in New Delhi were controversial, 
given the Indian Government’s position on CCS, as I observed at the time: 
It would seem that India has been avoiding any association with CCS in 
the international climate negotiations. Indian negotiators have been 
very outspoken about their reservations regarding CCS as a mitigation 
option under the CDM at previous COP/MOPs and CSLF meetings. A 
representative from the EU believes that this is because if the option 
were available under the CDM, then India might be in the position 
where they actually would have to clean up their heavily polluting 
coal-fired energy sector.  
DEFRA considered it a major concession by the Indian Government to 
give them permission to host the workshop; UK High Commission 
even surprised that Indian Government sent someone so senior 
(Minister for Science & Technology) to launch the event (Field notes, 
DEFRA/IRADe Workshop, New Delhi, 22 January 2008) 
No sooner had the Minister taken the stage at the inauguration of the DEFRA 
workshop, he made it clear that the Indian Government was sceptical about CCS 
technology; he strongly emphasised that it was something for the ‘far future’ and, that 
any consideration of deployment or demonstration in India at this stage was 
‘premature’ (field notes, DEFRA/IRADe Workshop, New Delhi, 22 January 2008). The 
reasoning he gave was that applying CCS was very expensive and the efficiency of 
power plants is reduced, factors which were ‘not reconcilable with Indian priorities’ 
(Ibid.). The Executive Director for Energy Technologies at the National Thermal Power 
Corporation Ltd. (NTPC), Dr. R Sonde, presented a similar case in the EU-India Working 
Group on Clean Coal. He said the reasons for not considering CCS at this time were 
primarily due to the high costs involved and ambiguities related with the 
environmental safety of CO2 storage (field notes, EU-India Clean Coal Working Group, 
New Delhi, 21st January 2008). He also noted that India’s current power fleet is already 
relatively inefficient (see Chapter 5); he was of the opinion that it was uneconomical to 
retrofit old power stations (their efficiency approx. 35%) with equipment that would 




New Delhi, 21st January 2008). However, he also stated that the Indian Government 
were not averse to research and collaboration, as they considered CCS a technology of 
the future, and a great deal more R&D was seen as needed on Indian specific 
conditions, especially on its high-ash coal (see Chapters 5 & 7 for detailed discussion of 
India-specific conditions). This became apparent at the DEFRA/IRADe workshop, 
where, once the Government officials left the proceedings, the research community 
consisting of nearly 100 scientists and engineers showed great interest and enthusiasm 
for CCS (field notes, New Delhi, 23 January 2014). CCS research was also at the time 
supported in India’s domestic policies as an important option for the distant future, 
such as the Integrated Energy Policy (2006) (Planning Commission 2006, p. 105; 
Planning Commission 2011, p. 42).  
India had an international stance of strong aversion to CCS technology. So it is clear 
that in the period 2007-10 the developed world (especially the UK and EU) was 
insistent that India take CCS seriously at this stage, given that CCS was at the time still 
at a nascent development stage, and yet to be deployed commercially (Rajamani 2011). 
India was deliberately cautious on CCS in the international domain in 2007-10 for two 
key reasons. First, because of CCS technology’s mixed identity and how it was 
presented as a complete product with exclusively GHG mitigation objectives: the Indian 
Government has rejected this interpretation. The second reason is political, and can 
best be explained through a political realist lens, as within international fora state 
actors are known to act in self-interest, paradoxical to climate and environmental 
objectives that are seen as a ‘common concern’ in international environmental law (see 
Birnie et al. 2009, p. 128). The following section expands on these two explanations 
further.  
6.2.2 “CCS isn’t the right technology for India, so stop trying to sell it to us” 
Using a sociotechnical perspective, the rationale behind India’s reluctance to accept 
CCS, despite being encouraged by the international community, can be explained 
through two factors. First, building on discussions from Chapter 2 and 4, the CCS 
technological system being presented to India was designed to look like a coherent, 
discrete technology, (rather than a messy, complex system), which had the sole 




CO2 capture linked to coal, as coal-based power is the most CO2-intensive energy sector. 
However, the chief aim of CCS was presented as curbing emissions, i.e. as a benefit is to 
the global commons; India’s development objectives of poverty reduction and 
electricity for the poor were not seen as served by this aim. There was no co-benefit 
associated with CCS technology, which would satisfy India’s approach to climate change 
and central ethos of CBRD (Rajamani 2011). CCS as defined by industrialised nations at 
the time did not fit with India’s vision of climate mitigation: CCS was not viewed by 
India as contributing to sustainable development, which is equally, if not more, 
important to India, than mitigating climate change. Moreover, several Indian 
researchers felt that the permanent storage of CO2 seemed like the waste of a good 
resource (field notes below). This is a viewpoint that had not been considered by 
international CCS proponents. The following is an excerpt of field notes from the Delhi 
Sustainable Development Summit (DSDS), which took place shortly after the EU and UK 
CCS workshops in 2008. It should be noted that the DSDS was initiated and organised 
by Dr. R. K. Pachauri, then the Chairman of the IPCC, and the overall theme of the 
summit was ‘Sustainable Development and Climate Change.’ 
Questions are being asked of how to ‘use’ the CO2; going to all that 
expense and effort, just to keep it stored underground makes no sense 
to some delegates. There seems to be more interest in concepts that 
involve using the CO2 for something else, such as making building 
materials; similar to the way coal ash from power stations is currently 
used in the Indian cement industry.  
Engineer from IIT Delhi comments that CCS “does not seem innovative 
or, that cutting-edge enough” to get India interested. He also adds that, 
having looked closely at proposed CCS technologies, it seems as if 
“they are trying to sell old technology as something new”; other related 
comments made: “we know how to do EOR, so then just say that it is 
EOR, rather than trying to sell it as something else” (Field notes, DSDS, 
9th February 2008). 
 From the various discussions with stakeholders that had attended both the DEFRA 
workshop and DSDS, it was apparent that CCS's uncertain and mixed identities posed a 
problem. If the CO2 could be put to use for something then that would have made the 
CCS strategy more appealing to India (Interview A2 2008; Interview B6 2008). The 
premise of potentially using the captured CO2 for Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR) was 




commented that although this may be a method to cover the expense of the technology, 
it did nothing to bring electricity to the millions of rural poor, rather, it just increased 
profits for private companies operating project (Interview B6 2008). Furthermore, 
there was scepticism of the storage aspect of the CCS chain, particularly as capturing 
such large volumes of CO2 and then storing it underground had yet to be demonstrated 
anywhere else in the world (Interview B6 2008), also:  
The Chairman of the Planning Commission lead a discussion at DSDS 
on India’s long-term vision (2050) for addressing climate change. I 
asked a question regarding the suitability of CCS in the near-future 
and, he answered that the technology was not ready to be tried out in 
India now, despite the urgency to mitigate emissions by the global 
community. Adding that, if it worked in other parts of the world then 
could also be applied in India by 2050. His reservations were to do with 
safety; explained in an interview later: “We don’t want another Bhopal 
disaster on our hands. What if something went wrong with the storage? 
How do we know that there won’t be explosions of CO2? [The] liability 
will be on our heads, not the private company [that builds the plant]. 
India is not prepared to be the guinea pig” (Combined field notes, 
DSDS, 8th February & interview notes, 27 February, Interview B6 2008). 
One of the counter arguments used by EU delegates, deployed to convince India to 
get involved in CCS at such an early stage, was to do with Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR) (Field notes, EU-India Clean Coal workshop, New Delhi, 21 January 2008). IPR 
issues related with technology transfer, especially from developed to developing 
countries, have been a contentious issue within the UNFCCC dialogue (see Ockwell et al. 
2010; Srinivas 2012). NGOs participating at DSDS, such as Greenpeace International 
and the Centre for Science and Environment (CSE) were of the opinion that CCS was a 
commercial scheme that favoured large multinational corporations (MNCs), because 
the IPR belonged to them (field notes, DSDS, 8th February 2008). A representative from 
DFID said there was a lot of mistrust in this area, but efforts were being made to 
encourage more collaborative joint ventures (Interview B11 2008). The interviewee 
further explained how the issue of technology appropriateness had tainted the 
technology transfer process in the past, where India had been sold ‘unsuitable 
technology’. In the context of energy technology transfer, the interviewee observed that 
in the past, organisations such as the World Bank had imposed certain prerequisites 
before granting loans. This included the precondition to open up the Indian power 




some cases, were not suitable to Indian coal (Interview B11 2008). This sentiment was 
also repeated in the stakeholder survey:  
“There has been very limited financing and technology transfer 
from developed to developing countries. Also the technologies 
being given are not necessarily those which developing countries 
are currently comfortable with at the moment.” (Respondent 11, 
Survey 2009, Appendix B) 
The issue of IPR is inherently linked to CCS technology’s mixed identity, as CCS 
contains established technologies that already have existing patents associated with 
them. For example, patents for the composition of the amine solution needed to capture 
CO2 reside with the company that has invested in the R&D to develop the technology in 
the first place, and is not owned by states. However, the negotiations regarding IPR in 
this context have largely taken place between states. Similarly, the IPR impediment to 
technology transfer is not just about patents; for the case of CCS, there is also an issue 
regarding ‘trade secrets’, or processes essentially belonging to the company, the 
disclosure of which would harm the business’ interests (see Martin & Law 2006; 
Sajewycz 2011). Trade secrets are quite prevalent in the oil and gas industry; examples 
include CO2 injection techniques for EOR, seismic data and interpretation, as well as 
exploratory methods and geological maps. An industry stakeholder surveyed 
explained: “technology transfer is a difficult issue due to the corporate structure of 
many private energy companies and equipment suppliers, especially when met by large 
nationalised companies” (Respondent 5, Survey 2009, Appendix B). Moreover, CCS was 
perceived as an amalgamation of existing technologies, but also as something untested, 
giving it a mixed identity. The impact of this mixed sociotechnical identity on IPR issues 
specific to CCS are discussed further in the Cambay basin study in Chapter Seven.  
The second factor influencing India’s position on CCS has to do with politics, where 
the state is the chief actor, being the customer, regulator and underwriter (see Street 
1992 & discussion in Chapter 2). The 2008 workshops attended in New Delhi 
specifically hinged upon India’s bilateral relationships with the UK and Europe. For 
example, both the EU-Coal and DEFRA workshops included large teams of UK and 
European academics and technocrats, but also energy MNCs, such as Alstom, BP, 




representatives outnumbered NGOs at these workshops (field notes, New Delhi, 21-23 
January 2008). Furthermore, the chief sponsor for the DSDS in 2008 was the 
Norwegian Government, which hosted a high-level session, with various heads of state 
participating. This included speeches by the Prime Ministers of Norway (Jens 
Stoltenberg) and Denmark (Anders Rasmussen), both of whom notably endorsed CCS 
technology in their official address (field notes, New Delhi, DSDS 7th February 2008). 
Days prior to the DSDS event, Norway’s Statoil signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with India’s national Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), 
which was an agreement to explore the potential of CCS projects in India, via the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM)68.  The fate of this MoU is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 7. The drivers behind these events in New Delhi can be interpreted through 
technological political realism, where countries with specific expertise supporting CCS 
technology were looking to expand into a new and potentially lucrative market. The 
Indian state was in essence the prospective customer. Furthermore, the same state 
actors, e.g. UK, Norway and EU, were the strongest proponents for including CCS within 
the CDM framework, and this issue is discussed in further detail below. 
6.3 The role of CCS in the International Climate Negotiations 
As discussed earlier, CCS technology has featured significantly within international 
legal discourse, particularly regarding climate and marine legislation. This section 
provides a broader view of CCS in an international context, where the focus is on 
responses of developing countries to the technology. Notably, India did not participate 
in the CCS-specific dialogue at Copenhagen in 2009. Nevertheless, the value of this 
discussion is to further demonstrate and highlight the political and commercial drivers 
behind CCS implementation in developing countries. 
During the period of empirical research for this thesis there was no international 
mechanism to support the development or deployment of CCS in developing countries. 
The analysis here is largely concerned with the negotiations under the United 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), specifically, the Clean 
                                                             




Development Mechanism (CDM). Empirical research data was gathered in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, where the fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UNFCCC was 
being held. It should be noted that dialogue regarding CCS took place under four 
separate bodies69 in Copenhagen; COP15 also served as the fifth Meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP570), and the discussions that took place under this body is 
the focus of analysis here. The negotiations specifically regarding the inclusion of CCS 
within the CDM framework originally took place under the workstream of the 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), and these were also 
observed at COP15. 
The deliberation about including CCS within the CDM framework had become a 
rather divisive issue in the lead up to COP15 (see de Coninck 2008); the discussions in 
SBSTA were often controversial, leading to heated debates, and the tone of these 
meetings were no different in Copenhagen (COP15). Interestingly, India was already 
notorious in 2008 for being one of the more vocal opponents to the inclusion of CCS 
under the CDM, particularly at COP13/CMP3 held in Bali, 2007 (Shackley & Verma 
2008, p. 3558), and did not participate in any SBSTA or CMP5 meetings related to this 
matter at COP15. The reasons behind this are discussed in detail in the following 
chapter (see Section 7.2.2). However, despite India’s absence at this particular 
discussion at COP15, a submission was put forward to SBSTA in December 2009 
outlining the necessary steps required of the CDM project cycle, in order to provide an 
enabling framework for any potential CCS deployment in India via the CCS-CDM model 
(see Bumb & Rituraj 2009). It should be noted that this was not an official submission 
on behalf of the Indian Government, but rather from an NGO, the Indian Youth Climate 
Network (IYCN). The following section focuses on the CSS/CDM debate observed at 
COP15, highlighting the divide within the developing country parties, which can be 
                                                             
69 Discussions related to CCS took place under the following bodies at COP15: (1) Scientific Body for 
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA); (2) Conference of the Parties serving as a Meeting of the 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP); (3) Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I 
Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP); (4) Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative 
Action (AWG-LCA). 
70 This is also referred to as a COP/MOP, shortened to CMP. The CMP was the Kyoto Protocol’s 
supreme body, but only Parties that had ratified or acceded to the Protocol could participate in 




explained through technology politics and realism, but can also be viewed as a 
symptom of CCS operating as a sociotechnical system rather than a discrete technology.  
6.3.1 CCS and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
As one of the market-based mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol (1st commitment 
period 2008-2012), the CDM allows Annex 171 Parties, essentially developed countries, 
to meet their commitments to reduce emissions based on actions taken in developing 
countries (Non Annex 1 Countries72). CDM projects undertaken in developing 
countries, according to Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, have to meet two main 
objectives. Firstly, CDM projects must contribute to the sustainable development needs 
of the host country and, secondly must generate Certified Emissions Reductions 
(CERs)73, which are essentially emissions credits that can be bought by Annex 1 
countries as an alternative to reducing their own greenhouse gas emissions. There has 
been expert analysis about the potential for receipt of revenues from CERs under the 
CDM as a possible mechanism for financing CCS demonstration in India (see Shackley & 
Verma 2008). However, a representative from the Ministry of External Affairs made 
India’s resistance to CCS explicit prior to the negotiations at COP15: 
                                                             
71 Annex 1 to the UNFCCC is a list consisting of industrialised nation states, including the original 
twenty-four members of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 
1990, as well as the European Union. This list also includes ‘economies in transition’ from Central 
and Eastern Europe, such as Croatia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Under Article 4.2 (a 
& b) of the Convention, these countries commit themselves to reduce their emissions to their 1990 
levels of GHG emissions by 2000, as well as accept emission targets for the period 2008-2012 (see 
Birnie et al. 2009, p. 356). 
72 These are developing nations that have ratified or acceded to the UNFCCC. 
73 A CER represents one tonne of CO2 equivalent greenhouse gas emissions reductions achieved 




“This is not a proven technology. Many technical parameters need 
to be still worked out. And, it’s certainly not economically feasible 
because if we fit CCS equipment to a coal based plant, it would 
double the investment. We have deep reservations about this 
technology, particularly if the storage has to be in terrain that is 
geologically unstable.” (Shyam Saran, special envoy of the Prime 
Minister on Climate Change, April 13th 2009)74 
Therefore, India’s absence from the CCS-CDM dialogue at COP15 came as no 
surprise. In a brief discussion with a representative from the Indian Ministry of 
External Affairs at the very start of the COP15 negotiations, it was mentioned that India 
did not think it likely for CCS to have much of a role within the first commitment period 
of the Kyoto Protocol, i.e. before 2012, and that CCS discussions would be more useful 
in workstreams focusing on post-Kyoto activities75. This would allow the USA to be 
involved in the discussions, as they are the most significant polluter and have the 
means to develop the technology (Interview B12 2009).  
More generally, CCS has been thought of as a viable mitigation option for 
developing countries, where discussions surrounding its inclusion in the CDM date 
back to 2005 at CMP1, Montreal. This was initiated by Vietnam and Malaysia, who 
wanted the CDM Executive Board (EB) to consider two new CCS technology 
methodologies (see UNFCCC 2006). The EB decided that it was not sufficiently 
equipped to respond to this new methodology and subsequently created a new 
workstream under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
in 2006 (Dixon 2009). Since then, CCS had been on every agenda of subsequent SBSTA 
meetings, which entailed deliberation on this issue every six months. This involved 
submissions from Parties and NGOs (2007-2008), culminating in two synthesis reports. 
The workstream was due to conclude in December 2008, where a decision was 
expected at CMP4 in Poznan. However, even though a draft text was prepared and 
debated upon, a decision could not in the end be reached and the decision was referred 
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to the EB, who were requested to report back at CMP5 (Copenhagen) (Dixon et al. 
2009). Notably, even though negotiations on potential CCS methodologies for the CDM 
were discussed under SBSTA to begin with, the ultimate decision to include CCS within 
the CDM could only have been made at the Ministerial-level by the CMP body76. 
In Copenhagen, the discussions on CCS inclusion within the CDM initially started in 
the SBSTA workstream, and the main arguments for or against are summarised in 
Table 6.1, derived from field notes (December 2009). Notably, the support for CCS 
came largely from oil-producing countries, and the opposition was led by Brazil, 
Grenada and Jamaica. The difference in opinion was mainly about how to proceed, 
where those in opposition thought the issue should be pushed back to the next SBSTA 
meeting in June 2010, whereas others wanted the issue to be addressed in Copenhagen 
and a final decision to be made by CMP5.  
In order to understand the tensions within the CCS-CDM forum at the Copenhagen 
COP it is helpful to interpret this debate through a sociotechnical lens, combined with 
insights from technology politics and realism, given that the states are the main actors 
within an international legal forum and, the mixed sociotechnical identity of CCS (see 
discussion in Chapter 2). Firstly, in terms of technological political realism, states are 
acting in their self-interest and this is evident from the list of countries supporting CCS 
inclusion in the CDM (see Table 6.1). Supporters of CCS technology fall mainly within 
two categories; (1) those states that are major fossil fuel exporters, e.g. from the 
MENA77 region, or (2) those developed states that not only export fossil fuel, but have 
established hydrocarbon industries that have already been exploring CCS R&D in their 
own regions, e.g. Norway, Australia, and the EU. Notably, of the EU member states, the 
UK has been the most active in the CCS-CDM debate and has contributed significantly 
through submissions on methodologies and assisting with developments to the 
European legislation regarding CO2 storage and the European Carbon market (Dixon et 
al. 2009).  
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Table 6.1: Summary of the main arguments for and against the inclusion of CCS within the 
CDM framework, including lists of countries that either oppose or favour the motion 
(source: field notes, COP15, Copenhagen December 2009). 
Countries 
AGAINST 











 Unproven technology; 
Currently no CCS [on 
coal power stations] yet 
in Annex 1 countries; 
Prove in Annex 1 first 
then transfer 
technology 
 CCS will flood CDM 
market with CERs, 
lowering CER prices, 
reducing incentives for 
renewables 
 Long-term liability – 
offset project that helps 
Annex 1 avoid domestic 
action in the short-term, 
e.g. host country would 
be left with 
responsibility in the 
long-term 
 Propagate inequitable 
distribution of CDM 
projects; already 
recognised that certain 
countries benefit more 
from CDM – e.g. China, 
India & Brazil are top 
countries with largest 
share of CDM projects 
 Does not meet 
sustainable 
development objectives; 
propagates further use 














 Climate change – all 
mitigation technologies 
should be applied 
especially if 2ºC 
rise/450 ppm by 2050, 
then role of CCS is 
approx 19% of 
mitigation action – take 
CCS out then 70% more 
expensive to achieve 
450ppm 
 CDM is meant to be 
technology neutral 




 CCS may help with the 
equitable distribution 
of CDM projects – e.g. in 
Africa & South East Asia 
 Can be done now with 
non-coal CCS, projects 
are waiting, e.g. natural 
gas & other industries 
 Some developing 
countries argue that 
they are dependent on 
fossil fuels and have 
little other natural 
resources, therefore 
this is the only way to 
reduce emissions. 
 
Moreover, the dominant role of industry should not be ignored, and naturally there 
was a lot of interest, evident by submissions from Business and Industry Non-
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Governmental observer organisations (BINGOs), such as the Carbon Capture and 
Storage Association (CCSa), the Global CCS Institute (GCCSI), the International 
Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) and the World 
Coal Institute (WCI)79. It should be noted that although the aforementioned BINGOs are 
international organisations, they are all based within key developed nations, who were 
leading in CCS R&D at the time – UK and Australia. Even though there can be a liberalist 
interpretation of this situation regarding the involvement of BINGOs, i.e. NGOs are just 
as politically relevant as State actors, in this context, it can be argued that these BINGOs 
were still working together with State actors that had a strategic interest in the CCS-
CDM debate. 
In the context of Non Annex 1 countries for CCS inclusion, the strongest support 
came from oil-rich countries in the Middle East. For example, the UAE were very keen 
for its inclusion because they felt it was the only way they could participate within the 
CDM framework (field notes, Copenhagen, SBSTA 3rd Meeeting, 12 December 2009). In 
an interview with the negotiator, it was gleaned that the UAE were working towards 
building infrastructure for a CO2 pipeline network that would enable the transport of 
CO2 from various industries, such as cement, soda-ash and urea/fertiliser production. It 
was envisioned that this captured CO2 would be transported offshore for EOR purposes 
(Interview B15 2009). Two factors explained their interest. First, although this project 
was being subsidised by the state, the UAE Government wanted that portion of funding 
or subsidy to be paid by the CDM instead. Second, notwithstanding the increased oil 
production from offshore EOR, the UAE were keen to lead on the technology for export 
purposes, and needed the CDM money to achieve this (Ibid.). When questioned about 
the cost of developing the capture technology, as it is both energy intensive and costly 
(see Chapter 4), the negotiator said that there was enough profit from gas and oil 
exports, so they did not feel impeded by such costs (Ibid.). Accordingly, when analysed 
through technological political realism, not only is there an element of national-
interest, but also there is interstate competition and technology; in this context CCS is 
seen as an exogenous instrument by which to gain a competitive edge. 
                                                             




When the CDM debate is considered through the second theme of the mixed and 
multiple identity of CCS, then some of the issues highlighted as counter-arguments in 
Table 6.1 stem from difficulties in defining the technology, which throws its eligibility 
for the CDM into question. This is linked with its questionable role as a mitigation tool 
and the argument that CCS does not really contribute to sustainable development, 
which is a core ethos of the CDM. For example, the first two submissions that initially 
sparked this debate were related to CO2 EOR offshore in Vietnam and, CO2 separation 
from LNG processing in Malaysia (see UNFCCC 2006). In both of these cases, it can be 
argued that the objective was not entirely based on mitigation, i.e. the aim was to 
extract more oil in Vietnam using CO2 EOR, and the reservoir in Malaysia was CO2 – acid 
rich, and CO2 needed to be separated in order to sell the gas. In addition to the 
questionable mitigation objectives, there is also the issue of whether these processes 
would qualify as ‘new’ technology or rather would entail the use of existing practices 
and techniques, e.g. ‘gas sweetening’ in Malaysia. Moreover, one could question 
whether these proposals are actually an opportunistic way to get money for something 
that would have to be done regardless, in order to extract the resource. The 
submissions by Vietnam and Malaysia can be best explained through technological 
political realism discussed earlier in this section. 
The following field note extracts demonstrate that countries resisting its inclusion 





Serendipitously sat next to the negotiator from Grenada at lunch today. This 
was just after a very intense Contact group meeting, having witnessed, literally, 
a shouting match between Saudi Arabia and AOSIS (mainly Grenada & 
Jamaica). The negotiator raised some concerns regarding CCS in the CDM and 
would like me to investigate. AOSIS have limited support staff; as an observer 
from University of Edinburgh, I was considered a neutral party and therefore 
suitable to provide some assistance in terms of research. His concerns included: 
- Not sure if CCS meets the eligibility criteria as the right kind of technology for 
the CDM – “isn’t it similar to nuclear?” 
- There are concerns regarding permanence – “how do we know that it will all 
stay below ground? If it will then why isn’t everybody doing it already?” 
- Benefits seem to be in the short-term, and primarily for private industry. In 
the long-run, the host Government takes on the liability, so “is it possible to get 
CERs back if there is leakage then?” 
- CCS seems like a hypothetical technology, not convinced that carbon 
reduction units would be real, measurable or verifiable. 
(Combined field notes and Interview B14, COP15, Copenhagen, 10th December 
2009). 
From the field notes above, it is evident that the negotiator considered CCS 
technology difficult to define, which is why its eligibility under the CDM was being 
questioned. There is also an association with nuclear technology due to the long-term 
storage of waste underground; hence leakage is a major concern. The negotiator felt 
that CCS was ‘overcomplicating things’, where the focus should be on technologies that 
are proven to work in developed countries first. Moreover, he wasn’t convinced that 
CCS would benefit the host country in terms of sustainable development or the 
mitigation process as a whole, because it was not clear that the emissions reductions 
could be verified or measured (Interview B14 2009). The observations and analysis of 
de Coninck (2008) and Dixon (2009) corroborate these findings.  
Even though India did not feature in the negotiations analysed here, the 
reservations voiced by other developing countries reflect the scepticism expressed by 
majority of Indian stakeholders surveyed. In terms of international fiancial mechanisms 
for facilitating technology transfer, the majority of stakeholders surveyed (13/18) felt 
that the exisiting infrastructure of the CDM and carbon markets were insufficient to 




respondent opined “that CDM and carbon markets of the future will not give enough 
support to CCS, for which investment is much higher than other low carbon 
technologies” (Respondent 14, Survey 2009, Appendix B & C). It was also considered 
that “policy changes that allow CCS to be part of the CDM will be insufficient due to the 
energy penalty [associated with] the technology” (Respondent 13, Survey 2009, 
Appendix B & C). In fact, the overall process of technology transfer was met with some 
scepticism; it was considered to “just mean being directed to a private company, which 
in turn charges large amounts of fees to share the knowledge of the technology” 
(Respondent 16, Survey 2009, Appendix B & C). 
A decision regarding CCS and the CDM could not be reached by the Ministers at 
CMP5, and the issue was pushed back to the following COP/MOP at Cancun, Mexico in 
2010. Notably, at CMP6 the following year, a decision was reached to include CCS 
within the CDM framework, provided specific issues related to procedures and 
methodologies were addressed, e.g. strengthening monitoring plans of any potential 
CO2 leakage during the crediting period and after (i.e. post-injection) (see Dixon et al. 
2013, p. 7592). Decisions made within the UNFCCC process are inherently political; 
agreements are reached by means of consensus ad idem, wherby all contracting parties 
must agree to identical terms in order to reach a formal agreement (see Martin & Law 
2006). Therefore it is possible for countries to hold debates ‘at ransom’, and in the case 
of CCS, this was quite apparent in Copenhagen. A form of bartering was observed 
outside the formal negotiations; for example, towards the end of CMP5, Brazilian 
negotiators were willing to “trade off” CCS if countries would support the eligibility of 
‘Forests in Exhaustion’80 under the CDM (Field Notes & Interview B16 December 2009, 
Copenhagen). In line with general observations made at this international forum, it 
became clear that there was a distinct conflict of interest in terms of climate change 
goals and development ambitions for all nations paticipating. It can be argued that 
political realism prevails in an international arena which was supposedly formed on 
the basis of political liberalist values, i.e. where there is a growing interdependence 
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between multiple actors, e.g. States, NGOs and MNCs, for cooperation at the global level 
(e.g. de Coninck 2009; de Coninck & Bäckstrand 2011). However, the CCS-CDM debate 
highlights that States act largely according to national self-interests, which tend to 
dominate or dictate the debate (de Coninck & Bäckstrand 2011). 
6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter explores the significant international dimensions of CCS, particularly 
the international effort to entice India to take an interest in the technology. This 
strategy involved engaging India in CCS dialogue via two channels: first, through 
bilateral workshops and conferences, funded by the UK government or the European 
Commission, held during the beginning of the study period; second, by means of the 
UNFCCC forum, where CCS was proposed as a mitigation option under the CDM 
framework. Notably, India aired deliberate caution regarding CCS at these international 
initiatives; from the outset India’s position has been against any demonstration or 
deployment on Indian soil, in addition to opposing the inclusion of CCS under the CDM. 
Interestingly, despite being a key target for CCS promotion by Western Governments 
and MNCs, India’s role on the international stage was for most of the time minor during 
this period of study, especially during the climate negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009. 
In order to understand India’s official international position on CCS technology, it is 
important to consider its domestic policy approach to climate change. India 
consistently emphasises the importance of historical responsibility, and therefore in 
2007-10 was not prepared to take on mitigation commitments if not based on the 
principle of CBDR. In the Indian Government’s view, development objectives could not 
be separated from actions on climate change; rather, there was a philosophy of ‘co-
benefits’. Therefore, the contribution of CCS to sustainable development was 
questioned, not only by India, but also by several other developing countries, as 
observed at COP15 in Copenhagen. 
At various international CCS events taking place in New Delhi, the Indian 
Government declared that any CCS deployment and demonstration in India would be 
‘premature’. The primary reasons given were due to its cost and inefficiency, but also 




countries. Furthermore, India felt pressured by the international community to 
consider CCS, despite being vocal in international meetings regarding its reservations 
about the technology. Consequently, most events attended, both in New Delhi and 
Copenhagen were contentious, and the political and commercial objectives behind 
hosting such events were apparent, given that they were all sponsored by developed 
states and MNCs with a strategic interest in developing CCS. 
Connected to these commercial drivers behind CCS technology transfer is the 
significant challenge of addressing concerns regarding the protection of IP belonging to 
MNCs. Issues related to IPR can be regarded as an impediment to technology transfer in 
general, and have been an established point of contention with the international 
negotiations on climate change. The protection of IP relating to CCS in particular 
becomes more challenging due to its complexity, e.g. certain sectors are more prone to 
employing trade secrets, such as the oil & gas industry, which are more difficult to 
transfer between countries. This adds to its mixed sociotechnical identity – CCS is 
combination of both old and new technologies and institutions, and therefore hard to 
define. 
Throughout the study period (2007-10) India maintained the position that CCS 
technologies had to be deployed and demonstrated in developed countries first before 
they would be considered in India. Therefore, in the lead up to COP15 in Copenhagen, 
India was known for being vehemently against the use of the CDM framework to 
support CCS technology transfer. Notably, India did not participate in the CCS-CDM 
debate observed in Copenhagen 2009. Despite India’s absence, it was interesting to 
observe the arguments for and against CCS inclusion in the CDM, and the divisions 
within the overall developing country negotiating bloc. The CCS-CDM debate was 
dominated by fossil-fuel states, which naturally had a commercial imperative to invest 
in CCS. The next chapter looks at CCS specifically regarding the domestic context and 
the sociotechnical issues surrounding the different parts of the technology chain. A 
more in-depth exploration, using the Cambay Basin case study, further explains the 





Chapter 7: Feasibility of CCS in India – Domestic Context and 
Challenges 
7.1 Introduction 
Previous studies show that the Indian government expresses minimal interest in 
CCS demonstration or policy (e.g. Narain 2007; Shackley and Verma 2008; Rajamani 
2011), and this research also found the same. As discussed in Chapter Six, the Indian 
Government considers CCS to be a technology of the future, which needs further 
development in industrialised countries first in order to bring down the cost through 
R&D and deployment. Furthermore, during the period of empirical research for this 
thesis (2007 – 2010), the Indian Government held the position that CCS was not a 
viable option for climate change mitigation in India, and therefore would not agree to 
any further assessment of CO2 storage potential, nor were they considering setting up 
any demonstration or early deployment projects. Therefore, from the onset of this 
research project, India did not looked favourably upon CCS, and as outlined in Chapter 
One, a key objective of the thesis is to explore and better understand why this was the 
case.  
In this chapter a range of technical options for the domestic implementation of CCS 
in India – introduced in Chapter Four – are explored in more detail, including: 
integration of CCS with a range of new types of power plant built or planned in India; 
the composition of coal mined in India; and geological storage. These technical issues 
are shown to be sociotechnical, infused with domestic and international politics (e.g. 
security issues) and economics. This chapter explores in detail the technological and 
political issues to do with of CCS implementation in India, which are bound up with 
particular limitations at the domestic level. For example, India’s key domestic 
challenges are to do with geology and outdated energy infrastructure such as inefficient 
power plants, in addition to, social concerns related to corruption, theft and insurgency 
in coal-rich areas. These issues could not be discerned from the international discourse 
analysed in the previous chapter and therefore, this chapter explores in detail how 
these domestic issues have also influenced the Indian Government’s international 
stance on CCS (as presented in Chapter Six). Moreover, a case study on the Cambay 




used to further explore how these complex challenges to CCS technology transfer in 
India have manifested. This case study includes an exploration of both technical aspects 
and political dimensions, in keeping with the theoretical frames introduced in Chapter 
Two, including the mixed identity of CCS, innovation and technology transfer, as well as 
the importance of international relations on these aspects.  
A series of elite interviews81 were conducted, with representatives from twenty-
five different organisations, predominantly Government and industrial sectors, as well 
as an expert stakeholder survey (see Appendix A, B and C), in order to assess in detail 
the sociotechnical context for the implementation of CCS in India (see Chapter Three 
for more details, especially Table 3.1 and 3.2). This data is drawn upon throughout 
Chapters Six and Seven, including the Cambay Basin case study.  
It is noted in Chapter 5 (see section 5.3) regarding India’s energy system that there 
are technical issues that make CCS challenging specifically for India, notably, the 
geological constraints. These technical geological issues are also a vital issue in 
explaining India’s attitude towards CCS and its failure to implement CCS in the period 
2007-10. Specifically, India’s geology impacts not only the storage aspect of the CCS 
chain, but also the poor quality of Indian coals requires unique capture technology to 
deal with its high-ash content. Section 7.2 explores the technical and geological 
feasibility of current CCS technologies in the Indian context. However, the political 
dynamics associated with India’s main fuel choice, coal, also influences India’s decision 
on CCS, and these aspects are discussed in Section 7.2.1 before looking at the whole CCS 
chain as potentially applied to India (i.e. capture, transport and storage). Finally, the 
case study of the Cambay Basin is presented in Section 7.3, going further in detail of 
both the technical potential in the region, as well as the social and political context that 
could undermine a potential CCS project. Some geopolitical dimensions of the case 
study, particularly in the context of shipping, are also explored later in this chapter, 
because, in geographical terms, the Cambay Basin is part of the Indian sub-continent, 
and essentially the original source of CO2 is physically located there. Therefore, these 
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geopolitical dimensions exist only after domestic challenges are met and the CO2 
physically leaves India.  
7.2 Putting CCS Technology into an Indian Context  
Chapters Two and Four demonstrate the complexities associated with CCS 
technology, both in terms of its innovation and development, as well as its flexible 
technical configuration, i.e. the integration of three distinct stages (capture, transport 
and storage). CCS thus has a mixed identity – it is actually a bundle of different types of 
technology, a sociotechnical system – and this is also reflected in how CCS has been 
perceived in India, as discussed in Chapter Six. This section explores CCS technology 
suitability to Indian local conditions, specifically in terms of the technical issues raised 
in Chapter Four.  
7.2.1 Externalities Regarding Coal 
Chapter Five explored the significant role that coal plays in India’s energy system, 
and, if CCS is truly going to make a considerable impact by mitigating CO2 emissions, 
then coal-based power will need to be where it is applied. Therefore, this section starts 
by exploring the very beginning of a potential CCS chain, i.e. the fuel source. This is 
because CCS implementation, especially on power plants reliant on indigenous coal, 
would perpetuate the mining of coal in India. The negative social and environmental 
impacts of mining for mineral resources and coal are well documented (see Josephson 
2006; Sudarshan & Noronha 2009; Marston 2011). Particularly, in the case of India, the 
mining is largely opencast because it is cheap, and manual labour is readily available 
(Sudarshan & Noronha 2009). Typically, international financial institutions, such as the 
World Bank, have contributed to “large-scale technological development projects”, 
especially energy projects, but failed “to understand or overlook[ed] their significant 
social and environmental impact” (Josephson 2006, p. 152; see also Chellaney 2011; 
Marston 2011). For example, Singrauli (Madhya Pradesh) provides 10% of India’s coal-
based power and was initially set up as the ‘coal hub’ by the World Bank; but rather 
than providing electricity locally, it supports large urban centres, leaving the locals in a 
state of perpetual poverty and depravation (see Marston 2011). In the context of this 




created an unstable domestic situation in India, and they continue to create further 
discontent. A key official within the Ministry of Environment and Forests commented 
that this malaise, largely due to poor governance, has already created much concern for 
the Indian Government and India will “need to get its house in order first” before 
considering any other new technology (Interview A2 2008). He added, too many people 
have suffered, lost livelihoods and lives; “such land grabs were all made in the name of 
development and energy security, but the country cannot continue on this path” (Ibid.). 
For two reasons, Indian coal is considered to be a rather dangerous commodity by 
Indian policymakers, with serious implications for national security. First, there is an 
issue regarding the accuracy of coal resource estimates (see also Section 5.3), which is 
linked to political corruption and illegal mining. In an interview with a senior coal R&D 
specialist for Coal India Limited82 (CIL), it was highlighted that mines were already 
being operated unsustainably to cope with the increased demand; he was of the 
opinion that with current rates of consumption, the extractable coal is likely to run out 
by 2030 (Interview B2 2008). He added further, significant amounts of produced coal 
are unaccounted for and there is widespread illegal mining, due to corruption, which 
goes up through the hierarchy to very senior levels, or by organised gangs (Ibid.). 
Commenting more on the former than the latter, the interviewee from CIL mentioned 
that due to the lack of transparency and corruption within the sector, there were major 
discrepancies when it came to the allocation of coal blocks to mining companies, to 
both public and private companies. Therefore, the interviewee concluded that official 
figures are very likely to be inflated and he was of the opinion that neither the future 
projections of coal-use made by Government reports, nor Indian coal availability, could 
be relied upon (Ibid.). This has implications for any potential CCS project that is to be 
based on Indian coal, especially as CO2 capture involves more coal use (see Chapter 4). 
Moreover, an unreliable fuel source has consequences for the overall operation of the 
power plant.  
During 2008, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) had already been 
investigating various scams connected with the coal sector and illegal mining in 
                                                             




resource-rich states such as West Bengal and Chhattisgarh (see Mittal 2008; Pandey 
2009). On 22nd March 2012 the Times of India, having obtained a draft copy of a report 
by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, reported that the Indian 
Government had incurred losses of “Rs10.67 lakh crore [or 10.67 Trillion Indian 
Rupees83], to commercial entities by giving them 155 coal acreages without auction 
between 2004 and 2009” (Dutta 2012). The CBI connected this scam to the highest 
political office, investigating the Indian Prime Minister at the time of this study, 
Manmohan Singh, who was also in charge of the Ministry of Coal from 2004 to 2009 
and since then, the Indian media have dubbed the whole affair as ‘coalgate’ (see Kumar 
2013; PTI 2014). The controversy over the allocation of coal blocks without 
competitive bidding remains a hot topic within public discourse and the Indian media 
(Ibid.). Given the large amounts of capital investment that a potential CCS project would 
require upfront, working with Indian coal would likely be considered a high-risk option 
for multinational corporations (MNCs). This is because the Government’s credibility 
had been shaken in 2011 due to political corruption scandals, and extensively profiled 
in the media, regarding its senior officials and the so-called ‘mining barons’ (Thakurta 
2011). In terms of prospective CCS technology transfer, MNCs would be required to 
cooperate with nationalised sectors, which are most likely to own and operate parts of 
the CCS chain. For example, as highlighted in Chapters Four and Six, MNCs are currently 
leading in CCS R&D and will have a crucial role to play in any technology transfer. 
There are very strong commercial drivers for CCS implementation alongside the role of 
state actors. However, this thesis does not explore the role of MNCs because the during 
the study period state actors took precedent in regards to implementation.  
The second reason why Indian coal is considered a risky commodity is connected to 
the illegal mining discussed above, which has resulted in a thriving black-market 
economy of coal. There is also evidence that this directly supports India’s Maoist 
insurgency. Ramana (2011, p. 29) explains that the origins of this insurgency started in 
the late 1960s, and “all those who have subscribed to the idea of an armed overthrow 
of the state have been generically referred to as Naxalites, the term having its origins in 
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Naxalbari village,” located in the coal and mineral-rich state of West Bengal. 
Furthermore, “the largest and most lethal of all Naxalite groups in operation in India” is 
the Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist)84, and is “avowedly committed 
to waging an armed revolution and consider[s] parliamentary politics a sham” 
(Ramana 2011, p. 29). The CPI (Maoist) group has become a stronger threat over the 
years, and now poses a huge security risk in resource-rich states, so much so that the 
Indian Government equates them with terrorists who are “out to destabilize the 
country and impede ‘development’, which is understood to mean industrialization” 
(Sundar 2011, p. 47). 
However, it should be noted that the vast majority of India’s coal is located in 
densely forested areas and tribal regions, and the root cause of the upsurge in Maoist 
attacks is connected to the poor governance and unsustainable mining practices 
conducted in these areas. Both the Ministry of Environment and Forests (Interview A2 
2008), and the Centre for Rural Development (Interview B3 2008) criticized Indian 
Government policymakers for treating tribal areas as “simply mineral-rich areas to be 
exploited”, with total disregard for the local population, who have been displaced as a 
result of large development projects. Furthermore, interviewees felt that this increase 
in discontent amongst the locals is because both public and private enterprises that 
operate in the area have failed to fulfil any environmental or social obligations to the 
people, whose land they have acquisitioned (Interview A2 2008; Interview B3 2008). 
This is further corroborated by the work of Marston (2011), which highlights the plight 
of local people in Singrauli district (site of major World Bank power projects), where, 
despite being based in the ‘coal capital’ of India, they lack jobs, electricity, clean 
drinking water, and live in abject poverty. Though, the Minister insisted that even 
though there is “unbelievable pressure” from the coal and power sectors for land 
acquisition and land clearances, He was strong in its support for protecting these areas 
(Interview A2 2008). The data discussed in this chapter highlights a wider, ongoing 
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conflict-of-interest within India’s domestic political scene (see footnote below)85, and 
the influence of this matter on CCS is further illustrated below in Section 7.3. 
Nevertheless, mining still implies land clearances, and decades of industrial 
development in these regions have created a great deal of instability. The high-security 
risk of operating a power plant with CO2 capture and transport in such areas will need 
to be considered by all, taking into account not only those parties invested in such a 
project but also the local population that would be impacted.  
Exploring further the security implications of operating coal and power plant 
projects (a situation which CCS would perpetuate), interviews were conducted with 
two, recently retired, senior Indian police officers who had worked extensively in 
India’s coal–bearing states of Bihar, Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh (Interview B7 2008; 
Interview B8 2008). Both security professionals were of the opinion that the 
flourishing black-market coal economy was largely responsible for funding the Maoist 
insurgency, and this was connected to an entrenched coal mafia culture, where the coal 
industry is best described as “a lawless and dangerous business” (Ibid.). The retired 
Director General of Indian Police Service (IPS) branch Jharkhand, a densely forested 
and mineral-rich state, described the coal sector as essentially being governed by 
powerful overlords, often referred to in the media as ‘coal barons’, who employ large 
armed gangs to protect their assets. Currently, this is the case for both legal and illegal 
mining operations, as even private industries that have obtained ‘legal’ permits and 
contracts for production require professionally trained and armed guards to protect 
their assets from the insurgency (Interview B7 2008). Both officers observed that, over 
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time, the weaponry of insurgents has become more and more sophisticated, indicating 
that there has been an increase in monetary support for the insurgency movement, 
most likely from selling coal and other resources on the black market (Interview B7 
2008; Interview B8 2008). Moreover, mines in particular are considered to be targets 
because they are also a source of explosives, which are generally used for blast-mining 
purposes (Ibid.). The retired officers described the situation on the ground as a vicious 
cycle, that has gone out of control; not only do the mining operations create instability, 
e.g. by land grabbing, they also become a key resource for ammunition to be used by 
the insurgency, and so the mining companies respond by hiring more armed guards 
(Ibid.). This situation is further exemplified by the work of Miklian & Carney (2010), 
reporting an incident that took place at an iron mine in 2006:  
“The richest iron mine in India was guarded by 16 men, armed 
with Army-issued, self-loading rifles and dressed in camouflage 
fatigues. Only eight survived the night of Feb. 9, 2006, when a 
crack team of Maoist insurgents cut the power to the Bailadila 
mining complex, [Chhattisgarh] and slipped out of the jungle cover 
in the moonlight. The guerrillas opened fire on the guards with 
automatic weapons, overrunning them before they had time to take 
up defensive positions. They didn't have a chance: The remote 
outpost was an hour's drive from the nearest major city, and the 
firefight to defend it only lasted a few minutes. 
The guards were protecting not only $80 billion-plus worth of 
mineral deposits, but also the mine's explosives magazine, which 
held the ammonium nitrate the miners used to pulverize 
mountainsides and loosen the iron ore. When the fighting was over 
and the surviving guards rounded up and gagged, about 2,000 
villagers who had been hiding behind the commando vanguard 
clambered over the fence into the compound and began emptying 
the magazine. Altogether they carried out 20 tons of explosives on 
their backs -- enough firepower to fuel a covert insurgency for a 
decade.” (Miklian & Carney 2010)  
Notably, other than the mines themselves, research by Ramana (2011, p. 35) on 
India’s Maoist insurgency shows that a growing number of attacks in the central-
eastern states of India specifically target infrastructure projects, with a focus on key 
sectors such as oil and natural gas, coal, transport and power, aiming to bring 




steel plants, cement plants, telecommunication towers and pipelines (see Table 7.1). 
From 2006-2010, attacks more than doubled, where the total was 71 in 2006, which 
increased to 171 in 2010 (Ramana 2011, p. 38-39). This rise in attacks is not just the 
story of a single state, rather an entire region. Both officers pointed out that it was no 
coincidence that the Maoist movement was gaining support in resource-rich states 
(Interview B7 2008; Interview B8 2008), and Miklian & Carney (2010) note “if you 
were to lay a map of today's Maoist insurgency over a map of the mining activity 
powering India's boom, the two would line up almost perfectly.” This is also 
demonstrated by the data presented in Table 7.1. Furthermore, several interviewees 
(Interview A2 2008; Interview B2 2008; Interview B7 2008; Interview B8 2008) were 
of the opinion that such issues of national security, if not addressed properly, would 
eventually lead to civil war, as the CPI (Maoist) group are gaining numbers daily, across 
a region covering approximately a third of the country. It should be noted that given 
the sensitive nature of this information, the apprehension regarding India’s coal sector 
first became apparent through interviews with policymakers during the first research 
field trip (i.e. Interviews A2 & B2). These issues were investigated further with in-depth 
interviews with security professionals after the first field trip (i.e. Interviews B7 & B8). 
Notably, these kinds of concerns regarding the coal sector were not obtained from the 
survey data, even though anonymity was assured. Nevertheless, all survey respondents 
considered coal to be ‘king’, and, crucially for this thesis, that CCS implied a 




Table 7.1: Maoist attacks on infrastructure projects by Maoists 2006 – 2010 (adapted from Ramana 2011, p. 38-39; continued on next page). 
Year of Attacks 2006 2007 2008 200986 2010 
Target  Location (State)87 No. Location (State) No. Location (State) No. Location (State) No. Location (State) No. 





































6 -- 0 Maharashtra 1 
Power Plants Andhra Pradesh 
Chhattisgarh 
4 Andhra Pradesh 3 Maharashtra 1 Maharashtra 2 Maharashtra 1 
 
                                                             
86 The data available for 2009 is only from Jan- June; this is because 2009 was also the year for general elections.  













No. Location (State) No. 
Transmission Lines/Poles Chhattisgarh 5 Chhattisgarh 10 Chhattisgarh 
Orissa 
24 Chhattisgarh 3 -- 0 
Other Relevant 
Infrastructure (e.g. Steel & 
Cement Plants; Pipelines; 





































Other (e.g. school 
buildings; rural offices etc.) 
-- -- -- -- -- 96 
Total Number of 
Attacks 
71 80 109 56 171 
                                                             
88 The data available for 2009 is only from Jan- June; this is because 2009 was also the year for general elections.  




Furthermore, a retired Police Inspector, who had served in several mining districts 
in the states of Bihar and UP, described how and why violence in the region has 
escalated:   
The general practice by extractive industries has been to clear forested 
land, and the local tribal population is removed usually by force. These 
enterprises don’t benefit the locals, who tend to be tribal people that 
relied on the forest for sustenance. The benefit goes to outsiders, who 
are brought in to operate the plant or mine, and the owners make 
windfall profits, lining their pockets with enough resources to allow 
them to become MPs for the region. This has resulted in the local 
villagers either joining or supporting the insurgency movement.  
Those who don’t pick up arms to join the Maoists, they join mafia 
gangs to pilfer coal, which is then sold on the black market. This is the 
only way that they can earn a living, feed their families; the only work 
available in these regions is as unskilled labourers. In addition, gangs 
involved in illegal mining also have access to this labour force. The 
victims are the local tribes people. However, not all rebel leaders are 
out fighting for ‘the people’, rather many tend to be opportunists, in it 
for the money by selling commodities, such as coal, on the black market 
(interview notes, Interview B8, 6 April 2008).  
Overall, interviewees (Interview B2 2008; Interview B7 2008; Interview B8 2008) 
were of the notion that sometimes these particular security-related aspects made MNCs 
or other private investors reluctant to participate in the coal sector, despite recent 
government initiatives to encourage private sector involvement. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter Five, India’s coal sector was highly nationalized in the 1970s (see 
Section 5.2.3). However, in 2009 the Coal Ministry started negotiations to amend the 
Coal Mines Nationalization Act of 1973 in order to sell up to 10% of CIL, and 
successfully managed to raise $3.5 billion on the Bombay Stock Exchange (Ebinger 
2011). However, the research data indicated that the security issue regarding Maoists 
was a cause for concern, particularly for setting up projects connected with pit-head 
plants, i.e. power plants in close proximity to the mine (Field notes, GHGT9, discussion 
with a representative from NTPC, Washington DC, November 2008). The interviewee 
(Interview B9 2008) worked for India’s National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC), 
which was at the time collaborating with a foreign MNC that specialises in providing 




projects, he was concerned about the pit-head projects based in these coal-bearing 
states, and was of the opinion that some might not go ahead. He was of the opinion that 
it would “be an age” before they came online (Ibid.).  
The relevance of these security issues for the thesis is to highlight the complex and 
highly politicised sociotechnical context in which CCS was being considered in India 
during the study period. The Maoist insurgency is an important issue for CCS because 
the targets are key parts of any potential CCS chain, and this has implications if projects 
were going to be considered in this area. Furthermore, it highlights an issue regarding 
the government’s ambition versus public acceptability. Several UMPPs were in the 
planning stages during the study period, and are discussed in more detail in the 
following sub-section.  
Moreover, the issues highlighted here have implications for India in terms of energy 
security and, such circumstances are more likely to push India towards coal imports. 
The surge in demand for electricity has been so considerable that India has already 
started diversifying its sources of supply and is getting coal imports from as far afield 
as Columbia (India has typically relied on imports from Australia, Indonesia and South 
Africa) (Chaudhary & Sethuraman 2010). Therefore, an alternative route to CCS 
implementation, proposed by UK technical studies at the time of my fieldwork (e.g. 
IEAGHG 2008; MottMac 2008a; MottMac 2008b), was to design a capture system based 
on imported coal, rather than India’s indigenous coal. 
7.2.2 Capture in the Indian context 
As highlighted by the review of India’s energy system in Chapter Five, the current 
fossil-fired power fleet in India is dominated by coal plants with subcritical steam 
conditions, which are not as efficient and therefore unlikely to be suitable for retrofit 
capture systems (IEA 2012). In addition, Indian coals are of poor quality, with high 
moisture and ash content, which affects combustion rates and efficiency (see Section 
5.3; IEA 2002a). The poor quality coal in India is a key technical (geological) reason 
why CCS was not considered a feasible technology to implement in the country, and 
was an issue emphasized repeatedly at workshops and conferences attended in 2008 




it was largely overlooked or perhaps ignored by the international diplomats and 
experts trying to encourage India to commit to CCS (see Chapter 6). This situation is 
curious, and deserves further exploration to better understand the persistence of 
international CCS advocates in the face of India’s stated lack of interest and poor 
technical suitability (see Sections 4.3.1 and 6.2.2). 
India’s priority, in the context of developing its power generation, has always been 
efficiency; mandated by its Energy Conservation Act (2001), key energy-intensive 
industrial sectors, such as thermal power generation, steel, cement and fertilizer 
production are required to undertake energy audits periodically (NAPCC 2008, p. 24). 
India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) also has a ‘National Mission for 
Enhanced Efficiency’ and it further outlines the types of initiatives considered by the 
Government in order to reduce GHG emissions from power generation. These 
initiatives include supercritical technologies, Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle 
(IGCC) Technology and natural gas-based power plants (NAPCC 2008, p. 38-39). 
Though, the Indian government intends to invest more in modern technologies, it is the 
entry of captive power plants from the private and industrial sectors which has brought 
in more efficient means of electricity generation into the country (see discussion in 
Section 5.3.2 & Joseph 2010). If CCS had been considered a viable option by India, then 
the captive power sector might have been an appropriate sector to use for an initial CCS 
retrofit demonstration, as many run on imported coal or gas, and therefore have a 
higher efficiency. However, as discussed in Chapters Four and Six, justification for CCS 
technology is to reduce CO2 emissions, not increase efficiency. In fact, some of the 
capture technologies presented in Chapter Four are more energy intensive and would 
therefore require burning more coal per unit of electricity generated. Moreover, as 
discussed in Chapter Six, India does not feel obliged to cut its carbon emissions nor its 
use of coal, given that the developed world is just as dependent on the fossil fuel, and at 
the time of this study, had yet to demonstrate a full CCS chain.  
Given that India’s priority is to improve efficiency first, before it can consider any 
new technology, there are site-specific conditions that need to be considered for the 
base power plant choice (e.g. pulverised coal combustion; gasification of coal; gas-fired 




India decides to integrate CCS technology into its energy system. Some of the India-
specific conditions related to its power sector were discussed during the workshops 
attended in 2008 on fieldwork (see Table 3.1) and the main challenges and proposed 
measures are listed below:  
The following list is derived from combined field notes of the two phases of the 
EU-India Working Group Meetings, i.e. these issues were raised at both 
meetings (presentations by Central Electricity Authority (CEA), “Clean Coal 
Technology in India,” 21st January 2008, New Delhi; National Thermal Power 
Corporation (NTPC), “Power Generation in India,” 27th November 2008, New 
Delhi): 
1) Current power fleet is very old; efficiency is roughly 35%. 
2) Need efficiency of power plant to be higher than 40% for potential capture 
retrofit; therefore not economical to use with older stations. 
3) Low efficiency due to high ash content of Indian coal (approx. 40-45%); this 
means coal is slow burning, and highly abrasive with high ash fusion 
temperature, which affects the design of boiler. 
4) Also, transmission and distribution losses are high, approx. 15%-20% 
depending on the state; generally losses are technical. 
5) There are plans to retire the old units with low efficiency, and increase share 
of renewables such as wind, solar and biomass; plus plans to increase share of 
nuclear power. 
6) Very interested in supercritical technology in order to reduce coal 
consumption and GHG emissions, as well as increase efficiency. 
7) Upgrades planned to old fleet involve switching to supercritical boilers and 
increasing unit size to 660-800MW; aiming for roughly 40% efficiency for each 
unit. 
8) Plans for Ultra Mega Power Projects with ultra-supercritical units, each 
4000MW; 3 UMPP projects already awarded construction contracts through 
competitive bidding process; all based on imported coal. 
9) Currently, roughly 63,000MW of new plant capacity under construction 
(includes UMPPs) 
The newer base power plant options discussed above, which are also initiatives 
listed in the NAPCC (e.g. supercritical technology, IGCC and UMPPs) all have the 




was not in favour of CCS because it reduces power plant efficiency, and also the safety 
of CO2 storage was not considered to have been demonstrated at scale (Interview B9 
2008). Furthermore, it was considered to be a very expensive option, and additionally a 
very risky endeavour with no benefit for the people (Interview B9 2008). Below, some 
of the newer base power plant options are explored further, which India was 
considering during the period of fieldwork (2007-2010), highlighting the specific 
challenges for each option in terms of CO2 capture. 
Supercritical power plants: 
Supercritical90 power plants heat steam to higher temperatures, which allow higher 
plant efficiencies to be obtained and this type of power plant is considered a good fit 
with post-combustion capture technology (see Section 4.2.1). Also, research by 
Chikkatur et al. (2009) shows that supercritical technology is suitable to Indian 
conditions, partly because a number of plants have already been built worldwide, and 
so the technology can be considered proven. Supercritical power plants were 
introduced in India starting with the Mundra power plant in the state of Gujarat, which 
has a 660 MW unit, and became operational in 2010 (Adani 2011). Notably, this 
particular power plant was set up as a CDM project through the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 
2010), indicating strong international dimensions, in terms of technology transfer and 
knowledge exchange. However, the decision to accept the Mundra project as a CDM 
project, which was made in Copenhagen by the CDM Executive Board at COP15 in 2009, 
was thought to be controversial by NGOs because inter alia, coal-fired power was 
considered to be against the sustainable development criteria of the CDM framework 
(Field notes, Copenhagen, 16 December 2009; also see CMW 2013). Moreover, at the 
same time, CCS had yet to be accepted under the CDM framework, which was also a 
contentious subject at the international climate negotiations (see Section 6.3). This is 
connected with the discussion in Chapter Six, regarding India’s stance on CCS, i.e. there 
were no co-benefits associated with implementing such expensive and untried 
                                                             
90Supercritical in this context describes the thermodynamic state of the steam that drives the 
turbine, i.e. there is no clear change of state between the liquid and gaseous phase. This is achieved 





technology, nor does India feel obliged to cut its CO2 emissions due to development 
priorities. 
Furthermore, even though coal washing (see Section 5.3), a process whereby 
impurities and ash can be removed, may be increasingly important to minimise the 
risks of boiler damage associated with burning poor quality Indian coals, concerns still 
remain that it may not be technically feasible to move to advanced supercritical steam 
conditions (Chikkatur and Sagar 2009). Therefore, in the future if India were to 
consider retrofitting CCS technology, it may be more appropriate to consider those 
supercritical power stations that are being planned on the basis of imported coal, such 
as the Mundra power plant and other coastal projects. Notably, imported coal will 
depend upon security of supply from other coal-rich nations, which hinges upon strong 
international cooperation and good political relations.  
Integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC): 
As described in Section 4.2.1, IGCC plants gasify coal instead of combusting it and 
the syngas (a mixture of carbon monoxide and hydrogen) produced by gasification is 
then burned in a combined cycle power plant. This type of plant is typically associated 
with pre-combustion capture technology. 
So far, there has been very limited global deployment of IGCC, partly due to the 
relatively high costs of IGCC compared to pulverised coal plants when CO2 capture is 
not required. It is likely, therefore, that different technologies will be better suited to 
particular sites depending on a number of local factors.  As noted by Ockwell et al. 
(2008) and Chikkatur et al. (2009), many Indian coals cannot use the most common 
gasification process (slagging entrained-flow) due to high ash content and high ash 
fusion temperatures. Therefore it is likely that Indian coals will favour the continued 
use of pulverised coal power plants for providing electricity from coal, even if CO2 
capture is used. For these reasons, the study by Ockwell et al. (2008), which looked 
specifically at IGCC technology transfer in an Indian context, recommended that 
indigenous R&D was crucial, and “possibly full-scale demonstration would be required 
before commercial plants would be viable” (Ockwell et al. 2008, p4113). Although other 




not yet considered commercial at the time of the research (2007-2010). Fluidised bed 
gasifiers are considered to be most appropriate for Indian coals and could potentially 
be adapted to include CO2 capture (Chikkatur et al. 2009). During the study period, 
Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL), India’s largest power plant equipment 
manufacturer, was testing a small-scale unit (6.2 MW) based on Indian coal, and a few 
independent experts that have studied BHEL’s gasifier “were quite positive about its 
potential viability” (Ockwell et al. 2008, p. 4111). 
With IGCC technology, India is actively participating in the early stages of 
technology development, i.e. directly involved in how the technology is defined. This is 
because IGCC technology developed so far in developed countries is using better quality 
coals; high-ash coals are not suitable for these forms of IGCC plants. Therefore, the 
interviewee from India’s National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) (Interview B9 
2008) opined that the shortcomings of pre-combustion technologies were connected 
with loss of efficiency, again, related to the quality of India’s coal. Though he felt that 
the more India was involved with research specific to Indian coal conditions then the 
more likely India would be willing to adopt the technology (Ibid.). Therefore, in this 
context, India has to play a significant role in shaping the technology, especially due to 
the unique conditions set by Indian coal. However, it should be noted that hydrogen is a 
by-product of this process, and all interviewees representing the power sector 
(Interview B1 2008; Interview B9 2008; Interview B10 2008) indicated that this was 
the key motivation behind Indian interests in IGCC. In this context, CCS is viewed in 
terms of its co-benefits, rather than just climate mitigation, demonstrating its mixed 
identity. 
Ultra Mega Power Plants (UMPPs): 
The discussion above explains India’s interest in these very large power stations, 
which have a generating capacity of 4GW per site and are based on ultra-supercritical91 
technology. Given India’s need to develop newer and more efficient power plants, in 
                                                             
91 What differentiates UMPPs from the supercritical technology discussed earlier is not only their 
substantial size and generating capacity, but also that both supercritical and ultra-supercritical 
boilers operate at such high temperatures and pressures that special materials and alloys are needed 




2008, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) commissioned a study, 
conducted by British engineering firm Mott MacDonald (MottMac). As a result, two 
reports were produced, one looked at the risks of moving to more advanced steam 
conditions for the UMPP projects (MottMac 2008a), and the other explored the 
potential for making UMMPs CO2 Capture-Ready (CCR)92, with the intention of making 
CCS retrofit less challenging if in the future India was in a position to retrofit this type 
of power plant for CCS technology (MottMac 2008b).  
There are two things to note regarding these reports. Firstly, the UK Government 
commissioned these technical reports, even though by 2008 the Indian State had made 
its stance on CCS technology quite clear, especially in the UNFCCC forum, i.e. that it 
opposed any form of implementation in India (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, the 
expertise employed was from a British engineering firm, with an established R&D base 
in the UK. Given the strong commercial drivers highlighted in previous chapters, my 
research clearly revealed that the MottMac studies were primarily discovering relevant 
opportunities for UK industry. Moreover, the MottMac analysis was not endorsed by 
the Indian Government, and key Indian decision makers, such as the Chairman of 
India’s Planning Commission, the Minister of Science & Technology and the Director of 
Technology at the Ministry of Power felt that the UK was forcing their particular brand 
of CCS technology on to India (Interview A1 2008; Interview B1 2008; Interview B6 
2008). Additionally, the representative of India’s Planning Commission expressed his 
suspicions about a technology that had yet to be demonstrated in the UK, and so, he 
questioned the reasons why the UK Government were intent on selling India an 
“untried and untested” technology (Interview B6 2008). This interviewee was adamant 
that he didn’t want India to be used as “a guinea pig” for CCS, likening it with the Bhopal 
disaster, and did not want foreign firms to exploit India under the guise of climate 
mitigation (Ibid.). Similarly, the representative from the Ministry of Science and 
                                                             
92 The MottMac study (2008b) study used an approach for capture readiness that was originally 
proposed by the IEAGHG (2007), and which has now been incorporated into UK carbon capture 
ready (CCR) regulations under section 36 of the Electricity Act 1989 (see UK DECC 2009b). This 
involves a comprehensive but flexible set of assessments of a new plant design to ensure that 
avoidable barriers to the retrofit of CCS are minimised.  Almost all of the modifications identified in 




Technology also questioned which State stood to gain more if CCS were demonstrated 
or deployed in India, mentioning that the IP is likely to remain with foreign firms 
(Interview A1 2008). Interestingly, this situation presents a conundrum in terms of CCS 
technology transfer. On one hand, the Indian Government would like CCS to be proven 
elsewhere before it considers it a possibility, while on the other hand the state wants to 
be involved with innovation and R&D processes in order to enhance its own 
capabilities. Therefore, this situation is best described through technological political 
realism, where inter-state relations are defined by competition over power and 
influence, demonstrating the political consequences associated with the mixed identity 
of CCS: India perceived it as a commercial project in UK’s favour, rather than a genuine 
option for mitigating climate change.  
Secondly, there are strong links with the international climate dialogue discussed in 
Chapter Six. The MottMac reports were published in 2008, when the CCS-CDM dialogue 
was at its peak, and it is evident that the CDM was a key driver behind the 
commissioning of these reports, showing that CCS technology is inherently bound with 
international political relations. For example, in the first (risk analysis) report, the 
three main categories of risks identified were: plant performance under Indian 
conditions, economic viability of advanced technologies, and the level of support 
offered by the potential value of Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs) that might be 
available within the CDM. This report concluded that:  
“..there are small differences between all technology options with 
low supercritical appearing the most attractive investment at all 
CER values for Indian coal and up to around US$20 per CER for 
plants firing international coal.” (MottMac 2008a, p. xiii) 
This connection to CERs is understandable because there was no other financial 
incentive for carbon abatement at the time, other than the EU Carbon Market and the 
EU Emissions Trading Scheme. Given the expense of CCS technology, CERs became even 
more important for financing potential CCS projects in developing countries, as it was 
the only financial mechanism available for climate mitigation projects. The interviewee 
from India’s Power Finance Corporation (PFC) stressed that it was critical for there to 
be some form of financial incentive to capture CO2 in India, carbon abatement on its 




approach to climate change and the need for co-benefits, as discussed in Chapter Six. In 
addition, the interviewee mentioned the historical responsibility of the West, and 
therefore the need for developed countries to cover costs of mitigation, particularly as 
CCS did not benefit the people of India (Ibid.). This sentiment was also emphasised in 
the stakeholder survey, where the majority of respondents were of the opinion that 
developed country governments were the most important group that should contribute 
to training and financing of CCS, both in terms of initial projects and overall wider 
deployment (Survey 2009, Appendix A & B). Developed country private industry was 
ranked as the second most important group that should contribute to CCS 
implementation (Ibid.), indicating also that the State’s role supersedes that of private 
industry. Therefore, this further demonstrates the importance of inter-state political 
decisions on CCS technology transfer. 
In regards to the second report on CCR method as applied to Indian UMPPs 
(MottMac 2008b), again, the analysis is contextualised in terms of a ‘global carbon 
market’: 
“The concept of CO2 ‘capture-ready’ plant is to design new-build 
generation plants without CCS, while facilitating later retrofit of 
CCS to avoid the lock-in of CO2 emissions from these plants caused 
by technical or economic cost barriers once the capture technology 
itself has matured.  This approach can imply low upfront costs and 
unimpaired performance, but maintains the flexibility to later 
retrofit CCS to the efficient coal plants being built today in India – 
when the improved CO2 capture technology maturity and the 
regulatory environment, including principally the expected 
commercial opportunities from the global carbon market, make this 
attractive to plant owners.” (MottMac 2008b, p. S-3) 
Based on this approach, plant capital requirements are reported to be increased by 
no more than 1% for the essential design changes required for a typical UMPP to be 
capture-ready.  Under the CO2 price scenarios assumed, it is also suggested that 
capture-readiness “would be a commercially attractive proposition” since it is valuable 
for plants to have the option to retrofit CO2 capture at minimal, although still 




Moreover, one of the more significant aspects of developing capture-ready projects 
can be in determining what measures should be required to show that any CO2 
captured at a particular site will be able to access a suitable storage site.  Within the 
Mott MacDonald study, it is assumed that: 
“The definition of ‘capture-ready’ should also encompass the 
transport and storage of CO2. Preliminary confirmation of feasible 
routes to CO2 storage should be undertaken, with the planning 
horizon and any required regulatory changes, to overcome current 
barriers, understood prior to generation plant construction.” 
(MottMac 2008b, p. S-5) 
At the time of the study, nine UMPP sites93 had been identified: three coastal sites 
using international coals and six inland sites using Indian coal and located at the pit-
head (open-cast mine). It was concluded that CO2 capture could be economically viable 
for all sites under the CO2 price scenarios considered, although expected costs could be 
around $5/tCO2 higher for the inland sites when compared to coastal sites, mostly due 
to increased transport distances for CO2 storage.  Out of the nine sites that were 
assessed, the three most favourable were all coastal plants; Kirshnapatnam (Andhra 
Pradesh), Cheyyur (Tamil Nadu) and Girye (Maharashtra) were considered to be the 
best sites in terms of least expensive94 options for CO2 emission abatement using CCS 
(including CO2 transport and storage) (MottMac 2008b, p. S-6). At the time, out of these 
three sites, Krishnapatnum was the only one with contracts awarded for construction. 
Moreover, it should be noted that successful deployment of CCS projects in any 
jurisdiction would require that adequate project finance could be obtained.  Making the 
case for project finance requires a number of factors in addition to cost to be taken into 
account.  For example, uncertainty associated with any incentives for reducing CO2 
emissions are likely to lead to project financiers requiring that CO2 prices are higher 
                                                             
93 This has risen to sixteen (see Chapter 4). 
94 The calculated cost was “approximately USD 33/tCO2, primarily due to their location close to 
potential CO2 sinks.  These three sites also do not require any significant overland transport of CO2 to 
the identified storage reservoirs, which may offer reduced regulatory and planning barriers relative 




than implied by only cost considerations for CCS projects to proceed, at least in the 
short to medium term. As a result, the study concluded, based on projected 
improvements in post-combustion CCS technology95, that a retrofit date in 2020 or 
beyond would be appropriate for Indian UMPPs, where it is “likely to increase the 
likelihood of an adequate incentive being available to abate greenhouse gas emissions” 
(MottMac 2008b, p. S-7). 
Finally, in the context of UMPPs, there is the issue of size, and the need for 
additional land to build a CO2 capture facility at a power plant. This has implications for 
the acquisition of land. Given the discussion in sub-section 7.2.1, there is already a high 
security risk associated with the UMPPs planned as pit-head projects, as these are 
based in close proximity to the existing coal mines, in those very locations with high 
occurrences of insurgency attacks. 
7.2.3 Storage in the Indian context 
For CCS technology to be applicable for mitigation, it is of course, necessary to 
identify suitable locations for safe, long-term storage of CO2.  As discussed in Chapter 
Four, the permanent storage of CO2 is generally expected to involve the injection of CO2 
into suitable formations in large sedimentary basins. Therefore, a detailed assessment 
of the storage potential, both in terms of quantity and integrity, is required for potential 
storage sites such as coal fields, oil and gas fields, and deep saline water-bearing 
reservoir rocks. The analysis in this section reviews whether there are suitable 
geological formations available for CO2 storage in the Indian subcontinent. 
At present, there is limited knowledge in this field due to a general dearth of 
essential data required to characterise geological sites. Nevertheless, preliminary 
studies indicate that potential storage sites on the subcontinent are located in the 
Gangetic (north, northeast), Brahmaputra (northeast, Bangladesh border) and Indus 
(northwest, Pakistan border) river plains, and along the immediate offshore regions on 
the Arabian Sea (southwest coast) and Bay of Bengal (southeast coast) (IEAGHG 2008). 
                                                             




Locations of these sites in relation to India’s current largest point sources of carbon 
dioxide emissions, as well as hydrocarbon fields are illustrated in Figure 7.1. Also, the 
storage basins are differentiated according to their storage potential, where the pink 
basins are those considered most suitable.  
 
Figure 7.1: Current CO2 sources and oil and gas fields in India with potential CO2 storage 
sites (source: IEAGHG 2008). 
Initial attempts at evaluating the storage potential in India were made by Singh 
(2006), estimating that roughly 5 Gt CO2 could be stored in unmineable coal seams, 7 Gt 
CO2 in depleted oil and gas reservoirs, 360 Gt CO2 in offshore and onshore deep saline 
aquifers, and 200 Gt CO2 via rapid mineralization into calcite and magnesite in basalt 
rocks. The latter estimate refers to laboratory experiments conducted by McGrail et al. 




water with basalts to form stable carbonate minerals. This analysis presents CCS 
opportunity for India as a very extensive portion of the central peninsula consists of 
one of the world’s largest basalt lava flows known as the Deccan trap formation. As a 
result, there is ongoing collaborative research taking place in this area between India’s 
National Geophysical Research Institute (NGRI) and the USA’s Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL), under the auspices of the CSLF. However, this concept is 
still in the experimental phase and can only be considered a possibility if the basalt is 
adequately permeable to the CO2 and can be demonstrated to be safe (Schaef et al. 
2009). Furthermore, storage of CO2 in basalts at the commercial scale may be decades 
into the future, therefore not considered relevant in terms of early deployment. 
A study conducted for the IEA Greenhouse Gas R&D Programme (IEAGHG 2008) by 
the British Geological Survey has revised down the estimates that were first made by 
Singh et al. (2006). The authors still conclude that there may be significant CO2 storage 
potential “in the oil and gas-bearing sedimentary basins around the margins of the 
peninsula, especially in the offshore basins, but also onshore in the states of Gujarat and 
Rajasthan” (IEAGHG 2008, p. 2). It should be noted, however, that the sites considered 
to have the best potential are not well placed in respect to major CO2 sources occurring 
in the central parts of the peninsula, such as Delhi or Calcutta (see Figure 7.2). 
However, in terms of other major urban centres, some of the potentially good storage 
sites are located near Mumbai, Ahmadabad and Chennai. In addition, the locations of 
some of the planned UMPP projects, in relation to sites potentially suitable for CO2 




Figure 7.2: Geological basins with good storage potential and current and planned CO2 
sources in India, plus the location of major cities (Delhi [1]; Calcutta [2]; Chennai [3]; 
Mumbai [4]; Ahmedabad [5]) (base map: IEAGHG 2008). 
The 2008 BGS assessment of potential for geological storage in India suggested that 
CO2 storage in coal seams is likely to be constrained since these coal reserves can be 
easily mined and used as fuel (IEAGHG 2008). Taking this into consideration, the 
calculated storage potential countrywide was found to be more of the order of 345 Mt 
CO2 in the major coalfields, where none have the capacity to store more than 100 Mt 
CO2, and only eight of the fields can store more than 10 Mt CO2 (Ibid.). 
For oil and gas reservoirs, the authors calculated the total storage capacity to be 




as the Bombay High field and offshore Mumbai, are thought to have ample storage for 
the lifetime emissions of a medium sized coal-fired power plant, although it is 
technically feasible for one capture plant to use multiple storage sites during its 
lifetime. None of the fields, it would seem, are large enough to store the lifetime 
emissions of India’s planned UMPPs (currently estimated each to produce 28-29 Mt 
CO2/year for a period of 35 years, or roughly 1 Gt CO2 in total for each UMPP). 
However, the IEAGHG report did not assess the potential of deep saline aquifers. 
Even though Singh et al. (2006) estimate a storage potential of roughly 360 Gt CO2 for 
saline aquifers, a recent analysis by the IEA assumes that only one-sixth of that could 
potentially be available for storage (IEA 2011c). Subsequently, in their analysis the 
total potential storage capacity would be limited to roughly 65 Gt CO2 for India, which 
includes depleted oil and gas fields, unmineable coal seams and saline aquifers, 
illustrated in Figure 7.3 (IEA 2011c, p. 30). The theoretical storage capacities in basalts 
are also shown in Figure 7.3. 
Figure 7.3: Regional distribution of CO2 storage potential estimates in sedimentary 




Some areas in the northeast, such as Assam, are thought to have reasonable CO2 
storage potential, although this region is quite distant from the main emission sources, 
requiring thousands of kilometres of pipeline infrastructure, typically costed at $1M 
per km (MottMac 2008b).  In addition, the most direct pipeline route passes through 
Bangladesh and significant increases in pipeline length would be required to avoid 
crossing Bangladesh. It should also be noted that even though the Indo-Gangetic plain, 
that lies in China, Nepal, India and Bangladesh, with the largest portion in India, has 
significant technical potential for storage, it has been classed as ‘limited’ by the authors 
of IEAGHG (2008), (green area in Figure 7.1). This is due to public acceptance concerns 
over possible conflict between multiple uses of land since this area is drained by 
several rivers and is, therefore, an extremely fertile region with over 580,000 square 
km of arable land that supports a population close to half a billion. This region 
represents India’s agricultural heartland, and it is considered to be one of the “bread-
baskets” that feed the world (UNDP 2007/2008). 
Furthermore, although it has not been discussed in detail in the literature, the 
implications of seismic activity in parts of India also need to be taken into consideration 
for any assessment of storage capacity. An expert from India’s Planning Commission 
expressed concern over injecting CO2 in earthquake-prone areas, such as the North-
Eastern regions (e.g. the state of Assam, which is considered to be suitable for CO2 
storage in Figure 7.2) (Interview B6 2008). 
Given the geological limitations discussed here, the prospects for CCS 
implementation in India are best in the offshore storage areas that are located near 
major cities and industrial corridors. The analysis below discusses these strategic areas 
and explores the options for shipping CO2 to other regions. 
7.2.4 Transport in the Indian context 
As emphasised in the Mott Macdonald report (MottMac 2008b), any ‘capture-ready’ 
design must include transport and storage. This study also suggested that coastal plants 
are likely to be favoured as locations for capture-ready power plants. One reason for 
this is that there is very limited transport infrastructure on land. In order to meet the 




transport will be required, and therefore new-build plants are preferred to be near port 
facilities or at the mine itself (IEA 2011c). This however, will also mean more 
investments in the transmission grid to distribute electricity to the main demand 
centres (Ibid.).  
In terms of CCS, existing pipeline infrastructure is located primarily in the 
northwest, in the industrial corridor between Mumbai and Delhi, via Gujarat. However, 
India is expanding its port infrastructure96, not only to support the UMPPs relying on 
imported coal, but also because there is a well established LNG and LPG trade with the 
Middle East, and India has become the principal hub for refined petroleum products, 
where the largest and most established refineries are on the coast (e.g. Jamnagar, 
Mumbai, Kochi, Vishakapatnum and Chennai). Therefore, shipping of CO2 may be the 
most cost-effective transport option for a prospective CCS project, as suitable storage in 
India is largely offshore.  
Furthermore, given that India has limited CO2 storage to match projected CO2 
emissions, then, one option may be to capture CO2 emissions from large industrial areas 
in India and export them to be used for EOR purposes in other regions that also have 
far more storage potential, e.g. the Middle East. States such as Qatar are dominant gas 
producers with established LPG tanker traffic, and so these tankers could essentially be 
converted to take return loads of CO2 for injection into depleted gas or heavy oil fields 
(see discussion in Section 4.2.2). The potential of this option is explored further here 
through the case study on the Cambay basin in North West India.  
 
 
                                                             
96 During the study period, India had two LNG import terminals on the western coast, in Dahej and 
Hazira. A third terminal became operational in December 2010 (Dabhol-Ratnagiri), and a fourth 




7.3 Case study: Cambay Basin (Gujarat)  
This section provides a detailed analysis of a case study on the Cambay basin area, 
based in the state of Gujarat. This region, from a technical perspective, has the potential 
to be a suitable place for early deployment of CCS technologies. However, as discussed 
throughout this thesis, from the outset the Indian Government has had reservations 
about CCS implementation in India for climate change mitigation purposes, for political 
reasons (see Chapter Six) as well as due to technical challenges (see Section 7.2.2 and 
7.2.3). The aim of this case study is to further demonstrate, that despite the Cambay 
Basin having geographical/technical favourable conditions for early deployment of CCS, 
there were social and political factors that prevented CCS technology transfer and 
implementation from occurring. It should be noted that the shipping and offshore 
scenarios discussed in this section are hypothetical and based largely upon exploratory 
discussions with interviewees or insights from the stakeholder survey.  
7.3.1 Case Study Selection 
As discussed in Section 7.2.2, new coastal-based power stations were highlighted as 
being suitable entry points for CCS technology transfer in the period 2007-10. It is also 
possible that the transport of CO2 by ship to other regions with suitable storage has the 
potential to be a cost-competitive option for CCS projects (see Aspelund et al. 2006). 
Furthermore, there is clustering of major CO2 sources in India (including major 
industrial sites as well as power plants), and also areas where a number of power 
plants are located in close proximity to coal reserves.  These large CO2 clusters are 





Figure 7.4: Existing CO2 sources grouped into industrial clusters and geological basins with 
CO2 storage potential. The Cambay basin is at the core of the Ahmedabad – Vadodara 
industrial belt (source: IEAGHG 2008). 
The UK and Europe have been considering the potential to take advantage of such 
clusters to minimise CO2 transport costs by using a shared infrastructure for long 
distance pipelines (see Element Energy 2007). If India decides in the future to 
implement CCS technologies, then the cluster or ‘hub’ approach was considered useful 
for determining suitable areas for potential CCS technology transfer.  
In Figure 7.4, six clusters of major CO2 sources (blue ovals) have been emphasised 
over the geological storage potential of the Indian sub-continent. Notably, Figure 7.4 
illustrates that half of the clusters are located over areas with limited storage capacity. 
The remaining clusters that are in close proximity to geological basins identified as 




i.e. matching CO2 sources with suitable storage sites, three candidate areas to be used 
as a case study, or a site with suitable conditions for early deployment, can be 
identified. Table 7.2 shows how these three areas perform against the selection criteria 
below: 
 Proximity to good geological storage site – based on assessments from IEAGHG’s 
2008 geological survey of the sub-continent; presence of numerous oil and gas 
fields; there is good potential for EOR in the area. 
 
 Fixed or potentially fixed project (e.g. UMPP) – the area already has an 
established industrial corridor and the necessary infrastructure for CCS 
technologies (e.g. pipelines, new-build power plants etc.); it is also one of the 
major point sources for CO2 emissions in India (e.g. world’s largest refinery is 
located in Cambay area). 
 
 In a politically stable area – this has implications for access and general safety 
whilst doing fieldwork, particularly if there is an opportunity for a site visit.  
 
 Established contacts – informants, who were either already working in the area, 
or provided linkages with further contacts, which were made during the first 
field trip in Jan-Mar 2008 (see Chapter 3). 



































Yes Yes No 
A crucial aspect of the selection criteria was the need for contacts, who could assist 
with access to data and/or also had an interest in the prospects of CCS technology in 




 The Cambay basin, which is located in the state of Gujarat (Ahmadabad – Vadodra 
region in Figure 7.4), was the only region that met all the criteria outlined in Table 7.2, 
and so was selected for a detailed case study.  
The state of Gujarat is considered to be one of the more industrialised states in 
India, and is also more politically stable, in comparison to the coal-rich states in the 
East97 (see Section 7.2.1). At the time of this study, Gujarat was ranked fifth in terms of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to India, which were valued to be more than $1 
billion dollars in the 2011-12 fiscal year (Khanna 2012). In comparison, the state of 
Maharashtra (the Mumbai-Pune belt in Figure 7.4), was the top state for foreign 
investment, worth over $9.5 billion this past fiscal year (Ibid.). According to the Indo-
American Chamber of Commerce, the key industries that attract FDIs and joint ventures 
are, inter alia, the oil and gas sector as well as infrastructure industries. Gujarat is very 
rich in limestone, and is the leading producer of cement and soda ash in the country. 
Some of the reasons why Gujarat is popular for FDI include an extensive network of rail 
and good roads, along with the highest number of airports in the country (IACC 2010). 
These are all indicators of the relevant infrastructure required for a prospective CCS 
chain. Therefore, with these characteristics, combined with the established contacts, 
the Cambay basin became the case study of choice.      
The case study draws upon on interviews with technical experts from the oil and 
gas sectors, as well as professionals from the shipping industry and security services. 
All interviewees, in the period 2008-2010 were either actively working in the Cambay 
area, or had experience of working in that area. A map of the region, with the relevant 
industrial infrastructure is depicted in Figure 7.5. 
                                                             
97 Compared to the threat of Maoist insurgency attacks Gujarat is relatively safer. However, in the 
recent past Gujarat suffered from fierce communal violence in 2002. The Chief Minister at the time 
was Narendra Modi, a very polarising figure in Indian national politics. He was the Chief Minister of 
Gujarat during the period of this study (2007-2010), and he had the reputation of being good for 





Figure 7.5: The industrial infrastructure surrounding the Cambay basin in the state 
of Gujarat. Source: Oilex Ltd. (www.oilex.com.au). 
Figure 7.5 shows the Cambay basin area, which is partly offshore, though 
predominantly onshore (also see Figure 7.4), and one of the active hydrocarbon fields 
within the basin is labelled as a yellow box in Figure 7.5. Notably, there are established 
refineries (including Asia’s largest, see Section 5.3.3) and other industries in the region. 
Due to the large amount of industrial operations in the Cambay region, there are 
existing pipeline networks as well as shipping terminals for LPG and LNG tankers. As 
discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, these are all features of other technological 
systems that have the potential to be integrated into a future CCS system (see Figure 
4.7). Given the mixed identity and flexibility of CCS technology, the Cambay basin 
becomes a useful starting point for future implementation. For example, there are 
infrastructural elements, such as newly built supercritical power plants, shipping docks 
designed for gas-transportation, combined with the geology being well-characterised 




system. Furthermore, the area hosts a range of carbon-intense industries, such as 
cement and steel production, which also have the potential to be integrated into a CCS 
technological system. Consequently, there is already a great deal of international 
technology transfer taking place in this region, mainly via joint ventures between MNCs 
and state-owned operators in the region. The following sections further examine such 
operations, highlighting the sociotechnical aspects that, despite the favourable context, 
prevented CCS implementation during the study period.     
7.3.2 CO2-EOR activities in the region: The Ankaleshwar/Hazira project  
The Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) of India is a state-run enterprise and is 
the main operator in the Cambay area. As discussed in Chapter Four, one pathway for a 
CCS chain could involve Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), which involves CO2 injection for 
oil extraction (see Section 4.2.3 & Figure 4.5). At the time of this study, there was 
interest in CCS-EOR from ONGC, and initially there had been demonstration of political 
support for such an endeavour (see Section 6.2.2). However, within a few months the 
Indian Government had a change of heart, and the focus of this section is the 
Ankaleshwar/Hazira project, which was central to the political turn-around. This 
section mainly draws upon an in-depth interview with a representative from ONGC, 
who was directly involved with the project.     
The Ankaleshwar/Hazira project currently receives acid gas98 at the Hazira plant 
(Fig 7.5) from the Mumbai High offshore fields (Figure 7.4), where the H2S is extracted 
using a Sulphur recovery unit (SRU) and then CO2 is released into the atmosphere. The 
volume of CO2 released at Hazira exceeds 600,000 SCM99/day, and the ONGC believed 
that setting up an EOR capability at a mature field, Ankaleshwar (Figure 7.5), could put 
this gas to an alternative use (Interview B4 2008). The injection being considered was 
at a depth of 1800-2200 m, which is a suitable depth range for CO2 storage (see Section 
4.2.3 and Holloway 2001). ONGC’s in-house research on this EOR project had shown 
that, due to the age and present condition of wells in the Ankaleshwar field, they would 
                                                             
98 Natural gas + H2S + CO2 




have to drill a new set of 67 producing wells and 15 injecting wells (Interview B4 
2008). Given the high profile of CCS at the UNFCCC during this period, it was thought 
that CCS-EOR was a good opportunity to attract international investment and 
cooperation, and potentially carbon credits through the CDM (Ibid.).    
In February 2008, ONGC signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU)100 with 
Norway’s StatoilHydro to develop projects on CCS and other carbon management 
projects, which could be considered for the CDM (see Section 6.2.2). Shortly after the 
MoU was announced, Statoil started reviewing and analysing the technical details 
regarding injection in Ankaleshwar, including making recommendations for improving 
processes that would result in better efficiency and separation in order to capture more 
CO2 for EOR (Interview B4 2008). ONGC were interested in capturing CO2 (approx. 1200 
tonnes) from their offshore Hazira facility and transporting it to their onshore field at 
Ankaleshwar (approx. 70km away), in order to maintain reservoir pressure, rather 
than use it to decrease the viscosity of the oil (Interview B4 2008; also see Shackley & 
Verma 2008).   
However, by mid-2008 ONGC and StatoilHydro had disagreements on the way the 
project was heading. Towards the end of 2008, the negotiations had reached a 
stalemate and the MoU was not revived (Interview B4 2008). According to an ONGC 
representative, who was involved in the negotiations for the project, StatoilHydro were 
looking to take advantage of the MoU as a means to gain access to the exploration 
business in India, which was not well received by India’s Ministry of Petroleum and 
Natural Gas, which essentially regulates ONGC (Ibid.). Consequently, ONGC started 
looking for other partners, because they were still very keen to explore a potential CO2 
market in the region (Interview C1 2008; Interview C2 2008). This is because, in 
addition to EOR purposes, it was envisioned that excess CO2 could be sold as feedstock 
for fertilizer production to the urea production companies, also located in the Cambay 
area (Interview B4 2008). The ONGC believed that for such projects, the CDM 
framework would give them a further incentive (Ibid.). However, despite dialogue with 
                                                             
100 This is a document describing bilateral or multilateral agreements between parties, but is not a 




other hydrocarbon exploration MNCs that had an interest in CCS in India, without 
approval from the central Indian Government such joint ventures could not go ahead 
(Interview C1 2008; Interview C2 2008). 
Eventually, towards the end of 2008, the ONGC as well as ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL), 
which deals with international oil and gas exploration, was pressured to stop 
considering any CCS related projects altogether, either in India or elsewhere (Interview 
B4 2008; Interview B5 2008). A lead person from ONGC explained that the pressure 
originally came from the Ministry of Power, which at the time of this study, wielded the 
most influence out of all energy-related ministries (Interview B4 2008; also see 
Footnote 85, p. 196). The Ministry of Power felt that all Indian Ministries should have a 
universal position on CCS and CO2 mitigation, i.e. in line with the central government 
position on climate change (discussed in Chapter Six), in the run up to the climate 
negotiations in Poznan (COP14) (Interview B4 2008). This illustrates the influence of 
domestic politics, which prevented CCS technology transfer to occur, despite there 
being interest from industrial sectors. This situation also resonates with Walker’s 
(2000) description of system inertia: circumstances when vested interests want to 
maintain the status quo and try to resist change.   
Notably, it also highlights the commercial interests behind such projects, where CO2 
mitigation is not necessarily the main driver, but rather a positive ‘side-effect’, which 
can provide an added income stream. Furthermore, an interviewee from OVL 
emphasised that the interest in CCS technology was more closely linked to how the CO2 
could be used, i.e. it was something of market value (Interview B5 2008). This aspect 
also highlights how, due to the mixed sociotechnical identity of CCS, it was being 
interpreted as something other than purely for mitigation purposes (see also Chapters 




7.3.3 An overview of CO2 storage in the Cambay basin 
In an interview with a small team of representatives from Cairn Energy India101, a 
MNC involved with hydrocarbon exploration and production, it was discussed that the 
company was exploring the potential for gas storage in the offshore region, within the 
Gulf of Cambay (Interview C3 2008). Interestingly, the head of reservoir development 
indicated that they would not consider CO2 storage within the region unless they had 
been instructed to do so by the central Indian government (Interview C3 2008). Most of 
the provisions regarding their operations in the area come through the New 
Exploration Licensing Policy (NELP) (see Section 5.2.4), and all MNCs operate using 
Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs). Specifically, PSCs that include EOR or encourage 
EOR practices, are designed primarily for fast economic recovery. According to the legal 
adviser to Cairn, if CCS-EOR were to be considered, then the current licensing regime, 
i.e. NELP, would have to be adjusted because all pore space is under central 
government control, not the state (Gujarat) government. He further added that if this 
were the case, then as a result the PSCs with MNCs could include a CO2 storage 
provision, but only if that were the ambition of the Indian Government. Notably, the 
Cairn Energy India team mentioned that ONGC had approached them regarding CO2 
injection, and were also interested in other possible economic resources for capturing 
CO2. Interestingly, the petroleum engineer was of the opinion that the current hold back 
to CO2-EOR in the area was due to the lack of a good quality source of CO2 (i.e. with few 
impurities), as the H2S separation at Hazira was proving to be technically difficult. It 
was opined that the capture of a purer stream of CO2, e.g. captured from a power plant, 
would perhaps be more useful for EOR. However, it was added that there were no 
power stations in the area that were considering such technology. 
In regards to other nearby hydrocarbon exploration activities, the senior petroleum 
engineer stated that further inland and heading north towards the Barmer basin 
(extension of the Cambay, see Figure 7.4), CO2 injection for EOR would not be advised. 
                                                             
101 This included the Head of Reservoir Development (geoscientist), a senior petroleum engineer, and 
an energy lawyer that dealt with oil and gas Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs) (see table 3.2). 
These interviews were all held together in December 2008, at the Cairn India head office, located in 




This is because the Barmer fields are more suited for chemical EOR, due to the high 
viscosity of the oil in that region. Towards the southern half of Cambay and heading 
offshore into the Mumbai fields, the interviewee was of the opinion that this area would 
be well suited for storage, having more capacity, and being relatively close to the 
industrial hub in Gujarat and potentially Mumbai as well. However, it was noted that 
these were carbonate reservoirs, and therefore would require further research in 
CO2/water/rock reactions before considering CO2 injection at a large scale. 
Furthermore, it was added that very little EOR was taking place anywhere else in 
Gujarat, and that this was still virgin territory for many companies looking to explore in 
the region.  
Notably, both the head of reservoir development and the petroleum engineer were 
of the opinion that the area was more likely to be considered for shale gas exploration. 
This is because the Tarapur shale, which is a regional cap rock that lies over the main 
reservoir rock, might potentially be rich in gas. If this were the case, then it would have 
implications for any potential CO2 storage in the region. In their view, shale gas 
exploration would likely tamper with the integrity of the seal for any potential storage 
area, and therefore would not be a suitable site as part of a larger CCS project. It was 
added that, if gas were discovered, then India would be more likely to exploit that 
resource first, rather than pursue a climate mitigation option.  
As discussed in Section 7.2.3, the Indian sub-continent has limited storage capacity 
in general, though Cambay was (theoretically) assessed to have good potential by the 
IEAGHG (2008). However, the findings from the Cairn interviewees indicate that the 
overall storage capacity in the Cambay basin, particularly at the scale required to match 
prospective CO2 outputs from large power stations, e.g. UMPPs, would not be sufficient. 
They also were of the view that the Indian Government had not shown any interest in 
CO2 storage, therefore they would only strictly abide to the terms of PSCs. Only if there 
was an indication from the Government would they invest in the technical assessment 
of the region. This presented a major hurdle for CCS implementation in India; storage is 
a crucial element of the CCS chain, without it there can be no CO2 mitigation. Therefore, 




explored as a way of furthering understanding of the complex international dimensions 
of CCS, discussed below.   
7.3.4 The prospect of shipping CO2 from India 
The idea for exporting captured CO2 from India to other countries via shipping is a 
hypothetical aspect of this case study. The idea emerged during the second year of the 
study period (2008), specifically exploring the potential of CO2 shipping between India 
and the Middle East. The concept derives from research indicating that there is greater 
storage capacity in countries with very large mature oil fields, such as Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE (see IEA 2010; GCCSI 2011; Masdar 2012). Therefore, CO2-export 
to this specific region formed the basis for interviews with individuals from the private 
shipping industry, which had a commercial interest in CO2 shipping in general. Given 
the wider geopolitical dimensions within the Middle East, professionals familiar with 
this particular trade route were also interviewed to determine the international 
security risks associated with operating in this region.  
According to the representatives from the shipping industry the most significant 
issue is that CCS demonstration and deployment at a large scale would need to become 
a reality if CO2 export via shipping were to become a viable option. This should entail a 
viable market for CO2, i.e. there needs to be a significant demand, enough for shipping 
companies to make the investments necessary for designing and building suitable 
vessels to transport it (Interview C4 2010; Interview C5 2010). Technically it is feasible 
to design such a tanker (see Section 4.2.2), however, currently there is no market for 
CO2 at the scale envisioned (Interview C4 2010; Interview C5 2010).  For example, 
power plants will produce significantly large volumes of CO2, and so interviewees 
insisted that there should be a legal and economic incentive to either store it or use it 
(Ibid). The representative from Maersk Group opined that to begin with CO2 shipping 
would be most feasible if linked with EOR, as this would require a vessel designed to 
carry larger volumes (Interview C4 2010). He further added that the economic 
incentive of oil would be needed because he felt that market mechanisms such as the 
CDM would not be enough to support a CCS project with a shipping option (Ibid.). 
Interestingly, these responses further illustrate how this particular aspect of the CCS 




difficulty in considering CCS as a coherent technological system due to the uncertainty 
associated with crucial links in a potential CCS chain (in this case, transport).  
Furthermore, there are geopolitical dynamics that need to be explored, as there are 
tensions specific to this particular trade route. Explicitly, CO2 export via shipping would 
entail the trans-boundary movement of CO2, i.e. it will involve multiple jurisdictions, 
requiring credible national guarantees. Therefore, international cooperation would be 
compulsory for any such prospective project. However, politically, this will require 
exceptional diplomacy (Interview B17 2010; Interview B18 2010). Despite being a key 
importer of hydrocarbons from the Middle East, out of the countries mentioned earlier 
in this section, India’s natural partner in this region is Iran (Ibid.). There is an 
established shipping route between the two countries, and a strong history of 
collaboration, more so than other Middle Eastern countries102 (Ibid.). In addition, 
mechanisms are already in place for technology transfer between the two nations. For 
example, Iran has also opened up its petrochemical sector in order to attract Indian 
investment and encourage joint ventures (Verma 2007). However, due to global 
sanctions, Iran’s energy infrastructure is underdeveloped, so much so that, currently it 
exports its crude oil to India in order get it refined into petroleum products (Verma 
2007; Interview B4 2008; Interview B5 2008; Interview B18 2010). These are then 
imported back from Indian refineries, such as Jamnagar in the state of Gujarat (see 
Figure 7.5) (Ibid.).  Furthermore, India has had to come up with creative and circuitous 
ways to sustain trade and partnership with Iran, particularly in the face of international 
pressure from countries such as the USA (Verma 2007; Interview B17 2010). In regards 
to security concerns with shipping, there is only one choke point – the Strait of 
                                                             
102 Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia have the largest hydrocarbon reserves in the region, and these 
countries have been the traditional exporters of oil to India (Interview B18 2010). Under the rule of 
Saddam Hussein, India had good relations with (secular) Iraq, which in turn soured relations with 
(Islamic) Saudi Arabia (Interview B17 2010). Although oil trade has not been necessarily affected, 
there has been a long-standing tension between Saudi Arabia and (predominantly Hindu) India 
(Ibid.). If oil dependency were not an issue, then the Indian Government would limit trade with Saudi 
Arabia, primarily due to their financial support for extremist Islamic terrorist groups based in 
Pakistan (Interview B17 2010; Interview B18 2010). For example, the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 




Hormuz103 – and this is considerably well protected by an array of naval bodies, due to 
its global strategic importance (Verma 2007; Interview B17 2010; Interview B18 
2010).  
In comparison, participants from both the security services and the oil industry 
highlighted an example where an attempt had already been made to collaborate on 
trans-national energy projects within the region, but failed due to wider geopolitical 
reasons (Interview B4 2008; Interview B5 2008; Interview C1 2008; Interview C2 
2008; Interview C3 2008; Interview B17 2010; Interview B18 2010; Interview C5 
2010). The project referred to by all interviewees was the failed proposal of the Iran-
Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, which would have stretched from the South Pars 
fields in Iran, through Pakistan, to the Barmer region in India (Ibid.; also see Verma 
2007). The proposed IPI pipeline included significant opportunities for international 
technology transfer via FDIs and joint ventures for all countries involved (Verma 2007; 
Interview B4 2008; Interview B5 2008; Interview C3 2008; Interview C5 2010). 
However, geopolitical factors in the region prevented any such cooperation. This 
included the high security risk involved with the transit of the pipeline either in close 
proximity to or through current conflict zones (e.g. Afghanistan and Pakistan, see Fair 
2014), combined with the competing interests of USA and China in the region (see 
Verma 2007; Gall 2014; Fair 2014). Nevertheless, participants from the security 
services and oil industry pointed out that pipelines are the least secure option, and 
although it may be more costly, shipping transport of gas (e.g. CH4 or CO2) would be the 
more secure route for any prospective Indo-Iran cooperation (Interview B5 2008; 
Interview B17 2010; Interview B18 2010; Interview C5 2010) .    
When questioned on the feasibility of this scenario in the context of CCS and this 
case study, interviewees had a general response: regardless of the wider geopolitics in 
the region, mitigation via CO2 injection into geological media has to become a global 
priority, before the CO2 export concept can become a reality for India or any other state 
(Interview B4 2008; Interview B5 2008; Interview C1 2008; Interview C2 2008; 
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Interview C3 2008; Interview B17 2010; Interview B18 2010; Interview C4 2010; 
Interview C5 2010). All were of the view that mitigation of CO2 emissions was not a 
priority for these countries, and their ambitions for development and industrialisation 
would take primacy (Ibid.). Therefore, interviewees from private industry in particular 
felt that developed nations would have to take the lead on developing the CO2 shipping 
aspect of any prospective CCS project (Interview C1 2008; Interview C2 2008; 
Interview C3 2008; Interview C4 2010; Interview C5 2010). In addition, 
representatives from Cairn Energy pointed out that there were largely carbonate 
reservoirs in the Middle East, therefore more research specific to those geological 
conditions would be required (Interview C3 2008). This shipping scenario 
demonstrates the potential impact of macro-level issues, e.g. geopolitics and 
international security, on the CCS sociotechnical system. Therefore, such issues would 
need to be considered in order to make the shipping scenario a reality.     
7.3.5 Case study Summary and Conclusions 
The Cambay Basin area was chosen for a case study on the basis of four selection 
criteria: (1) its proximity to a good geological storage site; (2) existence of fixed 
project(s), e.g. new-build power plants or large industrial source of CO2; (3) it is a 
politically stable region; (4) there were contacts and linkages with industry in the 
region that were willing to participate in the study. The region has a history of 
hydrocarbon exploitation, and depleted fields are presently being considered for gas 
storage. Also, during the study period, mature oil fields in the Cambay area were being 
considered for CO2-EOR. Therefore the interest in CO2 injection in the region was 
driven by further extraction of resources, rather than climate change mitigation. 
Nevertheless, there was interest in CCS because there was also need of a pure CO2 
stream for injection purposes, which could potentially be provided by captured CO2 
from a power plant. However, despite there being a technical opportunity to implement 
CCS, domestic political disagreements between the Ministry of Power and ONGC in the 
end prevented any technology transfer taking place. These domestic political issues 
were also connected to the wider international political stance taken by the Indian 




Furthermore, the Cambay area is currently being prospected for shale gas, and this 
could have implications for the integrity of the cap rock in the region. Therefore, 
neighbouring Mumbai High fields were identified as potentially having more storage 
capacity than Cambay. However, these are carbonate reservoirs and more research is 
required on the specific rock chemistry, looking at CO2-water-rock reaction, if CO2 is to 
be retained within the reservoirs permanently. MNCs operating in the region indicated 
that there were no plans for exploring this option unless the Indian Government 
showed interest. Given these limitations in storage, the feasibility of exporting CO2 via 
ships to suitable storage sites in the Middle East was also explored. This is because, 
even though the CO2 shipping aspect of the CCS technological system is still at a very 
nascent stage, there is an established LNG and LPG trade route between these two 
regions. Furthermore, there are opportunities for CO2-EOR at several large mature 
fields located in countries such as Iran. However, projects such as the failed IPI pipeline 
demonstrate that unfavourable geopolitical conditions can have a significant impact on 
technology transfer. Furthermore, currently CO2 mitigation is not a key priority in the 
region. Not only stronger international political drivers behind CCS implementation are 
compulsory, but further research is also required on carbonate reservoirs to assess the 
technical feasibility.          
7.4. Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
In addition to the Indian Government’s opposition to CCS on the international stage 
(see Chapter Six), there are key domestic factors that have prevented the uptake of CCS 
technology during the study period. This chapter highlights a combination of technical 
and social challenges for CCS implementation, specifically in an Indian context. These 
include limitations in terms of India’s geology, as well as, domestic political issues 
regarding corruption in key energy sectors and the prevalence of electricity theft (also 
see Chapter 5). Furthermore, there are security concerns with insurgency in the coal 
industry, which is essentially the backbone of India’s coal sector. A case study on the 
Cambay basin was used to further illustrate the sociotechnical issues, highlighting 
specific domestic reasons for the non-transfer of CCS to India. 
In regards to India’s coals specifically, they are of high-ash content and have a 




gasification) technology to suit these specific conditions. Therefore, technology transfer 
for CO2 capture is very unlikely to be in the form of a straight forward turnkey project 
or developed elsewhere. Indigenous R&D and state support would be required for this 
aspect of the CCS chain. However, the poor quality of India’s coal is not the only aspect 
that poses a challenge to CCS implementation. India’s coal reserves are predominantly 
located in forested areas and tribal land. There are serious social concerns associated 
with coal mining in these areas, which started as major development projects set up by 
the World Bank. The local population has not benefitted from such large coal projects; 
they are displaced and live in poverty due to a legacy of unsustainable mining practices, 
which have prevailed since the sector was nationalized in the 1970s. Furthermore, 
during the study period there was very little environmental regulation, as well as poor 
governance and extensive political corruption in the sector. This has been extensively 
profiled in the Indian media and includes senior government officials and the so-called 
‘mining barons’. Consequently, there is a significant amount of discontent amongst the 
local population in coal-rich areas and mining practices have directly fomented the 
Maoist insurgency in the region. Notably, key infrastructures, such as power stations, 
rail networks and transmission lines, tend to be consistent targets for insurgency 
attacks. Crucially, CCS technology would perpetuate the use of coal, and given its links 
with mature energy systems, it has the potential to be at a higher risk for an insurgency 
attack. For these reasons the Indian coal sector struggles to attract international 
technology transfer, as MNCs are reluctant to invest in this area.   
In the overall context of GHG mitigation in India, efficiency measures in the power 
sector will take precedent, such as switching to gas-powered plants, over CCS for 
reasons outlined in Chapter Six. Nevertheless, India is making efforts to bring in 
efficiency measures to its power sector, and is investing heavily in cleaner and more 
efficient technology, such as new supercritical and ultra-supercritical boilers. The 
discussion in Section 7.2.2 illustrates that due to the mixed identity of CCS, India would 
like to explore some aspects of the technology chain, but not others. For example, India 
has an interest in IGCC, but this is because hydrogen is produced as a by-product. 
Essentially, CO2 capture has another use, not just mitigation. Analysis in Section 7.2.2 
also shows that CCS technology transfer may be applicable to other newer technologies, 




Building upon the analysis in Section 7.2, the least technically challenging 
conditions for CO2 capture were considered to involve plants that rely on imported coal 
or gas, due to their high efficiency and better quality of fuel. These sources of CO2 also 
tend to be on coastal sites, with the potential for shipping links. Based upon these 
favourable conditions, along with other factors, such as contacts for access to relevant 
data, the Cambay Basin was selected as the focus for a case study in Section 7.3 to 
further explore India’s reluctance to CCS technology. If only technical factors are 
considered, Cambay appears to be suitable for CCS because there is relevant 
infrastructure in place, including supercritical power plants, pipeline networks, 
LNG/LPG terminals for shipping, and depleted oil and gas fields for potential EOR and 
CO2 storage. This area also demonstrates established routes of technology transfer via 
the private industry, which is operating successfully in all the relevant sectors that 
could potentially connect a CCS chain. However, it became apparent that key decisions 
resided with the central Indian Government. Therefore, CCS implementation would not 
be considered without ambition being shown by the state. The Cambay Basin case 
study demonstrates the sociotechnical nature of innovation processes.  
Furthermore, a significant technical impediment to CCS in this region is the limited 
amount of storage capacity to match volumes from CO2 sources. Therefore, a 
hypothetical scenario of exporting CO2 to suitable storage sites using ships was 
explored. In the context of India, the region that would naturally be considered for 
export is the Middle East, due to its geographical proximity and potential requirement 
for CO2-EOR. For political reasons, Iran was thought to be the best choice for potential 
India CO2 exports. Though, conversely, also for political reasons, such a trade link 
would be difficult to establish due to the complex geopolitical factors that surround 
Iran internationally. Therefore, the broader political dimensions in this region, e.g. 
international security, restrict India’s potential to export its CO2 emissions in a shipping 




Chapter 8: Summary, Conclusions and Reflections 
8.1 Introduction 
The implications of anthropogenic climate change, which is caused and exacerbated 
by the rise in CO2 emissions, are very grave for our existence as a global civilization, and 
steps need to be taken if society is to persist. In particular, the Indian subcontinent is 
facing a predicament, as it is home to over a billion people with urgent development 
needs, such as access to food, energy and clean water; yet this population is most 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change. The paradox is that historically, this 
part of the developing world has not contributed to the problem of climate change, 
rather, that onus belongs to the developed world. However, several developing 
economies are following in the footsteps of the Western industrial revolution and 
emerging as major CO2 emitters; India is such an economy, and in light of its 
predicament, a potential technological solution – Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) – 
was chosen as the focus of this thesis.  
This study was undertaken in the period 2007-2010, a period of great momentum 
in developing CCS technologies. Originally, I set out to discover whether CCS technology 
could be a viable solution for India’s heavy use of fossil fuels, notably coal. However, it 
quickly became clear that the Government of India had serious reservations about CCS 
technology, or at least, the conceptualisation of CCS that was presented to it by 
developed countries, notably the UK and EU. Accordingly, this thesis turned to examine 
in depth the reasons behind India’s reluctance to consider CCS as a means for 
mitigating climate change, focusing on why India was reluctant to implement this 
technology, despite it being a period during which developing countries with rising 
emissions, such as India, were under pressure in international negotiations to take 
climate mitigation action. 
The theoretical framework used for this study derives from a mix of social science 
literatures which focus on and explore the social processes behind technology and its 
development (see Chapter 2). An interdisciplinary approach has been used, linking STS, 
technology transfer and IR scholarly work within the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5, 




Two, when applied together, indicate that technology and politics are inherently 
connected, and that the success of any technology is fundamentally shaped by the 
political interests surrounding it. Therefore, the conceptual framing of the thesis has 
provided for an holistic, sociotechnical analysis of CCS in India.  
One of the key insights derived from linking STS concepts with political IR 
literature in the thesis is that there is a reciprocal relationship between technology and 
politics. For example, the case of India’s nuclear technology programme, discussed in 
Chapter Five, illustrates how the technology was historically connected to India’s 
independence movement and played a significant role in establishing India’s national 
system of innovation. As a result, nuclear power is still a key part of India’s identity, and 
the expansion of its civil nuclear programme remains a crucial element of India’s future 
development ambitions.    
A second insight, emerging from the conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 
Two is the multiple and mixed sociotechnical identities of CCS. Namely, CCS is not a 
single technology – but rather a sociotechnical system – and it has multiple potential 
(policy) objectives (e.g. oil recovery, climate mitigation, hydrogen production). This 
‘multiple identities’ theme is used throughout the empirical chapters (4, 5, 6 and 7), to 
analyse and explain why India did not implement CCS. The impact of this mixed 
sociotechnical identity on technology transfer is summarised in more detail under 
Questions 2 and 2(a) in the following section. 
8.2 Synthesis of Main Findings 
In this concluding chapter, the synthesis of the main findings of this thesis 
demonstrate that India’s rejection of CCS has been a complex sociotechnical process. 
The outcomes of this study are discussed according to the research questions 




Q. 1: Why did the attempted transfer of CCS technology to India not occur 
during the period 2007-2010? 
Chapter Six demonstrates that India’s position against CCS technology can be best 
understood by India’s overall approach to climate change during this study period. At 
the heart of India’s position lies the ethos of Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities (CBRD), combined with the logic of co-benefits (see Section 6.2). The 
latter element implies that development goals are just as important as, if not more so 
than, climate change objectives. The CBRD approach signifies that developed nations 
are expected to take the lead on mitigation first, as it is not considered a priority over 
development for developing countries. Therefore, India was not convinced that CCS 
made any contribution to India’s sustainable development objectives, i.e. there were no 
so called ‘co-benefits’, but rather it provided more to the overall mitigation of rising 
global CO2 emissions. In other words, CCS provided very little to the people of India, but 
more to the global commons. It is a case of technological political realism, where the 
Indian state’s prerogative is to protect national interests first. 
Furthermore, according to CBRD, the onus for combating climate change should lie 
with those nations that created the problem in the first place. Consequently, the 
empirical evidence from my research indicates that India wanted to see CCS 
implemented elsewhere before considering it as a viable option for the future. 
Therefore, the need for the demonstration of a fully functioning CCS chain was 
considered important both politically and technically. In political terms, CCS 
implementation by developed countries would demonstrate their commitment to 
climate change mitigation and their alignment to the CBRD approach. The technical 
reasons are equally important, where participants felt that developed countries should 
take on the costs and risks associated with implementing a commercially untested 
technology (see Section 6.2.2). The more specific technical challenges of CCS for India 
are discussed under Question 1(a). 
Q. 1(a): What were the specific technical challenges that ultimately prevented 
CCS technology transfer to India?  
When CCS was analysed specifically in an Indian context (see Chapter Seven) it 




unsuitable technology choice. Firstly, India’s main priority for power generation during 
the study period (2007-2010) was energy efficiency, as it operates a very inefficient 
fleet of power stations, combined with significant losses from an outdated transmission 
and distribution system. Therefore, any potential carbon capture would only work on 
new-build power plants, possibly post-combustion capture on supercritical and ultra-
supercritical boilers. However, retrofitting such capture would require a large amount 
of physical space, and India did not factor in any ‘capture-ready’ plans for any of its new 
power plants, given its other reservations on CCS.   
Secondly, Indian coal has a high-ash content and generally of inconsistent quality, 
which would require turbines and capture technology that could deal with this type of 
fuel. The particular characteristics of Indian coal therefore signify that indigenous R&D 
and innovation would be critical for potential CCS implementation in India. Not only 
would this require Government support, but it also implies that more inclusive and 
collaborative forms of technology transfer would be required, i.e. not turnkey projects. 
Therefore, CCS policy objectives, if effective would have had to be politically aligned at 
both domestic and international levels. The findings of the Cambay case study (see 
Section 7.3) indicate that despite there being suitable technological conditions, (e.g. 
new-build coastal power plants based on imported coal, existing transport 
infrastructure, proximity to good storage basin), potential CCS implementation in India 
was ultimately hindered by political dynamics at both the domestic and international 
level, and these were inherently linked.   
Notably, the most challenging aspect of the CCS chain for India is storage (see 
Section 7.2.3 & 7.3). India has limited geological storage capacity in terms of 
accommodating the volume of CO2 emissions anticipated over the lifetime of some the 
newer power plants that are coming online, e.g. the UMPPs. Areas identified as having 
good storage potential were predominantly based in coastal regions and offshore areas 
with known depleted oil and gas reservoirs. However, CO2 storage in these sites could 
only be considered up to a certain point, and, once they reached capacity, a system 
would have been required where the excess CO2 would need to be transported to 
another suitable storage site. For these reasons, CCS implementation was considered 




Q. 2: Can we better understand this lack of adoption by using a sociotechnical 
system analysis in conjunction with theories of international relations? 
IR theories embracing politics provide a useful complement to STS theories, which 
have been criticised for ignoring the international politics of technology development 
(e.g. Street 1992; Fritsch 2011; Meadowcroft 2011; Sylvest 2013). On the other hand, 
STS scholarship provides a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between 
society and technology, whereas IR/IPE scholars typically take a narrow view on 
technology, regarding it as an apolitical and passive entity (see Talalay et al. 1997; 
Herrera 2006; Fritsch 2011; Sylvest 2013). Therefore, an interdisciplinary approach – 
combining IR and STS – delivers a more comprehensive analysis of why India rejected 
CCS implementation during the study period. Each discipline has provided different 
insights, and tools for analysis. The research findings are summarised first through the 
STS perspective and then through the technology and politics viewpoint. These are 
then used in combination to summarise and answer the subsidiary questions (2(a) and 
2(b)).  
Mixed Sociotechnical Identity:     
In Chapter Four CCS technology is shown to comprise of three distinct stages: the 
capture, transport, and permanent geological storage of CO2 emissions from large point 
sources, where each stage has different technological configurations. This allows for 
different combinations of the three stages, giving CCS an inherent flexibility and 
increased applicability in a variety of contexts, but also a confusing identity. For 
example, CCS could entail capture from a coal-fired or gas-fired power plant, where the 
captured CO2 could be transported either by pipeline or ship, and stored in an offshore 
depleted hydrocarbon field, or deep unmineable coal-seams. Each set of choices could 
lead to a very different technological and institutional configuration. This makes CCS 
intrinsically complicated, giving it a mixed identity and, it becomes very challenging to 
define the boundaries of CCS as a technology. It is for this reason that CCS is viewed 
here instead as a sociotechnical system, hence embracing its multiple social and 
technical components, and its complexity. 
Moreover, the mixed identity of CCS can also be explained by looking at its origins. 




mature technological systems, which can be described as incremental innovations 
separately designed for a purpose other than CO2 abatement or climate mitigation. 
Chapter Four argues, therefore, that CCS is essentially a chain of existing technologies, 
whereby their integration in order cut CO2 emissions is the radical or the revolutionary 
aspect of the whole CCS technological system. Again, this gives CCS a mixed identity, 
comprising numerous different objectives, and integrating this suite of technologies 
together as a coherent system for the purpose of climate mitigation poses quite a 
challenge. Specifically, the challenge in this context is to do with the existing cultures 
that are already imbedded within the original mature systems. For example, the 
hydrocarbon industries are inherently based on a philosophy of extraction from 
geological media, therefore there will be a need to alter this inherited culture so that 
subsequent technological innovations are not just about taking material out, but also 
about putting polluting material back in permanently (see Section 2.3.2).  In addition, 
each stage of the CCS chain will inherit the culture from an existing system, and these 
cultures will need to learn to align their goals and work together more effectively (see 
Section 4.3).  
Technological Competitiveness: 
The notion that CCS is in fact a political project with a strong business agenda 
becomes most evident when looking at its role within the UNFCCC negotiations in 
Section 6.3. For example, the debate about CCS was initially sparked by the need for a 
CCS methodology for Malaysia and Vietnam, because both countries were interested in 
gaining funding through the CDM framework for projects that involved hydrocarbon 
extraction or refinement. However, this caused a divide within developing countries, 
and India along with several others such as Brazil and small Island nations were quite 
opposed to its inclusion, arguing that CCS did not contribute to sustainable 
development, which is what the CDM architecture was originally designed to promote. 
Notably, those countries in favour, predominantly Middle Eastern countries, were 
heavily reliant on oil export and trade. Furthermore, the support from Annex 1 
countries largely came from those that have a historic technology base in hydrocarbon 
extraction and exploitation; in this context it was chiefly the UK, Norway, and Australia. 
Also, there was a strong presence of key industrial players, such as large oil & gas 




Therefore, when viewed through the technology and politics realist lens, where states 
are rational actors motivated by competitiveness, it becomes evident that the driving 
forces behind CCS are those with strategic interests. This concept of technological 
competitiveness, which is linked to IR, is explored further below.   
Q. 2(a): How did the UK/developed world framing of the CCS technological 
system influence the process of attempting to implement CCS in India 
during the period 2007-10? 
As discussed in Chapter One, several plans for demonstration and deployment were 
announced in countries like the UK, USA, Australia and Canada in 2007. Furthermore, 
according to the UK and other developed countries, CCS presented a business 
opportunity by means of technology transfer to developing countries, particularly those 
heavily locked-into a fossil energy system. Therefore, CCS also appealed to political 
leaders of certain developed countries at that time, as it would enable their nation to 
maintain a competitive edge. For example, Tony Blair was very keen to push CCS 
technology during the 2005 G8 + 5 Gleneagles summit, by including it in the agenda and 
discussions on energy and climate change. This was bolstered by the development of 
the UK Government’s CAT strategy, developed in the lead up to 2007, drawing upon 
existing UK expertise in hydrocarbon exploitation, specifically with the aim to present a 
coherent technological system to newly industrialising countries like China and India 
(see Section 4.3.1). Therefore, when viewed through technological political realism, it 
can be argued, that CCS was formulated as a political project with strong business 
objectives, bolstering technological competitiveness for developed countries.  
Yet, despite all the impetus generated for CCS and climate mitigation at the start of 
the 21st century, a fully integrated CCS chain is yet to be demonstrated anywhere in the 
world (see Section 4.3). This is largely due to the fact that markets have crashed since 
then, plus the realisation that a project such as CCS cannot rely on the market. This is 
because it requires major infrastructures to be put in place, not just in terms of physical 
structures, but also regulatory frameworks, along with Governments taking up long-
term liability for storage sites. Given that CCS remained a radical vision, which hadn’t 
materialised or been implemented during the study period, India understandably had 




India’s disinclination to implement CCS can also be linked to issues associated with 
the mixed identity of CCS, including its multiple policy objectives. As Chapters Four and 
Seven explain, India was interested in some specific aspects of the CCS chain, but not 
others. However, CCS advocates from developed countries were trying to present CCS 
as a coherent technology for a specific purpose, i.e. climate mitigation, and were not 
sensitive to India’s more nuanced understanding of CCS. Consequently, CCS was 
interpreted by India in a different manner to which it was originally proposed by 
developed countries. For example, rather than seeing CO2 as a waste, India viewed it as 
a resource, and therefore saw CCS more broadly, not solely as a mitigation tool. This is 
also how countries such as the USA and China are looking into developing the 
technology, e.g. Carbon Capture Utilisation and Storage, or CCUS rather than CCS (see 
Section 2.2.2). The term ‘utilisation’ essentially evolved out of the need for an economic 
incentive to cover the very high costs associated with such a large-scale endeavour, 
requiring substantial long-term investment in national infrastructures. Therefore, CO2 
is considered as something of value that can be used, for example, to enhance 
hydrocarbon recovery, or be used as a feedstock for chemical processes such as 
fertilizer production.  
Q. 2(b): What are the principal social and political factors that prevented CCS 
from being considered as a viable climate mitigation option in India? 
One of the aspects highlighted by the interdisciplinary approach in this study is the 
reciprocity between technology and politics. A sociotechnical system in particular can 
have a significant bearing on a state’s identity, which is also connected to the concept of 
technological competiveness (see Section 2.4). With this perspective, the empirical 
evidence indicates that civil nuclear technology was a competing option with CCS 
technology during the study period (2007-10). For example, as Chapter Five explains, 
civil nuclear power is a good comparison with CCS because both contribute to base-
load power, both require large capital-intensive infrastructures, and in both cases there 
is a very significant role of the state, as a customer, regulator and, underwriter. Notably, 
India’s nuclear energy programme is culturally significant; science and technology 
policies implemented shortly after India’s independence in 1947 created national 
institutions and infrastructures, e.g. IITs, which fostered and exemplified India’s 




systems. India’s nuclear energy programme also further demonstrated the importance 
of politics on technological innovation, particularly in terms of international relations 
and technology transfer. Indigenous R&D combined with international technology 
transfer allowed for India to develop its own concept of breeder reactors based on 
thorium. However, the political ramifications of choosing this particular pathway were 
not anticipated by India’s leaders, and notably, inter alia the effects of the Cold War 
slowed down India’s progress in civil nuclear power. Nevertheless, India persevered in 
this area, and the Indo-US nuclear deal of 2008 allowed for the acquisition of nuclear 
fuel for civil purposes. Subsequently, the development of thorium reactors regained 
priority during the study period. Therefore, nuclear power remains a strong ambition, 
and will have a significant role to play in the future of India’s energy system, most likely 
being the favoured technology choice over CCS in terms of GHG mitigation, and de-
carbonising its power sector (see Section 5.3).  
India was already showing signs of carbon lock-in at the time of independence. The 
historical review in Section 5.2 connects India’s coal-fired energy infrastructure with 
the legacy of British colonial rule. Britain’s industrial revolution and colonisation are 
intrinsically linked; coal-fired power plants were first established and run by private 
British firms in India, prior to independence. Similarly, as discussed under the previous 
subsidiary question (2(a)), CCS technology has primarily been conceptualised and 
developed in rich countries (also see Chapter 4). The advocates for CCS were largely 
from developed countries or, from MNCs associated with those countries (see Section 
4.3.1 and Chapter 6). Furthermore, the IP for particular processes within CCS resided 
with MNCs, e.g. injection technology for EOR, and discussions pertaining to technology 
transfer of low-carbon technologies to developing countries were a contentious issue 
within international negotiations (see Section 6.2.2; Ockwell et al. 2010). India felt that 
that the technology transfer process was imbalanced, as it had been typically in the 
past, and therefore more in favour of the UK and other developed countries with a 
strategic interest in developing CCS (see Section 6.2.2). Notably, the empirical evidence 
shows that, indeed, CCS was a political project with commercial objectives and 
particularly advantageous to those nations with strong fossil fuel interests (see Section 
4.3.1; Meadowcroft & Langhelle 2009; de Coninck & Bäckstrand 2011). India’s rejection 




the fundamental and mutual relationship between technology and international 
political relations. Particularly, at the macro-level, whereby the Indian state was 
considered a potential customer.          
Moreover, India’s lack of enthusiasm for CCS is also connected to security issues 
surrounding India’s coal resource, which is currently an unreliable fuel choice. CCS 
technology would perpetuate the use of coal. In social and political terms, Section 7.2.1 
illustrates the grave externalities associated with the coal sector, which could impede 
the process of setting up any potential CCS projects. The most serious being the 
fomented violence and insurgency in resource-rich areas, which is the result of a long 
legacy of unsustainable mining practices and rapid development, displacing and 
depriving the local people. Consequently, coal mines, power plants and other 
associated infrastructure are prime targets for Maoist rebel attacks. Furthermore, 
governance within the mining sector is mired by corruption, making it an area 
regarded as inhospitable to MNCs and foreign investment. All of these factors made 
coal-based CCS an unattractive option for technology transfer, particularly linked to pit-
head projects. Again, the security concerns regarding India’s coal sector demonstrate 
the interdependent relationship between politics and technology, this time at the 
domestic level, which had wider implications for technology transfer and CCS 
implementation in India during the study period.  
8.3 Reflections on the Research Process 
Limitations: 
A key constraint when working with multiple disciplines is that concepts are often 
not able to be explored in depth. The result being an overview and appreciation of 
several different perspectives, rather than the development of a more profound 
understanding of a single theoretical concept. Therefore, even though interdisciplinary 
research produces a more holistic and nuanced understanding of a problem, the 
observations can lack adequate depth. Furthermore, the research methods and tools 
used for this thesis are exploratory in nature, (e.g. case study research and in-depth 
interviews), making the findings difficult to replicate. Although, a survey was used to 




This may be a reflection of the fact that the survey targeted very busy professionals 
connected to CCS. Notably, at the start of the study period CCS had a high profile 
internationally, and it was envisioned that this study would have more policy relevance 
for CCS implementation in emerging economies. However, the 2008 financial crash was 
not anticipated, and so, by the end of the research period there was very little interest 
in CCS development from both policy makers and industry due to financial constraints. 
Therefore, a limitation of the research has been influence of timing, e.g. wider global 
events can impact the policy relevance of the study.  
Lastly, I had underestimated the challenge of managing a multidisciplinary 
supervisory team, especially because it involved disciplines that have not had much 
previous collaboration, e.g. law and geology. In addition, the original supervisory team 
that was put together reflected the policy relevance of CCS at the start of the study 
period, as well as the high profile of CCS technology within the international arena. 
Given the diverse backgrounds of the original supervisory team – geology, law and 
engineering – it was difficult to maintain the interest of supervisors when the study 
was becoming less relevant to their particular research interests. In my case, due to 
issues related with access to technical data, the change in research direction gave more 
prominence to the social sciences and qualitative research methods. Understandably, 
supervisors with more technical science and engineering backgrounds felt that they 
could no longer provide sufficient supervision. In hindsight, a social scientist should 
have had a supervisory role from the start of the study, rather than towards the end.   
Strengths: 
Despite the limitations discussed above, the interdisciplinary research process has 
been an eye-opening experience. Given my physical sciences background, I initially 
approached this research topic with a rather narrow view of technology, i.e. 
considering it as a passive, discrete entity, and had expectations to conduct quantitative 
analysis on this topic. However, this research process has essentially broadened my 
perspective on how technology is developed and applied in real-world contexts. The 
value of such an interdisciplinary project is that it has built upon my existing technical 
knowledge and I now have a more mature understanding of the complexities of the 




provided opportunities to explore other disciplines and learn their ‘language’. For 
example, during the study period, I was able to take LLM classes in international 
environmental law. Although, a lot of the legal knowledge gained was not directly used 
in the thesis, it provided useful background training for fieldwork in contexts, such as 
the international climate negotiations, that I had no prior experience of. Similarly, I had 
the opportunity to participate in conferences such as the British Association of South 
Asian Studies (BASAS), giving me the chance to interact with scholars from historical or 
anthropological traditions. This exposure allowed me to consider the more cultural 
implications of technology development, particularly the impact of British imperialism 
on technology development in post-colonial states. 
Lastly, the interdisciplinary approach has been most useful in supporting the more 
creative elements of the research process. Due to the exploratory nature of the research 
design, I was able to investigate a hypothetical scenario of exporting CO2 from India to 
sites with greater storage potential. This particular aspect of the study also provided an 
opportunity to interact (and in some cases, brainstorm) with non-academic 
practitioners, e.g. shipping and security professionals, who very rarely deal with 
academic projects. This is perhaps the beginnings of transdisciplinary research, which 
not only crosses boundaries between scientific and social science disciplines, but 
additionally involves non-academic practitioners (see Baveye et al. 2014).                     
8.4 Future Research Directions 
Sustainable development in the face of a changing climate is a complex global 
problem, which needs to be addressed using international structures of governance. 
This will require fostering good political relationships that enable the technological 
innovation and transfer required for transitioning to a low-carbon economy. This thesis 
demonstrates the potential to strengthen STS by extending the analytical approach to 
integrate additional areas that are familiar in IR research, which considers politics at 
the macro-level. Often, wider geopolitical and security issues, as well as cultural and 
historical aspects, e.g. those imbedded within past North-South technology transfers 
due to colonisation, can get neglected by STS theories (see Herrera 2006; Fritsch 2011; 
Meadowcroft 2011; Sylvest 2013). Furthermore, STS scholarship largely derives from 




interconnected world innovates. In addition, developing countries have different 
priorities, which influence their receptivity of technological change. IR researchers 
could also benefit from seeing the additional understanding that can be developed by 
considering the STS perspective, as within IR scholarship technology is often assumed 
to be apolitical and exogenous to the international political system. There are political 
dynamics within the technology development process itself that often get bypassed by 
IR scholars, who tend to have a more narrow view of technology. Therefore, future 
research directions could entail the further integration of the concepts and analytical 
tools from these disciplines to produce an interdisciplinary framework that truly 
captures the inherent connection between technology and international political 
relations. 
Examples of other specific cases and research avenues that might benefit from such 
an approach might be, for example, the exploration of CCS in a different country 
context, such as Brazil or South Africa, which have been more receptive to the idea. 
Similarly, this framework could be used to analyse the successful transfer of other low-
carbon technologies, such as solar or onshore wind in India and other developing 
country contexts. The interdisciplinary approach used here does not necessarily have 
to be restricted to large climate mitigation technologies. The integration of STS and IR 
scholarship could also be useful for exploring the transfer of small-scale adaptation 
technologies, e.g. taking a more political constructivist perspective, where individuals 
and small communities have a central role. Furthermore, technology transfer studies 
have largely occurred in a North-South transfer context with entrenched unilateral 
processes. Given the growing influence of BRICS economies, perhaps the dynamics of a 
South-South transfer should also be explored using this interdisciplinary approach. In 
terms of a wider scope, complex areas where technological innovation is associated 
with social progress and poverty alleviation, such as global health research, could also 
find this approach beneficial. 
8.5 Concluding Remarks 
A social science approach offers useful concepts, ideas and tools for analysing why 
India rejected CCS in the period 2007-2010.  Two particularly relevant bodies of 




to bring together insights that can be offered by the tools and methodologies that are 
dominant in these two disciplines.  The thesis therefore uses an STS framework, 
strengthened by insights offered by IR, to offer a more complete analysis of why India 
rejected CCS during the study period than would have been possible if these two 
different disciplines had been used in isolation.  It does this by, for example, 
highlighting the intrinsic relationship between technological change and politics. This is 
particularly relevant for addressing complex societal challenges such as climate change, 
given that we live in a world characterised by interdependence both technologically 
and politically. 
The findings of this research indicated that CCS implementation in India for 
mitigation purposes was not in its national interest, but rather, of benefit to the global 
commons, and specific developed countries with strong fossil fuel interests. India’s 
development and poverty alleviation took precedent, and the Indian state felt that CCS 
did not contribute to its sustainable development objectives. India’s further rejection of 
CCS was due to CCS being presented as a discrete technology by strategically interested 
parties, such as the UK/EU, when it is in reality a complex sociotechnical system, with 
numerous technical configurations and multiple policy objectives. Furthermore, India is 
technically restricted due to the lack of storage capacity that could match the volumes 
of potential CO2 emissions from planned new-build power plants, such as the UMPP 
projects. Overall, the empirical findings indicate that India’s refusal to implement CCS 
during the study period (2007-10) was a complex political decision, at both 
international and domestic levels. 
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Appendix A – Stakeholder Survey  
The following is a blank copy of the survey that was sent to the network of 
stakeholders, formed over the course of fieldwork trips made in 2008. A summary of 
the results is presented in Appendix B. 
Does Carbon Capture & Storage (CCS) technology have a role in 
India? A survey of your thoughts and opinions. 
 
Introduction 
This survey is intended to gather views about how important climate change, energy 
and Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) are perceived to be in India.  It has been sent to 
a wide range of stakeholders with different levels of experience and previous 
knowledge of energy and CCS in India.  Please try to answer as many questions as you 
can.  Since the purpose of this survey is to gather stakeholder views there are no right 
or wrong answers.  
 
The survey is being carried out by Rudra Kapila (University of Edinburgh) with 
financial support from Christian Aid.  It is part of a short research project to assess the 
relevance of CCS technology to India (and China) and the potential (or otherwise) for 
collaboration between the UK (and Europe) and India on this technology being carried 
out by Rudra and colleagues at the University of Surrey.  It is intended that data 
collected in this survey will also be used in Rudra’s PhD research (funded by the UK 
Energy Research Centre) which is analysing the potential role of CCS in India. 
 
Sections I and II include a total of 14 questions that ask for your views on climate 
change, energy and CCS in India.  Section III consists of 3 questions asking for 
background information to assist us in data analysis.  We expect that the survey will 
take around 30 minutes to complete.  Thank you for your time.   
 
Please send responses to Rudra Kapila at Edinburgh University 
(r.v.kapila@sms.ed.ac.uk or fax to +44(0) 131 668 3184) by 14th June 2009 or as soon 
as possible thereafter.  If you would like to receive a copy of the reports produced by 
this project, please provide your e-mail address on the extra sheet circulated with this 







Background information about University of Edinburgh, University of Surrey and Christian 
Aid 
 
University of Edinburgh (Rudra Kapila) 
The School of GeoSciences at the University of Edinburgh explores the factors and 
forces that shape our world and environments in which we live. As a leading 
interdisciplinary group, it aims to understand the interaction between the Earth’s 
geology, atmosphere, oceans, biosphere and human responses and roles in this complex 
interplay. Rudra has a first degree in environmental geosciences and was previously 
based at the Oxford University Centre for the Environment. 
 
Univeristy of Surrey (Hannah Chalmers and Matt Leach) 
The Centre for Environmental Strategy at the University of Surrey is an internationally-
acclaimed centre of excellence on sustainable development. It takes a multi-disciplinary 
approach to the analysis of sustainable systems, integrating strong, engineering-based 
approaches with insights from the social sciences to develop action-oriented, policy-
relevant responses to long-term environmental and social issues.  Hannah and Matt 
both have first degrees in mechanical engineering and also have close links with 
Imperial College London.  
 
Christian Aid 
Christian Aid is a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) whose primary focus is on 
development.  For more than sixty years Christian Aid has been providing relief to 
those hit by disaster, helping people help themselves out of poverty and speaking out 
against injustice.  Christian Aid works with partner organisations in a range of 




Section I: Climate Change and Energy in India 
This section contains 9 questions and is intended to explore your opinions on the 
importance of climate change and energy security for India.  It asks for your views on how 
energy and electricity supply in India might develop between now and 2050.  After each 
question there is space for additional comments.  Please feel free to use this as much or as 
little as you wish. 
 
1. How concerned are you personally about climate change and energy security in 
India? Please check appropriately. 
 
Answer Choices Climate Change Energy Security 
Very concerned   
Moderately concerned   
Neutral   
Not concerned    








2. In your opinion, what is the level of priority given to climate change mitigation and 
energy security by the Indian government? Please check appropriately. 
 
Answer Choices Climate Change Mitigation Energy Security 
Very high priority   
High priority   
Medium priority   
Low priority   
Very low priority   









3. What proportion of private sector companies in India take climate change mitigation 
and energy security seriously? Please check appropriately. 
 
Answer Choices Climate Change Mitigation Energy Security 
No companies   
A small number of companies   
A moderate number of companies   
The majority of companies   








4. In your opinion, which sectors currently contribute the most to India’s total carbon 
dioxide emissions and how might this change? Please identify the three most important 
sectors and rank them in the order in which you think they contribute to carbon 








Transport    
Agriculture    
Commerce & Industry    
Power (electricity generation)    
Defence    
Other (please specify): 
 
   











5. In your opinion, what energy resources are most important to meet the energy 
demand of India and how might this change? Please identify the three most important 
resources and rank them in the order in which you expect them to contribute to India’s 
energy supply mix (where 1 is ‘most significant contribution’). 
 






Oil    
Gas    
Coal    
Traditional Biomass     
Other Biomass (e.g. Jatropha for biofuels etc.)    
Hydro    
Renewables (e.g. Wind, Solar)    
Nuclear    
Other (please specify):  
 
   








6. In your opinion, what energy resources are most important to meet the electricity 
demand of India and how might this change? Please identify the three most important 
resources and rank them in the order in which you expect them to contribute to India’s 
electricity supply mix (where 1 is ‘most significant contribution’). 
 






Oil    
Gas    




Traditional Biomass     
Other Biomass (e.g. combustion at power plants)    
Hydro    
Renewables (e.g. Wind, Solar)    
Nuclear    
Other (please specify): 
 
   








7. In your opinion, what are the main energy security concerns for India now and how 
might this change in the future? Please identify the three most important concerns and 
rank them (where 1 is ‘highest level of concern for India’). 
 






Lack of diversity in sources of energy supply     
Limited or no access to electricity for large rural population    
Inadequate energy infrastructure    
Highly dependent on imported oil    
Highly dependent on imported gas    
Highly dependent on imported coal    
Highly dependent on traditional biomass    
Other (please specify): 
 
   











8. If India is planning to invest in a low-carbon and energy secure future, then which 
technologies should be given investment priority for development by the Indian 
government and how might this change in the future? Please identify the three most 
important technologies and rank them (where 1 is ‘likely to be given highest priority’). 
 






Wind Energy    
Solar    
Marine Energy (e.g. Tidal, Wave)    
Hydro    
Nuclear    
CCS    
Geothermal    
Microgeneration    
Other (please specify): 
 
   








9. If India is planning to invest in a low-carbon and energy secure future, then which 
technologies will be given investment priority for development by private sector 
industry in India and how might this change in the future? Please identify the three 
most important technologies and rank them (where 1 is ‘likely to be given highest 
priority’). 
 






Wind Energy    
Solar    
Marine Energy (e.g. Tidal, Wave)    




Nuclear    
CCS    
Geothermal    
Microgeneration    
Other (please specify): 
 
   








Please feel free to make any additional comments on India’s energy sector and 



















Section II: CCS in India 
Some of the questions in Section I explored whether CCS may have a role to play in 
India in your opinion.  This section contains 5 questions and considers some more 
detailed issues around how CCS could be deployed in India, if it is decided that it is a 
suitable technology to be used in the Indian context.  As in Section I, after each question 
there is space for additional comments.  Please feel free to use this as much or as little 
as you wish. 
 
 
10. A number of different people and organisations talk and write about carbon capture 
and storage (CCS), but they don’t always have a common understanding of what CCS is.  









11. Please read the following statements and indicate whether you agree, disagree or 
have no opinion of them. 
 
 Statement Agree Disagree No 
Opinion 
11.1 The existing financial mechanisms (e.g. CDM, Carbon 
Markets) are insufficient to support and promote clean 
energy solutions. 
   
11.2 The international community is not doing enough to 
create a suitable framework for facilitating technology 
transfer. 
   
11.3 The international community is not doing enough to 
promote technology research & development 











One definition of CCS is that it is trapping the carbon dioxide emissions from power 
stations and industrial sites, then transporting it to be buried deep underground so that 
it does not escape into the atmosphere.  Please use this definition for the remaining 
questions in this section. 
 
12. Imagine that developed countries have demonstrated the full CCS chain to be safe, 
secure and functional at a large scale. If India were willing to try out the technology in 
some initial projects and then decides that wider deployment would be appropriate, 
then who should be responsible for covering costs and providing training?  Please 
identify and rank the three most important groups for each aspect (A, B, C & D) that 
should make a contribution in your opinion (where 1 is ‘most significant contribution’). 
 
 A. Training 
for initial 
projects 
B. Finance for 
initial 
projects 
C. Training  
for wider 
deployment 
D. Finance  
for wider 
deployment 
Developed country Governments     
Developed country private sector     
Developed country public     
Indian Government     
Indian private sector     
Indian public     
Other (please specify): 
 








13. In your opinion, what are the most important actions that should be taken by 
developed countries (such as the UK, USA etc.) to support the development and 
deployment of low-carbon technology in India, including CCS if it if it is decided that it 














14. In your opinion, what are the most significant challenges to implementing CCS 
technology in India? Please identify and rank the three challenges that you think are 
most important (where 1 is ‘most likely to prevent CCS implementation in India’). 
 






Technology readiness   
Construction costs   
Running costs   
Availability of skilled people   
Safety of carbon dioxide capture process   
Safety of carbon dioxide transport   
Safety of geological storage of carbon dioxide   
Public acceptability   
Political acceptability   
Financing mechanisms (e.g. loans, CDM etc.)   
Water supply   
Inadequate geological storage capacity   
High ash content in Indian coal   
Other (please specify): 
 
  






























Section III: Background information 
This section contains 3 questions in total and is intended to collect information to help 
us analyse any significant differences between the perspectives of different stakeholder 
groups who have participated in this survey.   
 
15. Do you work in the energy field directly? (Please delete appropriately) 
Yes 
No (if no, then please skip question 16) 
 
16. What is the main focus area of your work? (check all that apply) 
  
Oil & gas industry   
Coal industry    
Power industry   
Transmission/distribution  
Renewable energy   
Energy Policy    
Energy financing   
Regulation    
Other (please specify) _____________________________ 
 
17. What is your profession? 
Policymaker    
Regulator    
Technical expert   
Business planner   
Policy analyst    
Lobbyist/campaigner  
Researcher    




Thank you for your time in filling out this survey, your opinions and comments are very 
much valued and appreciated. 
 
Data collected in this survey will be presented in a research report written by Rudra 
and colleagues at the University of Surrey for the Christian Aid project.  It will also be 
used in Rudra’s PhD thesis and related academic papers.  The use of data will follow 
standard academic practice, so your identity (including company/affiliation) will not be 
reported although your profession and sector may be, where appropriate.  No other use 





Appendix B – Survey Results Summary 
Below is a summary of the results of the survey in Appendix A. The survey was carried 
out in May - June 2009 and, it was designed to explore stakeholder views on the 
prospects of CCS technology in India. This Appendix shows original data that has also 
been published in Kapila et al. (2009).  The data was collected and analysed solely by 
Kapila. The more detailed version of these results can also be found on pages 23-36 of 
the original report (available at: 
http://www.sccs.org.uk/expertise/reports.html#sccsworkingpapers).  
 
Section I – General Attitudes to Climate Change and Energy in India 
The results in this section refer to the following questions, with the choices for answers 
in brackets: 
 
Q1 – How concerned are you personally about climate change and energy security 
in India? (I am very concerned/moderately concerned/neutral/not concerned/not 
concerned at all) 
Thirteen out of the 18 respondents were ‘very concerned’ about climate change, 
and fourteen out of the 18 were ‘very concerned’ about energy security. Some 
respondents commented that these two challenges needed to be addressed collectively 
because of India’s increasing energy demand for development and that the impacts of 
climate change would largely affect the poor. A few were moderately concerned about 
climate change in comparison to energy security, commenting that “energy security is 
extremely essential for sustained economic growth and poverty alleviation,” and that 
climate change was an issue that would gain equal importance at a later stage in India. 
One respondent was of the opinion that “the energy policy and development of India 
will have a significant impact on global climate.” 
 
Q2 – In your opinion, what is the level of priority given to climate change mitigation 
and energy security by the Indian Government? (The Indian Government gives climate 
change mitigation and energy security very high priority/high priority/medium 
priority/low priority/very low priority/I don’t know) 
The majority of respondents thought that climate change mitigation was given a 
‘medium’ to ‘high’ level of priority. In comparison, the majority thought that energy 
security was given a ‘high’ to ‘very high’ level of priority by the Indian Government. One 
comment was, “energy security has been on the top of the agenda for quite some time 






Q3 – What proportion of private sector companies in India takes climate change 
mitigation and energy security seriously? (No companies/a small number of 
companies/a moderate number of companies/the majority of companies/I don’t know if 
any companies take climate change mitigation and energy security seriously) 
The greater part of responses considered that a ‘small’ to ‘moderate’ number of 
companies took climate change mitigation and energy security seriously. Respondents 
commented that the motivation to undertake any mitigation measure was primarily 
business driven for survival and growth, and therefore likely to be less of a concern at 
present to the private sector. It was noted, however, that the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) had been “quite instrumental in spreading more information about 
climate change mitigation in India.” Nevertheless, one stakeholder commented that 
from what they had observed in the Indian business and academic communities, 
climate change was generally regarded as the “environmental fad of the decade, instead 
of a serious problem.” They thought that there was still “an acute lack of awareness” 
outside a very small group of people in Delhi and other metropolises in India. It was 
commented further that “individual companies view energy security from their own 
short-term perspective rather than the wider context of [the] long-term future of 
generations to come.”  
 
Q4 – In your opinion, which sectors currently contribute the most to India’s total 
carbon dioxide emissions and how might this change? Please identify the three 
most important sectors and rank them in the order in which you think they 
contribute to carbon dioxide emissions (where 1 is ‘highest contribution’). 
(Transport, Agriculture, Commerce & Industry, Power (electricity generation), Defence, 
Other, I don’t know) 
 
Rank Now 2030 2050 
1 Power Power Transport 
2 Transport Commerce & Industry Commerce & Industry, 
Power 
3 Commerce & Industry Transport Agriculture 
 
The sectors respondents identified as the current most significant contributors 
to climate change were ‘power,’ ‘transport,’ and ‘commerce & industry,’ where a clear 
majority (16/18) ranked the power sector at the top, transport second and the 
commerce and industry sector at third. By 2030, most respondents still ranked the 
power sector as the top contributor, but commerce and industry moved to second and 




and that this was going to be the development objective for the next couple of decades.”  
In addition, it was thought that after thermal power plants, the steel sector in particular 
was most carbon intense. 
  The greater part of the responses expected the transport sector to eventually 
become the top contributor to India’s carbon emissions by 2050, and that power, 
commerce and industry would be jointly ranked as second. By 2050, the majority 
thought that the agriculture sector would have the third highest contribution to India’s 
overall carbon emissions. These non-CO2 contributors to the greenhouse gas emissions 
are typically difficult to reduce below a certain level, partly since they are associated 
with food production and are difficult to avoid. 
 
Q5 – In your opinion, what energy resources are most important to meet the energy 
demand of India and how might this change? Please identify the three most 
important resources and rank them in the order in which you expect them to 
contribute to India’s energy supply mix (where 1 is ‘most significant contribution’). 
(Oil, Gas, Coal, Traditional Biomass, Other Biomass, Hydro, Renewables, Nuclear, Other, I 
don’t know) 
 
Rank Now 2030 2050 
1 Coal Coal Coal 
2 Oil Oil & Gas Oil & Gas 
3 Gas Hydro & Renewables Renewables 
 
Coal was ranked outright as the main energy resource to meet India’s energy 
demand at present, and it is expected to remain the primary choice of fuel to meet 
energy demand through to 2050. The majority also considered oil and gas to be an 
important part of the current energy resource mix, ranking them second and third, 
respectively. By 2030, oil and gas were jointly ranked at second, and hydropower and 
renewables collectively formed the 3rd most important resource expected to be used to 
meet energy demand. By 2050, it was expected that renewables such as wind and solar 
would become more prominent than hydro and form the third most important energy 
resource for India. Though most stakeholders saw a shift in favour of renewable 
sources of energy, it was noted that this would hinge upon whether the cost of 
renewables-based electricity could be “drastically brought down through technology 
break-throughs, international cooperation, and high volume production of renewable 
based generation technologies.” Another comment made in terms of energy resources 




of the bio-fuel industry”, and that land acquisition for the renewable sector could 
become an issue in the future. 
 
Q6 – In your opinion, what energy resources are most important to meet the 
electricity demand of India and how might this change? Please identify the three 
most important resources and rank them in the order in which you expect them to 
contribute to India’s electricity supply mix (where 1 is ‘most significant 
contribution’). (Oil, Gas, Coal, Traditional Biomass, Other Biomass, Hydro, Renewables, 
Nuclear, Other, I don’t know) 
Rank Now 2030 2050 
1 Coal Coal Coal 
2 Hydro Hydro Nuclear 
3 Nuclear Nuclear Hydro & Renewables 
 
Coal was again ranked as the most important resource through to 2050 for 
meeting India’s electricity demand. Hydropower was ranked as the second most 
important resource for electricity at present and through to 2030. By 2050, it is 
expected to drop to third position as part of a renewables mix that includes solar and 
wind. Responses consistently featured nuclear in the electricity mix, where the majority 
see it as the third most important resource at present and through to 2030. By 2050 
nuclear is envisioned to become second to coal in terms of electricity generation. It was 
noted that certain technologies such as hydro and nuclear had yet to be developed for 
their full potential, but until then, “coal is king.” 
 
Q7 – In your opinion, what are the main energy security concerns for India now and 
how might this change in the future? Please identify the three most important 
concerns and rank them (where 1 is ‘highest level of concern for India’). (Lack of 
diversity in sources of energy supply, Limited or no access to electricity for large rural 
population, Inadequate energy infrastructure, Highly dependent on imported oil, Highly 
dependent on imported gas, Highly dependent on imported coal, Highly dependent on 
traditional biomass, Other, I don’t know) 
Rank Now 2030 2050 
1 Limited/no access for 
rural population 
Dependence on 
imported oil, gas & coal 
Dependence on 
imported oil, gas & coal 









3 Inadequate energy 
infrastructure 
Limited/no access for 
rural population 
Limited/no access for 
rural population 
 
When asked to consider India’s main energy security concerns, the greater part 
of respondents thought that the ‘limited or no access to electricity for the large rural 
population’ was of primary concern at present, with ‘dependence on imported oil’ and 
‘inadequate energy infrastructure’ as second and third, respectively. By 2030 and 
through to 2050, respondents expected that dependence on imported oil and other 
fossil fuels such as coal and gas will become the main concern, with inadequate energy 
infrastructure ranked second. During this period it is envisioned that the lack of power 
to the rural poor will still be an issue, with respondents ranking it as the third most 
important energy security concern.  
 
Q8 – If India is planning to invest in a low-carbon and energy secure future, then 
which technologies should be given investment priority for development by the 
Indian Government and how might this change in the future? Please identify the 
three most important technologies and rank them (where 1 is ‘likely to be given 
highest priority’). (Wind Energy, Solar, Marine Energy, Hydro, Nuclear, CCS, Geothermal, 
Microgeneration, Other, I don’t know) 
Rank Now 2030 2050 
1 Nuclear & Hydro Solar Solar & Nuclear 
2 Wind Nuclear Hydro 
3 Solar CCS & Hydro CCS 
 
For the current Indian Government, nuclear and hydro were equally considered 
as the current top investment priority for India, with wind and solar as second and 
third, respectively. By 2030, the majority ranked outright solar as the main investment 
priority, with nuclear second, and CCS and hydro equally at third. By 2050, 
stakeholders ranked nuclear and solar equally as the top investment priority for the 
Indian Government, with hydro ranked second and CCS third. One respondent was of 
the opinion that “alternate renewable technologies are still in a nascent development 
stage, and the scene will change if R&D models improve or transfer of technology is 
undertaken.” It was also noted that “CCS will remain at the end of the technology 







Q9 – If India is planning to invest in a low-carbon and energy secure future, then 
which technologies will be given investment priority for development by private 
sector industry in India and how might this change in the future? Please identify 
the three most important technologies and rank them (where 1 is ‘likely to be given 
highest priority’). (Wind Energy, Solar, Marine Energy, Hydro, Nuclear, CCS, Geothermal, 
Microgeneration, Other, I don’t know) 
Rank Now 2030 2050 
1 Solar & Wind Solar & CCS CCS 
2 Hydro Wind & Hydro Solar 
3 Microgen Microgen Nuclear 
 
Stakeholders considered solar and wind to be equally most important, hydro as 
second and microgen as third for current investment by private sector industry in 
India. By 2030, CCS was thought to be as important as solar in terms of investment 
priority. Wind and hydro were ranked second and microgen as third. By 2050, CCS was 
ranked outright as the top investment priority for private industry, with solar and 
nuclear as second and third, respectively. It is important to note here that roughly half 
the respondents answered ‘don’t know’ for the 2050 option, a few commenting that it 
was too difficult to gauge at this point what direction the private industry would take in 
the future.  
 
Section II – CCS in India 
This section of the survey asked five questions in total, specifically on CCS 
technology and whether it may have a role to play in India. The questions also consider 
more detailed issues around how CCS could be deployed in India, if it is decided that it 
is a suitable technology to be used in the Indian context. Results are given after each 
question with choices for answers in brackets, where relevant. 
 
Q10 – A number of different people and organisations talk and write about carbon 
capture and storage (CCS), but they don’t always have a common understanding of 
what CCS is. Please could you explain what you think CCS technology includes? 
All responses seemed to indicate that the respondents were quite familiar with the CCS 
paradigm, with answers including: 
 “Technologies to de-carbonise fossil fuel combustion/gasification. A process 
by which CO2 from the combustion of fossil fuels is prevented from being 




transported, and stored/sequestered, using geological storage/conversion 
processes.” 
 “It includes capture of carbon dioxide from the flue gases generated due to 
combustion of carbonaceous fuel, and capture of CO2 generated during 
production syngas or producer gas or water gas. The captured CO2 is 
separated from capturing media to obtain pure CO2. The pure CO2 is 
transported in supercritical state to the identified geological site for storage.” 
  “As per my understanding CCS should include separation of CO2 from source 
emissions in purest possible concentration using adsorptive or membrane 
separations and subsequently to be sequestered for permanent storage. 
Alternatively, if close loop is to be followed then CO2 should be used for its 
valorisation to produce hydrocarbon fuels.” 
  “As the name suggests, CCS includes capture, storage and transportation of 
captured CO2 to sinks – geological seams, oceans. Capturing is most capital 
intensive in a CCS project followed by transportation via pipeline or ships. 
While post-combustion technology in a power and O&G104 sector is more 
common – a mature technology market, it is economically feasible in cluster of 
industries to reduce the costs. Pre-combustion technology is more common in 
emerging technology market, while oxyfuel is in early development phase.” 
 
Q11 – Please read the following statements and indicate whether you agree, 
disagree, or have no opinion of them: 
 
Q11.1. “The existing financial mechanisms (e.g. CDM, Carbon Markets etc.) are 
insufficient to support and promote clean energy solutions.” (I agree/disagree/have 
no opinion) 
The majority of stakeholders (13/18) agreed with the statement above, three 
respondents disagreed, and two had no opinion. In the context of the CDM and carbon 
markets, it was commented that “there is very little support and incentives for CDM for 
SME’s [small and medium enterprises] in developing countries such as India.” One 
respondent commented further: “I agree with the view of some of the technocrats in 
India that CDM and carbon markets of the future will not give enough support to CCS, 
for which investment is much higher than other low carbon technologies.” Another 
respondent concurred: “In my opinion, policy changes that allow CCS to be part of the 
CDM will be insufficient due to the energy penalty of the technology.” 
 
                                                             




Q11.2. “The international community is not doing enough to create a suitable 
framework for facilitating technology transfer.” (I agree/disagree/have no opinion) 
The greater part of respondents (14/18) agreed with the statement above, one 
person disagreed, and the remaining three had no opinion. The overall process of 
technology transfer was met with some scepticism; it was considered to “just mean 
being directed to a private company, which in turn charges large amounts as fees to 
share the knowledge of the technology.” Several additional comments were made 
regarding the issue of technology transfer including: 
 “The Doha declaration on Environmental Goods and Services needs to be 
brought in line with carbon capture technologies to reduce the trade barriers, 
so that transfer of technology can penetrate at a faster pace.” 
 “There has been very limited financing and technology transfer from 
developed to developing countries. Also the technologies being given are not 
necessarily those which developing countries are currently comfortable with at 
the moment.” 
 “Technology transfer is a difficult issue due to the corporate structure of many 
energy companies and equipment suppliers, especially when met by large 
nationalised companies.” 
 
Q11.3. “The international community is not doing enough to promote technology 
research & development.” (I agree/disagree/have no opinion) 
There was a more varied response to this statement, with half of the 
respondents in agreement, six out of the eighteen disagreeing, and the remaining three 
having no opinion. It was noted that “R&D is universal, so that seems to be going ok, it’s 
the transfer part that is the issue, as is nationally appropriate energy research.” One 
stakeholder was of the opinion that activities are in place, but more effort is needed to 
involve India more in fundamental research and technology development. It was 
commented further that the “development of solutions required have to be more 
specific/designed for India – the technology needs to be appropriate.”  
 
Q12 – Imagine that developed countries have demonstrated the full CCS chain to 
be safe, secure and functional at a large scale. If India were willing to try out the 
technology in some initial projects and then decides that wider deployment would 
be appropriate, then who should be responsible for covering costs and providing 
training for the following aspects? Aspects: (a) training for initial projects; (b) 
financing for initial projects; (c) training for wider deployment; (d) finance for 
wider deployment. (The three most important groups that should make a contribution 
are developed country governments/developed country private sector/developed country 
















































(a) Training for initial projects: the greater part of the respondents (17/18) thought 
that the developed country governments should pay for the training for initial 
projects. The developed country private sector and the Indian Government 
were ranked second and third, respectively. 
(b) Financing for initial projects: the majority (17/18) of respondents thought that 
governments of developed countries should also provide financing for initial 
projects. The developed country private sector and the Indian private sector 
were considered as the second and third most important groups that should 
make a contribution. 
(c) Training for wider deployment: it was thought by most (15/18) that 
responsibility for covering costs for training for wider deployment should be 
carried out by the private sector industry from developed countries foremost. 
In addition, governments from developed countries and India were thought to 
be equally important after the private sector, in terms of training.  
(d) Financing for wider deployment: developed country governments were ranked 
first in regards to covering the costs for wider deployment. The Indian private 
sector industries along with the Indian Government were thought to be equally 
the second most important group responsible for financing projects. The 
private sector from developed nations was ranked third. 
 
One stakeholder commented that this question was “rather tricky, just because the 
differentiation between governments, public and private sector is hazy and taxation 
can unite those three. In addition, it should be noted that several respondents thought 
that there should have been another separate option as ‘International Finance 
Institutions’ such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and the Asian 




would have appeared in the ranking of organisations that have a role in financing CCS 
projects.  
 
Q13 – In your opinion, what are the most important actions that should be taken by 
developed countries (such as the UK, USA etc.) to support the development and 
deployment of low-carbon technology in India, including CCS if it is decided that it 
is a suitable technology to be used in the Indian context? 
This was an open-ended question, which gathered a variety of responses. 
Suggestions were made to support development by “facilitating vendor to vendor 
transfer of technology for components and/or CCS,” and creating India as a low-cost 
manufacturing hub, “as India does not have sufficient geological seams for storage, 
power plants are scattered and pipeline transfer could be costly.” Further comments 
made in regards to CCS development were that the focus should be on “global R&D”, 
whereby facilitating frameworks for setting up a carbon price, technical and 
institutional capacity building, assuring technology transfer and financial aid are all 
very important factors.  
One stakeholder was of the opinion that CCS demonstration plants should be 
built and operated as soon as possible in developed countries, followed by funding for a 
demonstration plant in India. This would require the development of international 
industrial and academic research collaboration to develop and deploy low carbon 
technologies.  They added that “it is critical that whatever technologies are developed 
and deployed, they must be appropriate for India (in terms of geography, society, 
development)” and that in order to achieve this “full engagement and collaboration is 
required” whereby “India gets (part) ownership of the technologies.”  
 
Q14 – In your opinion, what are the most significant challenges to implementing 
CCS technology in India? Please identify and rank the three challenges that you 
think are most important in the context of initial projects and for widespread 
deployment. (The top three challenges to implementing CCS are technology 
readiness/construction costs/running costs/availability of skilled people/safety of carbon 
dioxide capture process/safety of carbon dioxide transport/safety of geological storage of 
carbon dioxide/public acceptability/politically acceptability/financing mechanisms (e.g. 
loans, CDM etc.)/water supply/inadequate geological storage capacity/high-ash content 
in Indian coal/other/I don’t know) 
Rank Initial projects Widespread deployment 
1 Technology readiness Technology readiness 





3 Political acceptability Construction & running costs 
4 Financing mechanisms Political acceptability 
5 Safety of geological storage Safety of geological storage 
 
Most respondents ranked at least five to eight challenges in response to this 
question, although only three were asked for, and the ‘top five challenges’ are, 
therefore, reported here based on the rankings given by the respondents.  It is also 
important to note that some of the respondents thought that these options were not 
mutually exclusive.  For example, as technology develops changes in costs can be 
expected.  This indicates that any actions taken to address challenges to CCS must 
consider a relatively complex web of interrelated issues if they are to successfully 
support demonstration and/or deployment.  
General comments made on implementing CCS projects gave the impression 
that the concept of CCS is far from established as an option for deployment in India - 
bringing it forward first at the government policy level, then at the public level, or 
possibly both together. ‘Technology readiness’ was regarded as the main challenge in 
terms of initial projects and widespread deployment, where the general feeling was 
that CCS had to be technologically demonstrated in developed countries before it could 
be applied to India. In terms of ‘technology readiness’ in particular, it was generally 
thought that trying out CCS with low efficiency plants would reduce their overall 
efficiency even further. One stakeholder was of the opinion that “due to the age of the 
plants in India, their efficiency is about 35% and therefore not suitable for CCS, as 40% 
is recommended as a good figure for installing capture capability.” 
A few stakeholders thought it would be particularly interesting to see how CCS 
would cope with the high ash content of Indian coal, or whether it required to be based 
on imported coal. It was emphasized that “due to the characteristics of Indian coal, the 
technologies being developed in the West, such as IGCC, might not be a viable option for 
India [due to the loss of efficiency by using high-ash coal], but post-combustion capture 
might be a good option.” There was the general view that if India were to come closer to 
adopting the technology, then research specific to Indian coal conditions was needed. 
Furthermore, stakeholders viewed the technology in its current state to be too 
expensive, not only in construction but also in terms of running costs. Possible 
repercussions highlighted included “additional fossil fuel emissions, auxiliary power 
consumption, deterioration in efficiency of the generation and the cost involved in 
supplementing the generation due to the loss of efficiency.” In addition, a comment was 
made on the concept of ‘capture-readiness’: “Building a power plant that is ‘capture-
ready’ makes it less efficient by 1.5-2% because of turbine design, which has to allow 
for the secondary stream of steam for the capture facility. Cumulatively, these losses 




place (which could take ten years or more), and there is no certainty that the plant will 
be fitted with the capture facility in the future.”  
Finally, it is interesting to note that stakeholders from different sectors within 
industry had varying viewpoints on the potential for implementing CCS technology. For 
example, it was commented: “Private power generators such as Reliance have little 
incentive to be involved in CCS since they have no influence over pricing of electricity. 
The central and state governments decide the tariff structure for electricity. This 
implies that the private players have no way of increasing the tariff, especially if they 
implement CCS and pass on the cost to the consumer.” In contrast, it was noted that the 
petroleum industry is more likely to have an interest in CCS due to the incentive of EOR, 
citing examples such as ONGC’s Ankaleshwar/Hazira project and the MoU signed with 
StatoilHydro in 2008105. However, since then the StatoilHydro deal has reached a 
stalemate due to disagreements on the way the project was heading106. 
 
                                                             
105 See: http://www.statoilhydro.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2008/Pages/CooperationIndia.aspx 




Appendix C – Overview of Survey Participants 
Below is a table of the organisations that participated in the survey presented in 
Appendix A. This information was collated from the responses to questions 15-17 in 
Section III of the survey. It should be noted that even though there were 18 
respondents out of the 65 invited to take part, only 13 organisations are listed below. 
This is because in some cases, more than one survey was sent to an individual 
organisation, so that a range of professionals that are typically present in a single 
institution due to the multidisciplinary nature of the subject, were included in the 
sample. For example, surveys were returned by a business planner and a technical 









Technical expert 5 
KBR Technical expert & 
business planner; oil & 
gas industry, energy 
policy, power 
3 & 4 
Schlumberger Technical expert & 
business planner; 
energy financing 
1 & 2 
Reliance Industries Ltd. Technical expert & 
business planner; 
energy financing 









Research The Energy Resources 
Institute (TERI) 
Researcher & policy 
analyst; renewables, 
energy policy 




education & research 
15 
Integrated Research and 
Action for Development 
(IRADe) 
Researcher & policy 
analyst; renewables, 
energy policy 
10 & 11 
Heriot Watt University Academic; energy 
education & research 
6 
University of Nottingham Academic; energy 
education & research 
7 
Indian Institute of 
Technology, Mumbai 
Researcher; renewables, 








World Institute of 








Appendix D – Technical Interview Questions 
The following is an interview guide that was sent to Cairn Energy containing a set of 
technical questions. This was sent to the Cairn Energy team in advance so that they had 
an idea of the type of information that was to be discussed, but also it was like a ‘wish 
list’ of the kind of data required. Incidentally, not all of the information requested was 
provided because some of the data was considered to be commercially sensitive. Also, 
permission could not be obtained by the Indian Government to use or publish the data, 
even if discussed informally. 
Location & Maps: 
- Location/map of main production field(s) in basin 
- Possible to get map of top of reservoir? 
- What is the projection and sphaeroid of the map? (needed for GIS) 
- Are there any natural sources of CO2? Locations will help to add to the map 
- How close is the field to the refinery? 
 
Reservoir Attributes: 
- What were the oil and gas reserves in place estimated to be? I.e. STOIIP & GIIP 
- What is the production per month? 
- How long will production last? I.e. Cessation of Production date 
- If production has stopped, what percentage has been recovered?  
- How deep is the reservoir? 
- Possible to get a composite well log? 
- What is the porosity? 
- What is the permeability? (e.g. horizontal/vertical) 
- What is the current reservoir pressure?  
- What was the reservoir pressure originally? 
- What is the API gravity? 
- Are there any saline aquifers nearby? Is there aquifer support during 
production?  (E.g. high, med, low?) 
- What is the sand thickness and layering of reservoirs? 
- Has the reservoir been water-flooded? 
 
Thoughts on Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR): 
- What do they perceive are the main barriers to EOR? E.g. costs? Legal? 
Practicalities? 
 
- If they were considering EOR, what would they need to know? What kind of info 
do they need? 
 
- What would be required to make it happen? E.g. pipe network? Logistics? What 





- What are ONGCs plans in the area? Does this affect their plans? 
 
- Under what circumstances would they build pipelines? 
 
- What are the rival technologies for EOR? (e.g. new wells & cost; polymer 




I am not looking for commercially sensitive data but rather general or even old 
information that I could use to build a case study around the Cambay basin. If required 
to, we are willing to sign a confidentiality MoU. This is a standard procedure that our 
institute goes through because it is quite common to have collaborations between 
industry and the University of Edinburgh. We intend to publish the general conclusion, 
but would ensure that any data will not be attributable to specific sites or companies if 
required to do so. 
 
                                                             
